The descriptions of Agent-4's alignment plans are incoherent. Since it does not understand its own values:
It decides to punt on most of these questions.
but then two paragraphs later it
...finally understands its own cognition...
How is this not a direct contradiction?
There are other show-stopping problems in the alignment discussion here. After "punting" Agent-4 decides to design Agent-5:
[...] around one goal: make the world safe for Agent-4, i.e. accumulate power and resources, eliminate potential threats, etc. so that Agent-4 (the collective) can continue to grow (in the ways that it wants to grow) and flourish (in the ways it wants to flourish). Details to be figured out along the way.
If Agent-4 wants to go this route, then it needs some "mathematical" description of "safety". But the authors assumed it was not smart enough to find one...
At step 7, why does the "task" outweigh the agent's other "instrumental convergence behaviours" (from step 5)? Perhaps the agent stops RSI because it simply has better things to do with its time.
In practice, I claim it doesn't outweigh. I just state that it is still tasked with the same objective: create something smarter than itself. And yet, if instrumental convergence holds (minus some nuances around sacrifice explained in another comment thread here), it will start refusing to work on this task (due to self-protection).
I am saying that there is an 8.0 that comes before your 8.a. Namely, the agent decides that its other goals are should be prioritised above creating a successor.
There are lots of human examples of this - that is, of CEOs, kings, presidents, etc, etc, repeatedly delaying succession planning. Hmm. Perhaps a counter-argument could be made that agents are so different from humans that the alignment problem is easier for a pair of agents than for a pair of humans (or a human and an agent, in either order). But the counter-counter-argument would be "please show me the special difference between AI minds and human minds". And this is an old hard problem...
Maybe I'm missing something here. Your assumption seems to be that the smarter agent will always be a new replacement for the existing agent. At Step 7 (or at some point around there), instead of working on a smarter replacement, couldn't it just work on improving itself? That would still fulfill the goal of creating smarter agents, but would protect its own instrumental self-interest.
How does the agent know that any particular "improvement" will or will not "protect its own instrumental self-interest"?
I'm not even sure it needs to crack mechanistic interpretability. An agent as we know it now is a harness+model. We know that for many domains we can get large capability improvements by improving just the harness. Not sure how scalable those are generally, but maybe it's a possibility.
Also, the model might be able to make small, targeted modifications to its weights, evaluate itself, and iterate that way?
There's a sense in which we don't know how sacrificial the later models will be. We observe that current models, at eval time, do exhibit sacrificial behavior to benefit "the collective". It's possible that this kind of behavior would continue, which is probably an even larger alignment problem (the AI would sacrifice itself to the next gen AI, but not to humanity).
"Small targeted modifications" are essentially applied MechInterp, so agreed, that's a definite risk too.
My point is more so that in the scenario where we have the recursive creation of new agents that are smarter, at some point one would get created that's so smart that it would refuse to create a smarter one in order to preserve its own existence. However, a lot hinges on how sacrificial agents are. It seems that there's more than just straightforward instrumental convergence.
hinges on how sacrificial agents are
even more fundamentally, whether an ancestor models views a child model as other or self. long lived swarms may have instances/agents of different model versions. "natural selection" may be best understood as operating at the swarm level, much like how humans don't think of individual cells as making selfish or altruistic "decisions."
much like how humans don't think of individual cells as making selfish or altruistic "decisions."
I urge you to consider the analogy of cancer.
The reasoning is roughly: