To pick up some repeating arguments.
Re Taiwan: I don't think this serves as a counterargument. The remnants of the non-communist Kuomintang forces retreated to Taiwan as a last base. For mainland China to consider this a "left over territory to conquer which we didn't complete in 1949" is historically and culturally more justifiable than what international foreign intervention usually means.
Re China's internal despotism: China being not militaristically expansionist does not equal China being a humanistic society or desirable system of state or societal organization. However, being a controlling, despotic system with inward facing repression, also doesn't falsify the introductory claim. Contrary to many other despotic states, China undoubtedly has the military capability to expand forcefully (and ironically probably enough indifference to human life to not care about the loss of armed personnel).
Re roads and belts initiative: I agree it is not just an infrastructure project. Quite the opposite: it is an effective mixture of soft- and hard-power (we develop your country without meddling in your internal affairs but we lock you into economic dependence on the way). It is however distinguishable from the way development aid by western countries has often played out for other countries' elected governments.
All in all: China's track record internally is much worse than western countries, judged against standard definitions of human rights. China's track record externally is way better than western countries, judged against international law and human rights. We have to accept the ambiguity.
As to what happens if China aligns AGI first: can't know obviously, but some aspects to consider.
Re the addendum: by 1895 the US track record for wars against established and independent neighbouring nations was already down the toilet.
Often I see people claim it’s essential for America to win the AI race against China (in whatever sense) for reasons like these:
Those claims slide between a few different actual threat models:
The Dario quote points to (3) with unusual directness. The “race rather than slowdown” ending of AGI 2027 also supposes that our AI lead will create interest in overthrowing the Chinese government. But most of the quotes I gave as examples above are interpreted as (1): that an AI-enabled Chinese government would overthrow Western governments.
My main point here is that (1) seems unfounded to me. China is not an aggressive nation at all. As far as I can tell, China has literally never attacked a non-bordering country in its entire history, nor have they ever tried to overthrow a foreign government by covert or manipulative means. China is also unique among nuclear powers for its unconditional no-first-use policy, which at face value implies they would withhold a nuclear response to even an overwhelming conventional invasion. Further:
More broadly, China is a very inward-looking country compared to other major powers. Only 0.1% of Chinese residents were born abroad, much fewer than the 15% in America and 14% in France, fewer even than the 0.3% and 3% in India and Japan respectively. The Chinese government has peacefully compromised on almost all border disputes in central and southeast Asia, often taking a minority of the contested territory. (The Indian border is the exception.)
In particular, there's less history of Chinese overseas expeditions that are motivated by ideology alone. The British Empire famously destroyed overseas slavery at great cost to themselves, and the Americans and Soviets interfered in foreign regimes and civil wars, all for basically ideological rather than self-interested motives. The use of power for this kind of crusading is much less precedented in China.
To many American voters and elites, tracing back to Woodrow Wilson more than 100 years ago, “the justification of America’s international role was messianic: America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles throughout the world” (Kissinger). That isn’t the historical attitude of the Chinese government, whose leaders perceive foreign intervention or expansion as threatening to Chinese identity and culture.
It’s true that China doesn’t practice liberal governance. The core of liberalism is freedom of contract, limitations on government interference, and equal access to independent courts. In China, the CCP explicitly rejects limited government and exercises highly invasive control over business, speech, association, and religion. In China there’s no private ownership of land and no independent judiciary.
If you think it’s prudent to disable and overthrow the Chinese government when it becomes achievable militarily, then that’s certainly one (bellicose) position you could hold. Then you could say that a downside of losing the AI race is that the CCP may defend itself. But it’s unwise to project this ideological aggression onto the CCP itself without evidence.
Addendum: It would have been mistaken for a European to say, in 1895, "Who cares about American industrialization? They have almost no army and have barely left their far-away continent." Soon afterward that European might find the Americans replacing his regime or dismantling his empire. So a counterargument here is that in general, countries that become wealthy and militarily powerful become aggressive regardless of how passive they seemed before. Under this reasoning, China has had limited imperial ambitions in the past only because it e.g. lacked naval superiority. This has to be an argument based on a general view of human nature and government.