There's been a fair amount of discussion here on whether it's better for AGI to be developed in the US or in China, or more generally about how valuable a US lead is. For example, Tomás B.'s Why Should I Assume CCP AGI is Worse Than USG AGI?, Arjun Panickssery's China Derangement Syndrome, and Chastity Ruth's China won’t win the AI race but would it be much worse if it did? question whether AGI being developed primarily in the US is that good. Elsewhere, it's touched on in the context of racing, as in William Saunders's Principles for the AGI Race and Max Tegmark's The Hopium Wars: the AGI Entente Delusion.

I've written a new post on this topic: What would make a large US lead in AI good or bad for the world? The post doesn't make a case one way or another, but I think draws some useful distinctions and lists a bunch of the most important cruxes. But fwiw, here's my overall take (not supported in the post, though I'd like to write more about this in the future):

My current best guess is that the US lead in AI is very good. I think a large US lead over China is better for the world (not just for the US), and that a shrinking US lead would be bad. A large lead gives US companies and the US government more room to test frontier AI systems, make them secure, and avoid panicked decisions. I also think it’s better if frontier AI development happens mostly in a pluralistic, open society with checks and balances. This is one reason why much of my work has focused on understanding and improving US export controls on AI chips and tooling (though, of course, other factors affect the costs and benefits of these controls aside from their effect on the lead). But while I’m confident enough in this to act on it, I’m still overall pretty uncertain and think it would be good to understand these dynamics better.

Some general points I make in the post:

• The lead can grow or shrink in at least four ways: by speeding or slowing US progress, and/or by speeding or slowing Chinese progress
• There is a difference between the size of the lead and the rate and direction of change in the lead
• Systemic bias can make the actual lead and decision-makers’ perception of the lead come apart
• There’s uncertainty about the size of the lead
• The lead can be jagged
• There could be a tipping point past which a lead gets permanently locked in

And some cruxes/questions I think are important:

• Would a larger and/or stable/growing lead make the US and/or Chinese governments less likely to make panicked, rushed decisions?
• Would a larger lead result in the US directing more resources towards developing AI safely?
• Would a larger lead make an agreement, or other cooperation on AI, between the US and China more or less likely?
• How does the direction of change in the lead affect incentives to cooperate or fight?
• Would a quickly growing or shrinking lead generally increase volatility or panic in a way that leads to worse or riskier decisions?
• How do the safety culture and safety capabilities of leading US AI companies compare to those of leading Chinese ones, and how important is this difference?
• Would the development of very powerful AI be more transparent in the US than in China, and how would this matter?
• Will the US’s stronger checks and balances reduce the risk of coups or of extreme power concentration?
• Which country is more likely to distribute the benefits of (aligned) AI widely, including to those who are not, or were previously not, citizens of that country?
• Which country is more likely to lock in some set of values permanently, or in any other way foreclose future debates about norms and values?