This paper introduces the "open global investment" (OGI) model, a proposed governance framework for artificial general intelligence (AGI) development. The core idea is that AGI development could proceed within one or more corporations in a context that (a) encourages wide international shareholding, (b) reduces the risk of expropriation, (c) implements strengthened corporate governance processes, (d) operates within a government-defined framework for responsible AI development (and/or a public-private partnership), and (e) includes additional international agreements and governance measures to whatever extent is desirable and feasible. We argue that this model, while very imperfect, offers advantages in terms of inclusiveness, incentive compatibility, and practicality compared to prominent alternatives—such as proposals modelled on the Manhattan project, CERN, or Intelsat—especially in scenarios with short AGI timelines.
Introduction
Various governance models have been proposed for projects that aim to develop and deploy transformative AI.[2],[3] Some have favored an American-led "Manhattan project for AI"—a vision in which the U.S. competes with an analogous project in China in a battle for perpetual cosmic hegemony.[4] Others have proposed an ownership and governance structure consisting of a U.S.-based nonprofit or public benefit corporation.[5] Others still have explored more internationally cooperative models, such as a "CERN for AI" or an "Intelsat for AI".[6]
Governance models may emphasize different objectives, such as democratic oversight, national security, international cooperation, legitimacy, economic efficiency and dynamism, equitable benefit sharing, AI safety, free enterprise, wise stewardship, scientific advancement, operational security, or responsible deployment. No governance structure can fully achieve all these goals. Transformative AI will, moreover, pose special challenges beyond those present in most other policy contexts—including the risk of misaligned or misused AI causing existential catastrophe, and the potential for extreme concentrations of power. Any governance design will therefore be subject to criticism for falling short on some reasonable desiderata. The choice will be one between imperfect options.
Furthermore, as we approach a potential intelligence explosion, governance structures will come under great strain. This is in part because the stakes become extraordinarily high and in part because the context in which they operate will undergo rapid and profound change.[7] Thus, it is not enough that a given structure would be satisfactory if it governed the development of transformative AI: it is also needful that the structure be robust enough to maintain its integrity throughout the process, and incentive-compatible enough to retain the support of relevant actors—and to be adopted in the first place.
This paper outlines a paradigm that we call the "open global investment" (OGI) model. We then assess how OGI meets various governance desiderata compared to alternative models, and tentatively conclude that it appears relatively attractive.
The open global investment model
Core features and variations
In the OGI model, AGI development is led by one or more ventures that are widely open to international investment and that operate under a government-defined regulatory framework, buttressed by enhanced government assurances and assistance. The status quo already roughly approximates this model, though we could move closer to the ideal. If we favor the OGI model, it could mean that we should strive to move closer to its ideal form; and perhaps more importantly, it could mean that we should resist proposals (like nationalization) that would remove us farther away from it.
This core idea can take different forms depending on whether there is a single lead AGI company ("OGI-1") or several ("OGI-N"); on whether the companies are domiciled in the United States ("US-OGI"); and on what supporting features and structures are put in place.
The following analysis adopts a somewhat U.S.-centric perspective, reflecting current realities in AGI development and the surrounding Western discourse. However, the OGI model itself is geographically neutral—it could in principle be implemented by any technologically capable nation as host, or by multiple different countries as hosts for different AGI ventures.
Example (US-OGI-1)
A fairly full-fledged version of the US-OGI-1 version (a U.S.-domiciled single AGI firm) could look like this:
(a) A publicly traded corporation ("AGI Corp") either already exists or is floated, domiciled in the U.S. AGI Corp could be a standard corporation or a Delaware public benefit corporation.
(b) Many people buy shares, including private individuals both in the U.S. and around the world. Sovereign wealth funds and other investment vehicles also buy significant chunks. If there is an IPO, it is structured such that initial ownership is widely distributed.
(c) There may be multiple share classes with different voting rights. For example:
Class A shares: profit participation and 1 vote/share
Class B shares: profit participation and 10 votes/share
Class C shares: profit participation and 1,000 votes/share
These numbers are merely for illustration. The key point is that profit participation and voting rights can be partially separated—though ideally both should be widely distributed. For instance, everyone worldwide might be able to buy Class A shares, while Class B and Class C shares could be restricted to citizens of countries that agree to a responsible AI framework; and class C shares could be allocated as founder shares to key parties.
(d) Foreign governments and their citizens, including major powers that might otherwise be considered strategic rivals, are permitted and indeed encouraged to buy shares in AGI Corp (perhaps up to some high limit, such as 20% for any single country).
(e) To help AGI Corp to be the first to develop AGI and to have a big lead, cooperating governments could take various actions, such as:
Provide subsidies, tax breaks, regulatory waivers, etc.
Pass regulation that impedes competitors (such as restricting access to advanced AI chips, etc.)
(f) AGI Corp could also buy up competitors and merge them into its own efforts. Given the corporation's special status and official sanction, and the headwinds its competitors can expect to face, it might have a low cost of capital, enabling it to make such acquisitions. The USG could agree to waive antitrust enforcement.
(g) The charter of the corporation might be created or amended to strengthen governance procedures beyond those typical of Fortune 500 companies. For instance, the board could meet more frequently and have various resources and provisions for internal oversight.
(h) Ideally, some significant portion of the corporation's shares are acquired by independent organizations and not-for-profits whose remit is to benefit all of humanity and to serve other moral missions. This might occur because the original IPOing corporation already had such entities on its cap table. Philanthropic organizations can also buy additional shares on the open market.
(i) AGI Corp is subject to the laws of the land where it is domiciled. Assuming a US-OGI model, the USG thus retains the ability to pass laws or take regulatory action to prevent AGI Corp from deploying products deemed unsafe. It could even shut down development of more advanced models until certain safety and security standards are met. The USG could also insist on vetting technical personnel or other measures to counteract espionage.
(j) Various mechanisms are employed to make it legally as difficult and costly as possible for the USG or any other government to expropriate AGI Corp—using an assortment of legal and structural devices employed by other multinational corporations for that purpose.
(k) Additionally, leaders of the USG (and other governments) should, at its inception and periodically thereafter, signal support for the corporation and reaffirm commitments to respect its property rights and independence (e.g. pledging no confiscatory taxes or nationalization). Ideally these commitments would be embedded in laws and treaties, but informal pledges or expressions of support would be better than nothing.
(l) To the extent practicable from a security perspective, a significant portion of the AGI Corp's data centers could be distributed across multiple countries and jurisdictions, to further increase the difficulty of expropriation.
In versions with multiple AGI companies (OGI-N), provisions (e) and (f) would not apply, resulting in a situation closer to today's status quo. This paper remains agnostic on the relative merits of the single-company model (OGI-1) versus the multi-company model (OGI-N).
The other half of the picture
The scenario sketched above gives only half of the governance picture: it outlines ownership and control of the AGI project(s). The other half is the set of rules governments impose on how the AGI sector operates.
Myriad governance challenges will arise as AGI technologies permeate the economy and society—protecting consumers, maintaining political integrity, assisting displaced workers, preventing abuse, etc. These challenges will mostly fall to governments. In a US-OGI scenario, the U.S. government would bear primary responsibility for oversight—setting safety standards for advanced model development/deployment, establishing monitoring procedures, and so forth. Other countries would impose their own rules on how AI products are used domestically. The details of this regulatory landscape are not unique to the OGI model and lie outside this paper's scope. In the ideal case, states might agree on an international framework for safe and responsible AI that enables cooperation and provides basic global safeguards, within which each country could then implement its own more specific regulations.
The AGI corporation (or corporations, in OGI-N versions) can also play a role in addressing these issues. For instance, it can choose not to offer products or services it believes would harm its shareholders' long-term interests or violate its broader mission. A Delaware public benefit corporation charter would increase the scope for sacrificing profit in favor of ethical values, stakeholder interests, or the public good. Even without that, U.S. corporate law gives ordinary for-profit boards considerable latitude in practice to consider factors other than immediate profit maximization.
Motivations
The rationale behind the OGI model is threefold:
(1) To leverage well-entrenched norms, laws, and institutions related to the protection of property rights. These may be more robust and reliable than some novel ad hoc governance scheme concocted specifically for AGI.
(2) To distribute ownership and control widely, including among powerful actors (such as capital owners, political representatives, etc., both in the U.S. and overseas). This serves important functions:
It gives powerful actors personal incentives to uphold the corporation's property rights rather than pursue some radical expropriation or nationalization push that risks unraveling the property rights framework under which their interests are protected.
It offers international rivals an alternative to resentment and overt hostility: they are instead welcome to invest and participate in both profits and control over the first AGI. (On the margin, this may also reduce their willingness to engage in a risky race to AGI.)
It promotes a somewhat wider and globally more equitable distribution of benefits and influence compared to models in which ownership and control are even more narrowly concentrated.
(3) To present a path that has a realistic chance of being implemented, given current actors' motivations, political and geopolitical constraints, short AI timelines, etc.
Roles and powers of various actors
We now consider the main actors in an OGI scenario—the AGI corporations, the U.S. government (as host), other governments, and citizens—and the roles and powers each would have.
AGI corporation(s)
In addition to managing its internal affairs and research processes, an AGI corporation can choose which products it develops, whom it sells those products to, at what price, and with what constraints as to their use.
It is assumed that the corporation will be significantly driven by a profit motive in making these decisions. However, its products may so profoundly affect the world that they impact its shareholders in ways beyond direct profits. Therefore, the corporation would plausibly be influenced by shareholders' non-monetary interests to a greater extent than a typical company. If the AGI corporation is chartered as a public benefit corporation, its legally defined public mission could also significantly shape its choices.
Note that in the OGI-N version, the power of any one corporation to shape the impacts of AGI is reduced because of competitive pressures. One corporation might refrain from developing a product it believes would be harmful to society, but if this means foregoing profits then another corporation may fill the gap. Thus, if one believes it is important for both government and the lead AGI developer to have substantial influence over how AGI impacts unfold, this would be an argument for OGI-1—or at least keeping the number of top AGI corporations very small.
The United States government
The USG (or another host government) can block AGI corporations from pursuing certain developments or from deploying or selling certain products, for example in order to protect the public from foreseeable harm. It can also insist on procedures to reduce the risk of espionage against a corporation or loss of its intellectual property.
The host government can also choose whether to take actions that help an AGI corporation, such as buying some of its stock, removing regulatory barriers, providing tax breaks and subsidies, or hindering its competitors.
In a fully realized OGI model, the USG would also give up some of the options it currently has to commandeer or expropriate companies. For example, it could commit not to nationalize the AGI firm, not to impose special punitive taxes on it, and not to force foreign shareholders to divest.
Other governments
Other governments can have influence via several channels.
First, they can buy shares in AGI corporations, which gives them voting rights and profit participation.
Second, they can regulate AGI products and services within their own jurisdictions, and potentially prevent a corporation from doing business within their borders unless it complies with all local laws.
Third, if the corporation is a public benefit corporation, they could sue in U.S. courts if the corporation fails to sufficiently advance its public benefit mission.
Fourth, they could exert influence on the USG (and hence indirectly on American AGI corporations) through normal diplomatic and economic channels.
Fifth, if formal or informal multinational agreements have been entered into (e.g. responsible AI policies, assurances of respect for the AGI Corporation's autonomy, etc.), they may have institutional or legal recourse provided by those agreements.
Sixth, if data centers or other corporate assets have been located on their territory, they may as a last resort be able to seize those assets if the U.S. were to renege on its side of the bargain. (One could also imagine novel technical arrangements, such as an n-out-of-m multisignature mechanism to remotely disable critical AI hardware if certain conditions are met.)
Citizens
Citizens (both in the U.S. and around the world) would have at their disposal all the ordinary ways of influencing their governments, and thereby, indirectly, AGI corporation(s): through appeals to officials, voting, protests, lobbying, etc. They can also use familiar methods of influencing corporations: through their purchasing behavior, whether they choose to work for the corporation, taking actions that affect the corporation's brand image, etc.
In the OGI model, citizens additionally have the option to acquire shares in the AGI corporation, which would let them directly participate in the corporation's governance. This ability is, of course, distributed unequally due to wealth disparities both within and between countries. In particular, populations in lower-income countries would have very little influence per person.
While this inequity is unfortunate, one must ask: compared to what? Under most realistic alternative models (say, a U.S.-only Manhattan Project or a privately-held U.S. company), those same people would plausibly have even less ability to influence outcomes. Furthermore, national governments, sovereign wealth funds, religious organizations, charities, or other NGOs could buy shares on behalf of people too poor to participate directly; those institutions could then use internal democratic processes to decide how to exercise their shareholder power on behalf of their constituents.
Representativeness and fairness
It is tempting to assume that a government-controlled initiative would be more representative and inclusive than a privately controlled initiative. In the present case, that assumption is questionable. Even a large country like the U.S. has only about 4.2% of the world population (and 26% of world nominal GDP).[8]
In a U.S. nationalized project, 95.8% of the world population (and 74% of the world economy, or 85% if we adjust for purchasing power) is excluded from ownership and influence.[9] Even those figures optimistically assume that The Project would remain under effective democratic control in the U.S., which is far from a given in some scenarios.[10] By contrast, in the ideal-type instantiation of the OGI model, everybody with enough financial assets to buy stocks (and access to the relevant financial institutions) would have an opportunity to participate; and large swathes of the world population may in fact participate, either directly (via private investments) or indirectly (e.g. via sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, index funds, etc.).
Global wealth is very unequal. Almost half of global wealth is owned by the richest 1% of individuals.[11] But a substantial fraction of global wealth and stocks is also owned by a large number of moderately wealthy individuals. We can put some rough numbers on this. The Gini coefficient of global wealth is approximately 0.89.[12] The Gini coefficient of global stock ownership, while not precisely measured in standard databases, is plausibly higher, perhaps approaching 0.90-0.92, given that financial assets are more concentrated than overall wealth.[13] A U.S.-nationalized program—even if we assume that all U.S. citizens have exactly equal stakes and influence in it (which seems optimistic) while non-U.S. citizens have no stake or influence—gives a global distribution with a Gini coefficient of approximately 0.96.[14] That is to say, by at least one common measure of inequality, the U.S. nationalization model appears more unequal than the open global investment model in terms of the distribution of financial gains and influence.[15]
This initial gap in favor of the OGI model widens substantially when we consider that some fraction of the profits of the AGI sector would be taxed by governments both in the U.S. (or wherever the AGI corporations are domiciled) and in countries where shareholders report their foreign-source dividends and capital gains: tax revenues which would be used to provide services or payouts to vast numbers of citizens around the world. The gap may widen further still if we consider OGI-N versions of the model, in which a substantial fraction of potential profits may be competed away rather than captured by a single monopoly actor (as in OGI-1 or U.S. nationalization). Furthermore, to the extent that we place significance on the geographic dispersion of benefits, the OGI model does much better in that regard.
Arguably, therefore, an open and internationally participatory investment structure is fairer and more globally representative than any structure that is wholly owned and controlled by a single country.
It is possible to conceive of organizational arrangements that would be more inclusive than OGI. For example, one might imagine an AGI project run by the United Nations, or by some new idealized version of the UN set up for the purpose. One major problem with such more idealistic constructions is that they may not be incentive-compatible for current power-holders and potential funders, and so may have little chance of being implemented. Many international governance organizations are also often slow and may not be capable of running a globally competitive AGI project. There is currently no frontier AGI effort operated by any international governance organization, nor any that is operated by a national government (at least as far as is publicly known). The timeline for reaching agreements to set up a perfectly globally inclusive effort might be long—especially one that is embedded in international treaties—and the resulting organizational structure would be relatively untested compared to the international corporate property rights regime upon which the OGI proposal is based. An additional difficulty that an internationalized project would confront is how to achieve operational and information security, particularly if one envisions that its research and management staff would be drawn from nearly 200 countries.[16]
Military applications and foreign competitors
The distinction between civilian technology and military technology is already often difficult to draw. AGI may complicate the picture further and introduce novel areas of application where precedent offers limited guidance as to classification. High levels of AGI capabilities, even if not specifically designed for military applications, may be capable of greatly contributing to military success—for example by helping with military planning and logistics, operating drones and robots, conducting rapid military R&D, and executing cyber and information operations.
