This is a linkpost for https://www.greentape.pub/p/one-year-in-dc
Is there a name for the general principle that doing boring things is more effective than doing interesting ones? It seems generally true in a lot of situations.
Paul Graham called it schlep blindness. He was talking in the context of startups but it applies more broadly.
I think it's especially true for the type of human that likes Lesswrong. Using Scott's distinction between Metis and Techne, we are drawn to Techne. When a techne-leaning person does a deep dive into metis, that can generate a lot of value.
More speculatively, I feel like often--as in the case of lobbying for good government policy--there isn't a straightforward way to capture any of the created value; so it is under-incentivized.
Most intriguing is this hints at a testable hypothesis: policy markets should show greater inefficiency in domains where feedback loops are longest and most distorted. Would bet FOIAs on national security consistently outperform economic policy FOIAs in information yield despite lower attention
(h/t Otis Reid)
I think this post captures a lot of important features of the US policymaking system. Pulling out a few especially relevant/broadly applicable sections:
1. There's No Efficient Market For Policy
There can be a huge problem that nobody is working on; that is not evidence that it's not a huge problem. Conversely, there can be a marginal problem swamped with policy work; that's not evidence it's really all that big of a deal.
On the upside, this means there are never-ending arbitrage opportunities in policy. Pick your workstreams wisely.
2. Personnel Really Is The Most Important Thing
The quality of staffers varies dramatically and can make or break policy efforts. Some Hill staffers are just awesome; if they like your idea, they'll take it and run with it, try to find the right cosponsors, understand where it fits procedurally, etc. Other staffers have absolutely no idea what's going on.
3. The Hill is Not for Wonking
[...]
Optimize for impact, not panel invites. This may seem obvious, but this is not how most (c)(3)s are set up. Many large think tanks conceive of themselves as a "university without students," instead of a policy shop engaging with day-to-day policymaking. Others want to be a convening organization, spending resources on capital-C Conversations between capital-E Experts in Congress. And at an individual level, many think tankers simply do not like taking Hill meetings. There’s nothing wrong with this – but it is not a great strategy for driving policy change.
4. There's Alpha In Doing Boring Stuff
My colleague Lars Schönander has had enormous policy success because he sends hundreds (thousands?) of FOIA requests to state and local governments to track malign foreign influence over critical infrastructure. Much of his success comes from being willing to spend hours every day emailing FOIAs to places like the San Jose Port Authority.
Similarly, my summer and early fall were spent on phone lines with state departments of environmental quality, tracking their use of flexible permits. It was objectively soul-destroying work; it also led to an executive order, a bill being enacted into law, and several other bills being introduced.
(related EA Forum post)