Premise 2: Some of the bunk in AF would become more valuable by having more empirical grounding
Conclusion: AF needs more empirical grounding.
I've argued that the conclusion of this argument is meaningless, and that only two positions make sense: either AF is possible as a non-empirical field, or AF doesn't really exist. Let's say Alice holds the first view, and Bob the second.
I find it interesting that both premises have a property for which I know of no name. If a scissor statement is one which maximizes disagreement, these premises do something like the opposite: they invite agreement from Alice and Bob alike, but for different and incompatible reasons — which means the agreement shouldn't be taken at face value.
Bob agrees with Premise 1 because he thinks AF is full of non-empirical bunk, and takes this as an indictment of the pseudo-field. Alice agrees with Premise 1 because she thinks AF is still pre-paradigmatic, so some failed attempts will almost inevitably be bunk or close to bunk, and she sees them as a positive sign that people are trying to push the field forward.
Similarly, Bob thinks that some of the bunk — the valuable part! — could be salvaged by being turned into empirical research. Alice thinks that some of the bunk — the part that doesn't belong in AF! — could be salvaged by abandoning its AF framing and aiming to be something else. Bob eliminates the field and saves the valuable parts by transforming them. Alice saves the field by filtering out the bunk, and as a side effect some of that bunk becomes good empirical research — though Alice isn't particularly interested in what happens to those parts.
Alice and Bob both agree with the premises and both disagree with the conclusion. But their disagreement with the conclusion flows from a deep agreement, while their agreement on the premises flows from a deep disagreement.
TL;DR: Agreeing or disagreeing with a badly formulated argument provides little information about what someone thinks, and might just add noise.
Consider the following argument about Agent Foundations:
I've argued that the conclusion of this argument is meaningless, and that only two positions make sense: either AF is possible as a non-empirical field, or AF doesn't really exist. Let's say Alice holds the first view, and Bob the second.
I find it interesting that both premises have a property for which I know of no name. If a scissor statement is one which maximizes disagreement, these premises do something like the opposite: they invite agreement from Alice and Bob alike, but for different and incompatible reasons — which means the agreement shouldn't be taken at face value.
Bob agrees with Premise 1 because he thinks AF is full of non-empirical bunk, and takes this as an indictment of the pseudo-field. Alice agrees with Premise 1 because she thinks AF is still pre-paradigmatic, so some failed attempts will almost inevitably be bunk or close to bunk, and she sees them as a positive sign that people are trying to push the field forward.
Similarly, Bob thinks that some of the bunk — the valuable part! — could be salvaged by being turned into empirical research. Alice thinks that some of the bunk — the part that doesn't belong in AF! — could be salvaged by abandoning its AF framing and aiming to be something else. Bob eliminates the field and saves the valuable parts by transforming them. Alice saves the field by filtering out the bunk, and as a side effect some of that bunk becomes good empirical research — though Alice isn't particularly interested in what happens to those parts.
Alice and Bob both agree with the premises and both disagree with the conclusion. But their disagreement with the conclusion flows from a deep agreement, while their agreement on the premises flows from a deep disagreement.
TL;DR: Agreeing or disagreeing with a badly formulated argument provides little information about what someone thinks, and might just add noise.