Furthermore, the potential for extremely rapid economic growth (such as is predicted in some models of AGI development) could itself have destabilizing effects on a country's security and geostrategic position, since any sufficiently large gap in economic development would likely also cause a divergence in military power.[17]
For this reason, the host government—the USG, if we assume the US-OGI model—may seek to restrict the sale of AI products and services, thereby preventing other nations from participating fully in shaping the emerging machine intelligence era. Furthermore, the USG may seek to restrict sales of top-tier AI capabilities to its own citizens, perhaps on grounds of dual-use concerns.
Fearing such a scenario, rival states with the resources to compete with the U.S. in AI development (such as China) may pursue their own independent national and/or commercial AGI projects. They may do so even if they were significantly invested in American AGI corporation(s) and even if they were reasonably confident that the U.S. would honor its commitments to respect corporate autonomy and property rights. These dynamics reflect understandable concern on all sides about technological dependence and national security.
When considering how much of an objection this is to the US-OGI model, it is important to bear in mind that the most relevant comparison is to alternative models that have some realistic prospect of being implemented, not an idealized world order in which all of humanity voluntarily comes together in perfect friendship and harmony to wisely work together for the common good of all. We should remain open to and favor the latter whenever we have opportunities to do so; but simultaneously it is prudent to think through and develop second-best options in case the preconditions for the first-best option should prove unattainable.
Thus, if we compare the OGI model to a "U.S.-led Manhattan Project for AGI" model, or to a model in which AGI is developed by a privately-held corporation, we can observe that in those cases, too, rival powers would have incentives to pursue their own AGI projects. In fact, their incentives to pursue independent projects in those alternative models would be stronger. In the basic US-OGI model, although it would not guarantee the maintenance of their geostrategic position in scenarios where the U.S. restricts exports of advanced AGI capabilities, they—and also individuals within their economic and political elites, who may have personally invested in the project—would at least have a stronger prospect of being able to participate in the economic upside of AGI development than they would in alternative models. They would also have at least some say, via their shareholder voting rights, in how the technology is developed and which products are offered for sale.
At present, this degree of participation is certainly not enough to make U.S. rivals abandon their own AGI efforts. But it might, at the margins, reduce their urgency or scale. Moreover, one can imagine circumstances where the prospect of share gains from AGI Corp's success could conceivably tip the balance in favor of rivals stepping back. For example, if it became overwhelmingly clear that racing to be first with AGI would pose an extremely high level of existential risk (due to misaligned superintelligence), even great-power competitors might consider unilaterally slowing down and relying on the shared project.
If stronger assurances to non-host countries are both desirable and possible, then the basic OGI model could be augmented with additional mechanisms, such as international arms control agreements, non-aggression pacts, etc. The OGI model should be as amenable to such international assurances as e.g. a private development model or a Manhattan Project model. It is conceivable that models that focus on concentrating AGI developments within a jointly operated international project would have an advantage in this regard. But they have other difficulties (see appendix 4); and they would still confront the issue of how to deal with competing commercial or national projects.
For comments and discussion I'm grateful to Renan Araujo, Guive Assadi, Nick Beckstead, Catherine Brewer, Joe Carlsmith, Tim Chan, Aleya Cotra, Max Dalton, Max Daniels, Tom Davidson, Oscar Delaney, Lukas Finnveden, Peter Gebauer, Ryan Greenblatt, Rose Hadshar, John Halstead, Holden Karnofsky, Will MacAskill, Fin Moorhouse, Avro Muñoz, Toby Newberry, Abi Olvera, Toby Ord, Liam Patell, Zershaaneh Qureshi, and Anders Sandberg. ↩︎
By "transformative AI", we shall mean, roughly, artificial general intelligence (AGI) that is capable enough to have the potential, if fully deployed, to have profound cross-sectoral impacts on the economy, labor market, and national security. ↩︎
For one compilation of proposed international AI institutions, see Maas & Villalobos (2023). ↩︎
Congressional oversight of the Manhattan Project was extremely limited—only a handful of congressional leaders knew of the project's existence, and even they received minimal information (Rhodes 1986). Vice president Harry Truman was not aware of the Project until after President Franklin Roosevelt's death (Wellerstein 2021). And AGI, which would allow widespread automation of intelligence analysis, propaganda, policing, and military capabilities, could lend itself to coups or other paths to extreme concentrations of power. ↩︎
According to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2022 (the most recent available with detailed methodology), the global wealth Gini coefficient was 0.889; see Davies et al. (2022). This figure has remained relatively stable in recent years. ↩︎
This estimate is based on the fact that financial assets are somewhat more concentrated than overall wealth. In the U.S., for instance, the top 1% own 54% of public equities while owning approximately 35% of total wealth. ↩︎
This calculation assumes that the U.S. population (4.2% of global total) owns 100% of the "asset" (i.e. control of the hypothetical U.S.-national project via voting rights) while the remaining 95.8% owns 0%. Using the standard Gini formula G = 1 ﹣ 2B, where B is the area under the Lorenz curve, gives G ≈ 0.96. ↩︎
A significant portion of voting power in public companies is concentrated among large institutional asset managers. For instance, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street collectively control approximately 25% of voting rights in S&P 500 companies (Fichtner et al. 2017). But this concentration might be compared to representative democracies where citizens delegate power to elected officials—in both cases, many individuals choose where to allocate their resources (investments or votes), but actual decision-making is exercised by a smaller number of actors purportedly acting on their behalf. ↩︎
Open Global Investment as a Governance Model for AGI[1]
(2025) Nick Bostrom
[Working paper, version 1.0]
www.nickbostrom.com
ABSTRACT
This paper introduces the "open global investment" (OGI) model, a proposed governance framework for artificial general intelligence (AGI) development. The core idea is that AGI development could proceed within one or more corporations in a context that (a) encourages wide international shareholding, (b) reduces the risk of expropriation, (c) implements strengthened corporate governance processes, (d) operates within a government-defined framework for responsible AI development (and/or a public-private partnership), and (e) includes additional international agreements and governance measures to whatever extent is desirable and feasible. We argue that this model, while very imperfect, offers advantages in terms of inclusiveness, incentive compatibility, and practicality compared to prominent alternatives—such as proposals modelled on the Manhattan project, CERN, or Intelsat—especially in scenarios with short AGI timelines.
Introduction
Various governance models have been proposed for projects that aim to develop and deploy transformative AI.[2],[3] Some have favored an American-led "Manhattan project for AI"—a vision in which the U.S. competes with an analogous project in China in a battle for perpetual cosmic hegemony.[4] Others have proposed an ownership and governance structure consisting of a U.S.-based nonprofit or public benefit corporation.[5] Others still have explored more internationally cooperative models, such as a "CERN for AI" or an "Intelsat for AI".[6]
Governance models may emphasize different objectives, such as democratic oversight, national security, international cooperation, legitimacy, economic efficiency and dynamism, equitable benefit sharing, AI safety, free enterprise, wise stewardship, scientific advancement, operational security, or responsible deployment. No governance structure can fully achieve all these goals. Transformative AI will, moreover, pose special challenges beyond those present in most other policy contexts—including the risk of misaligned or misused AI causing existential catastrophe, and the potential for extreme concentrations of power. Any governance design will therefore be subject to criticism for falling short on some reasonable desiderata. The choice will be one between imperfect options.
Furthermore, as we approach a potential intelligence explosion, governance structures will come under great strain. This is in part because the stakes become extraordinarily high and in part because the context in which they operate will undergo rapid and profound change.[7] Thus, it is not enough that a given structure would be satisfactory if it governed the development of transformative AI: it is also needful that the structure be robust enough to maintain its integrity throughout the process, and incentive-compatible enough to retain the support of relevant actors—and to be adopted in the first place.
This paper outlines a paradigm that we call the "open global investment" (OGI) model. We then assess how OGI meets various governance desiderata compared to alternative models, and tentatively conclude that it appears relatively attractive.
The open global investment model
Core features and variations
In the OGI model, AGI development is led by one or more ventures that are widely open to international investment and that operate under a government-defined regulatory framework, buttressed by enhanced government assurances and assistance. The status quo already roughly approximates this model, though we could move closer to the ideal. If we favor the OGI model, it could mean that we should strive to move closer to its ideal form; and perhaps more importantly, it could mean that we should resist proposals (like nationalization) that would remove us farther away from it.
This core idea can take different forms depending on whether there is a single lead AGI company ("OGI-1") or several ("OGI-N"); on whether the companies are domiciled in the United States ("US-OGI"); and on what supporting features and structures are put in place.
The following analysis adopts a somewhat U.S.-centric perspective, reflecting current realities in AGI development and the surrounding Western discourse. However, the OGI model itself is geographically neutral—it could in principle be implemented by any technologically capable nation as host, or by multiple different countries as hosts for different AGI ventures.
Example (US-OGI-1)
A fairly full-fledged version of the US-OGI-1 version (a U.S.-domiciled single AGI firm) could look like this:
(a) A publicly traded corporation ("AGI Corp") either already exists or is floated, domiciled in the U.S. AGI Corp could be a standard corporation or a Delaware public benefit corporation.
(b) Many people buy shares, including private individuals both in the U.S. and around the world. Sovereign wealth funds and other investment vehicles also buy significant chunks. If there is an IPO, it is structured such that initial ownership is widely distributed.
(c) There may be multiple share classes with different voting rights. For example:
These numbers are merely for illustration. The key point is that profit participation and voting rights can be partially separated—though ideally both should be widely distributed. For instance, everyone worldwide might be able to buy Class A shares, while Class B and Class C shares could be restricted to citizens of countries that agree to a responsible AI framework; and class C shares could be allocated as founder shares to key parties.
(d) Foreign governments and their citizens, including major powers that might otherwise be considered strategic rivals, are permitted and indeed encouraged to buy shares in AGI Corp (perhaps up to some high limit, such as 20% for any single country).
(e) To help AGI Corp to be the first to develop AGI and to have a big lead, cooperating governments could take various actions, such as:
(f) AGI Corp could also buy up competitors and merge them into its own efforts. Given the corporation's special status and official sanction, and the headwinds its competitors can expect to face, it might have a low cost of capital, enabling it to make such acquisitions. The USG could agree to waive antitrust enforcement.
(g) The charter of the corporation might be created or amended to strengthen governance procedures beyond those typical of Fortune 500 companies. For instance, the board could meet more frequently and have various resources and provisions for internal oversight.
(h) Ideally, some significant portion of the corporation's shares are acquired by independent organizations and not-for-profits whose remit is to benefit all of humanity and to serve other moral missions. This might occur because the original IPOing corporation already had such entities on its cap table. Philanthropic organizations can also buy additional shares on the open market.
(i) AGI Corp is subject to the laws of the land where it is domiciled. Assuming a US-OGI model, the USG thus retains the ability to pass laws or take regulatory action to prevent AGI Corp from deploying products deemed unsafe. It could even shut down development of more advanced models until certain safety and security standards are met. The USG could also insist on vetting technical personnel or other measures to counteract espionage.
(j) Various mechanisms are employed to make it legally as difficult and costly as possible for the USG or any other government to expropriate AGI Corp—using an assortment of legal and structural devices employed by other multinational corporations for that purpose.
(k) Additionally, leaders of the USG (and other governments) should, at its inception and periodically thereafter, signal support for the corporation and reaffirm commitments to respect its property rights and independence (e.g. pledging no confiscatory taxes or nationalization). Ideally these commitments would be embedded in laws and treaties, but informal pledges or expressions of support would be better than nothing.
(l) To the extent practicable from a security perspective, a significant portion of the AGI Corp's data centers could be distributed across multiple countries and jurisdictions, to further increase the difficulty of expropriation.
In versions with multiple AGI companies (OGI-N), provisions (e) and (f) would not apply, resulting in a situation closer to today's status quo. This paper remains agnostic on the relative merits of the single-company model (OGI-1) versus the multi-company model (OGI-N).
The other half of the picture
The scenario sketched above gives only half of the governance picture: it outlines ownership and control of the AGI project(s). The other half is the set of rules governments impose on how the AGI sector operates.
Myriad governance challenges will arise as AGI technologies permeate the economy and society—protecting consumers, maintaining political integrity, assisting displaced workers, preventing abuse, etc. These challenges will mostly fall to governments. In a US-OGI scenario, the U.S. government would bear primary responsibility for oversight—setting safety standards for advanced model development/deployment, establishing monitoring procedures, and so forth. Other countries would impose their own rules on how AI products are used domestically. The details of this regulatory landscape are not unique to the OGI model and lie outside this paper's scope. In the ideal case, states might agree on an international framework for safe and responsible AI that enables cooperation and provides basic global safeguards, within which each country could then implement its own more specific regulations.
The AGI corporation (or corporations, in OGI-N versions) can also play a role in addressing these issues. For instance, it can choose not to offer products or services it believes would harm its shareholders' long-term interests or violate its broader mission. A Delaware public benefit corporation charter would increase the scope for sacrificing profit in favor of ethical values, stakeholder interests, or the public good. Even without that, U.S. corporate law gives ordinary for-profit boards considerable latitude in practice to consider factors other than immediate profit maximization.
Motivations
The rationale behind the OGI model is threefold:
(1) To leverage well-entrenched norms, laws, and institutions related to the protection of property rights. These may be more robust and reliable than some novel ad hoc governance scheme concocted specifically for AGI.
(2) To distribute ownership and control widely, including among powerful actors (such as capital owners, political representatives, etc., both in the U.S. and overseas). This serves important functions:
(3) To present a path that has a realistic chance of being implemented, given current actors' motivations, political and geopolitical constraints, short AI timelines, etc.
Roles and powers of various actors
We now consider the main actors in an OGI scenario—the AGI corporations, the U.S. government (as host), other governments, and citizens—and the roles and powers each would have.
AGI corporation(s)
In addition to managing its internal affairs and research processes, an AGI corporation can choose which products it develops, whom it sells those products to, at what price, and with what constraints as to their use.
It is assumed that the corporation will be significantly driven by a profit motive in making these decisions. However, its products may so profoundly affect the world that they impact its shareholders in ways beyond direct profits. Therefore, the corporation would plausibly be influenced by shareholders' non-monetary interests to a greater extent than a typical company. If the AGI corporation is chartered as a public benefit corporation, its legally defined public mission could also significantly shape its choices.
Note that in the OGI-N version, the power of any one corporation to shape the impacts of AGI is reduced because of competitive pressures. One corporation might refrain from developing a product it believes would be harmful to society, but if this means foregoing profits then another corporation may fill the gap. Thus, if one believes it is important for both government and the lead AGI developer to have substantial influence over how AGI impacts unfold, this would be an argument for OGI-1—or at least keeping the number of top AGI corporations very small.
The United States government
The USG (or another host government) can block AGI corporations from pursuing certain developments or from deploying or selling certain products, for example in order to protect the public from foreseeable harm. It can also insist on procedures to reduce the risk of espionage against a corporation or loss of its intellectual property.
The host government can also choose whether to take actions that help an AGI corporation, such as buying some of its stock, removing regulatory barriers, providing tax breaks and subsidies, or hindering its competitors.
In a fully realized OGI model, the USG would also give up some of the options it currently has to commandeer or expropriate companies. For example, it could commit not to nationalize the AGI firm, not to impose special punitive taxes on it, and not to force foreign shareholders to divest.
Other governments
Other governments can have influence via several channels.
First, they can buy shares in AGI corporations, which gives them voting rights and profit participation.
Second, they can regulate AGI products and services within their own jurisdictions, and potentially prevent a corporation from doing business within their borders unless it complies with all local laws.
Third, if the corporation is a public benefit corporation, they could sue in U.S. courts if the corporation fails to sufficiently advance its public benefit mission.
Fourth, they could exert influence on the USG (and hence indirectly on American AGI corporations) through normal diplomatic and economic channels.
Fifth, if formal or informal multinational agreements have been entered into (e.g. responsible AI policies, assurances of respect for the AGI Corporation's autonomy, etc.), they may have institutional or legal recourse provided by those agreements.
Sixth, if data centers or other corporate assets have been located on their territory, they may as a last resort be able to seize those assets if the U.S. were to renege on its side of the bargain. (One could also imagine novel technical arrangements, such as an n-out-of-m multisignature mechanism to remotely disable critical AI hardware if certain conditions are met.)
Citizens
Citizens (both in the U.S. and around the world) would have at their disposal all the ordinary ways of influencing their governments, and thereby, indirectly, AGI corporation(s): through appeals to officials, voting, protests, lobbying, etc. They can also use familiar methods of influencing corporations: through their purchasing behavior, whether they choose to work for the corporation, taking actions that affect the corporation's brand image, etc.
In the OGI model, citizens additionally have the option to acquire shares in the AGI corporation, which would let them directly participate in the corporation's governance. This ability is, of course, distributed unequally due to wealth disparities both within and between countries. In particular, populations in lower-income countries would have very little influence per person.
While this inequity is unfortunate, one must ask: compared to what? Under most realistic alternative models (say, a U.S.-only Manhattan Project or a privately-held U.S. company), those same people would plausibly have even less ability to influence outcomes. Furthermore, national governments, sovereign wealth funds, religious organizations, charities, or other NGOs could buy shares on behalf of people too poor to participate directly; those institutions could then use internal democratic processes to decide how to exercise their shareholder power on behalf of their constituents.
Representativeness and fairness
It is tempting to assume that a government-controlled initiative would be more representative and inclusive than a privately controlled initiative. In the present case, that assumption is questionable. Even a large country like the U.S. has only about 4.2% of the world population (and 26% of world nominal GDP).[8]
In a U.S. nationalized project, 95.8% of the world population (and 74% of the world economy, or 85% if we adjust for purchasing power) is excluded from ownership and influence.[9] Even those figures optimistically assume that The Project would remain under effective democratic control in the U.S., which is far from a given in some scenarios.[10] By contrast, in the ideal-type instantiation of the OGI model, everybody with enough financial assets to buy stocks (and access to the relevant financial institutions) would have an opportunity to participate; and large swathes of the world population may in fact participate, either directly (via private investments) or indirectly (e.g. via sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, index funds, etc.).
Global wealth is very unequal. Almost half of global wealth is owned by the richest 1% of individuals.[11] But a substantial fraction of global wealth and stocks is also owned by a large number of moderately wealthy individuals. We can put some rough numbers on this. The Gini coefficient of global wealth is approximately 0.89.[12] The Gini coefficient of global stock ownership, while not precisely measured in standard databases, is plausibly higher, perhaps approaching 0.90-0.92, given that financial assets are more concentrated than overall wealth.[13] A U.S.-nationalized program—even if we assume that all U.S. citizens have exactly equal stakes and influence in it (which seems optimistic) while non-U.S. citizens have no stake or influence—gives a global distribution with a Gini coefficient of approximately 0.96.[14] That is to say, by at least one common measure of inequality, the U.S. nationalization model appears more unequal than the open global investment model in terms of the distribution of financial gains and influence.[15]
This initial gap in favor of the OGI model widens substantially when we consider that some fraction of the profits of the AGI sector would be taxed by governments both in the U.S. (or wherever the AGI corporations are domiciled) and in countries where shareholders report their foreign-source dividends and capital gains: tax revenues which would be used to provide services or payouts to vast numbers of citizens around the world. The gap may widen further still if we consider OGI-N versions of the model, in which a substantial fraction of potential profits may be competed away rather than captured by a single monopoly actor (as in OGI-1 or U.S. nationalization). Furthermore, to the extent that we place significance on the geographic dispersion of benefits, the OGI model does much better in that regard.
Arguably, therefore, an open and internationally participatory investment structure is fairer and more globally representative than any structure that is wholly owned and controlled by a single country.
It is possible to conceive of organizational arrangements that would be more inclusive than OGI. For example, one might imagine an AGI project run by the United Nations, or by some new idealized version of the UN set up for the purpose. One major problem with such more idealistic constructions is that they may not be incentive-compatible for current power-holders and potential funders, and so may have little chance of being implemented. Many international governance organizations are also often slow and may not be capable of running a globally competitive AGI project. There is currently no frontier AGI effort operated by any international governance organization, nor any that is operated by a national government (at least as far as is publicly known). The timeline for reaching agreements to set up a perfectly globally inclusive effort might be long—especially one that is embedded in international treaties—and the resulting organizational structure would be relatively untested compared to the international corporate property rights regime upon which the OGI proposal is based. An additional difficulty that an internationalized project would confront is how to achieve operational and information security, particularly if one envisions that its research and management staff would be drawn from nearly 200 countries.[16]
Military applications and foreign competitors
The distinction between civilian technology and military technology is already often difficult to draw. AGI may complicate the picture further and introduce novel areas of application where precedent offers limited guidance as to classification. High levels of AGI capabilities, even if not specifically designed for military applications, may be capable of greatly contributing to military success—for example by helping with military planning and logistics, operating drones and robots, conducting rapid military R&D, and executing cyber and information operations.
Furthermore, the potential for extremely rapid economic growth (such as is predicted in some models of AGI development) could itself have destabilizing effects on a country's security and geostrategic position, since any sufficiently large gap in economic development would likely also cause a divergence in military power.[17]
For this reason, the host government—the USG, if we assume the US-OGI model—may seek to restrict the sale of AI products and services, thereby preventing other nations from participating fully in shaping the emerging machine intelligence era. Furthermore, the USG may seek to restrict sales of top-tier AI capabilities to its own citizens, perhaps on grounds of dual-use concerns.
Fearing such a scenario, rival states with the resources to compete with the U.S. in AI development (such as China) may pursue their own independent national and/or commercial AGI projects. They may do so even if they were significantly invested in American AGI corporation(s) and even if they were reasonably confident that the U.S. would honor its commitments to respect corporate autonomy and property rights. These dynamics reflect understandable concern on all sides about technological dependence and national security.
When considering how much of an objection this is to the US-OGI model, it is important to bear in mind that the most relevant comparison is to alternative models that have some realistic prospect of being implemented, not an idealized world order in which all of humanity voluntarily comes together in perfect friendship and harmony to wisely work together for the common good of all. We should remain open to and favor the latter whenever we have opportunities to do so; but simultaneously it is prudent to think through and develop second-best options in case the preconditions for the first-best option should prove unattainable.
Thus, if we compare the OGI model to a "U.S.-led Manhattan Project for AGI" model, or to a model in which AGI is developed by a privately-held corporation, we can observe that in those cases, too, rival powers would have incentives to pursue their own AGI projects. In fact, their incentives to pursue independent projects in those alternative models would be stronger. In the basic US-OGI model, although it would not guarantee the maintenance of their geostrategic position in scenarios where the U.S. restricts exports of advanced AGI capabilities, they—and also individuals within their economic and political elites, who may have personally invested in the project—would at least have a stronger prospect of being able to participate in the economic upside of AGI development than they would in alternative models. They would also have at least some say, via their shareholder voting rights, in how the technology is developed and which products are offered for sale.
At present, this degree of participation is certainly not enough to make U.S. rivals abandon their own AGI efforts. But it might, at the margins, reduce their urgency or scale. Moreover, one can imagine circumstances where the prospect of share gains from AGI Corp's success could conceivably tip the balance in favor of rivals stepping back. For example, if it became overwhelmingly clear that racing to be first with AGI would pose an extremely high level of existential risk (due to misaligned superintelligence), even great-power competitors might consider unilaterally slowing down and relying on the shared project.
If stronger assurances to non-host countries are both desirable and possible, then the basic OGI model could be augmented with additional mechanisms, such as international arms control agreements, non-aggression pacts, etc. The OGI model should be as amenable to such international assurances as e.g. a private development model or a Manhattan Project model. It is conceivable that models that focus on concentrating AGI developments within a jointly operated international project would have an advantage in this regard. But they have other difficulties (see appendix 4); and they would still confront the issue of how to deal with competing commercial or national projects.
For comments and discussion I'm grateful to Renan Araujo, Guive Assadi, Nick Beckstead, Catherine Brewer, Joe Carlsmith, Tim Chan, Aleya Cotra, Max Dalton, Max Daniels, Tom Davidson, Oscar Delaney, Lukas Finnveden, Peter Gebauer, Ryan Greenblatt, Rose Hadshar, John Halstead, Holden Karnofsky, Will MacAskill, Fin Moorhouse, Avro Muñoz, Toby Newberry, Abi Olvera, Toby Ord, Liam Patell, Zershaaneh Qureshi, and Anders Sandberg. ↩︎
By "transformative AI", we shall mean, roughly, artificial general intelligence (AGI) that is capable enough to have the potential, if fully deployed, to have profound cross-sectoral impacts on the economy, labor market, and national security. ↩︎
For one compilation of proposed international AI institutions, see Maas & Villalobos (2023). ↩︎
Aschenbrenner (2024) ↩︎
Juijn et al. (2024). See also various discussions of OpenAI's and Anthropic's public benefit corporation structures. ↩︎
MacAskill & Hadshar (2025) ↩︎
Bostrom (2014), Dafoe (2018), Karnofsky (2023), Bengio et al. (2024) ↩︎
U.S. Census Bureau (2025), IMF (2025) ↩︎
IMF (2025) ↩︎
Congressional oversight of the Manhattan Project was extremely limited—only a handful of congressional leaders knew of the project's existence, and even they received minimal information (Rhodes 1986). Vice president Harry Truman was not aware of the Project until after President Franklin Roosevelt's death (Wellerstein 2021). And AGI, which would allow widespread automation of intelligence analysis, propaganda, policing, and military capabilities, could lend itself to coups or other paths to extreme concentrations of power. ↩︎
UBS (2023) ↩︎
According to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Databook 2022 (the most recent available with detailed methodology), the global wealth Gini coefficient was 0.889; see Davies et al. (2022). This figure has remained relatively stable in recent years. ↩︎
This estimate is based on the fact that financial assets are somewhat more concentrated than overall wealth. In the U.S., for instance, the top 1% own 54% of public equities while owning approximately 35% of total wealth. ↩︎
This calculation assumes that the U.S. population (4.2% of global total) owns 100% of the "asset" (i.e. control of the hypothetical U.S.-national project via voting rights) while the remaining 95.8% owns 0%. Using the standard Gini formula G = 1 ﹣ 2B, where B is the area under the Lorenz curve, gives G ≈ 0.96. ↩︎
A significant portion of voting power in public companies is concentrated among large institutional asset managers. For instance, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street collectively control approximately 25% of voting rights in S&P 500 companies (Fichtner et al. 2017). But this concentration might be compared to representative democracies where citizens delegate power to elected officials—in both cases, many individuals choose where to allocate their resources (investments or votes), but actual decision-making is exercised by a smaller number of actors purportedly acting on their behalf. ↩︎
Cf. Bostrom (2017) ↩︎
Cf. Erdil & Besiroglu (2024) ↩︎