80% of MATS alumni who completed the program before 2025 are still working on AI safety today, based on a survey of all available alumni LinkedIns or personal websites (242/292 ~ 83%). 10% are working on AI capabilities, but only ~6 at a frontier AI company (2 at Anthropic, 2 at Google DeepMind, 1 at Mistral AI, 1 extrapolated). 2% are still studying, but not in a research degree focused on AI safety. The last 8% are doing miscellaneous things, including non-AI safety/capabilities software engineering, teaching, data science, consulting, and quantitative trading.

Of the 193+ MATS alumni working on AI safety (extrapolated: 234):

• 34% are working at a non-profit org (Apollo, Redwood, MATS, EleutherAI, FAR.AI, MIRI, ARC, Timaeus, LawZero, RAND, METR, etc.);
• 27% are working at a for-profit org (Anthropic, Google DeepMind, OpenAI, Goodfire, Meta, etc.);
• 18% are working as independent researchers, probably with grant funding from Open Philanthropy, LTFF, etc.;
• 15% are working as academic researchers, including PhDs/Postdocs at Oxford, Cambridge, MIT, ETH Zurich, UC Berkeley, etc.;
• 6% are working in government agencies, including in the US, UK, EU, and Singapore.

10% of MATS alumni co-founded an ... (read more)

I am a Manifund Regrantor. In addition to general grantmaking, I have requests for proposals in the following areas:

• Funding for AI safety PhDs (e.g., with these supervisors), particularly in exploratory research connecting AI safety theory with empirical ML research.
• An AI safety PhD advisory service that helps prospective PhD students choose a supervisor and topic (similar to Effective Thesis, but specialized for AI safety).
• Initiatives to critically examine current AI safety macrostrategy (e.g., as articulated by Holden Karnofsky) like the Open Philanthropy AI Worldviews Contest and Future Fund Worldview Prize.
• Initiatives to identify and develop "Connectors" outside of academia (e.g., a reboot of the Refine program, well-scoped contests, long-term mentoring and peer-support programs).
• Physical community spaces for AI safety in AI hubs outside of the SF Bay Area or London (e.g., Japan, France, Bangalore).
• Start-up incubators for projects, including evals/red-teaming/interp companies, that aim to benefit AI safety, like Catalyze Impact, Future of Life Foundation, and YCombinator's request for Explainable AI start-ups.
• Initiatives to develop and publish expert consensus on AI safety macr

As part of MATS' compensation reevaluation project, I scraped the publicly declared employee compensations from ProPublica's Nonprofit Explorer for many AI safety and EA organizations (data here) in 2019-2023. US nonprofits are required to disclose compensation information for certain highly paid employees and contractors on their annual Form 990 tax return, which becomes publicly available. This includes compensation for officers, directors, trustees, key employees, and highest compensated employees earning over $100k annually. Therefore, my data does not include many individuals earning under $100k, but this doesn't seem to affect the yearly medians much, as the data seems to follow a lognormal distribution, with mode ~$178k in 2023, for example.

I generally found that AI safety and EA organization employees are highly compensated, albeit inconsistently between similar-sized organizations within equivalent roles (e.g., Redwood and FAR AI). I speculate that this is primarily due to differences in organization funding, but inconsistent compensation policies may also play a role.

I'm sharing this data to promote healthy and fair compensation policies across the ecosystem. I believe th... (read more)

Hourly stipends for AI safety fellowship programs, plus some referents. The average AI safety program stipend is $26/h.

Edit: updated figure to include more programs.

Why does the AI safety community need help founding projects?

1. AI safety should scale
   1. Labs need external auditors for the AI control plan to work
   2. We should pursue many research bets in case superalignment/control fails
   3. Talent leaves MATS/ARENA and sometimes struggles to find meaningful work for mundane reasons, not for lack of talent or ideas
   4. Some emerging research agendas don’t have a home
   5. There are diminishing returns at scale for current AI safety teams; sometimes founding new projects is better than joining an existing team
   6. Scaling lab alignment teams are bottlenecked by management capacity, so their talent cut-off is above the level required to do “useful AIS work”
2. Research organizations (inc. nonprofits) are often more effective than independent researchers
   1. “Block funding model” is more efficient, as researchers can spend more time researching, rather than seeking grants, managing, or other traditional PI duties that can be outsourced
   2. Open source/collective projects often need a central rallying point (e.g., EleutherAI, dev interp at Timaeus, selection theorems and cyborgism agendas seem too delocalized, etc.)
3. There is (imminently) a market for for-profit AI safety companies and value-al

I did a quick inventory on the employee headcount at AI safety and safety-adjacent organizations. The median AI safety org has 10 8 employees. I didn't include UK AISI, US AISI, CAIS, and the safety teams at Anthropic, GDM, OpenAI, and probably more, as I couldn't get accurate headcount estimates. I also didn't include "research affiliates" or university students in the headcounts for academic labs. Data here. Let me know if I missed any orgs!

I'm interested in determining the growth rate of AI safety awareness to aid field-building strategy. Applications to MATS have been increasing by 70% per year. Do any other field-builders have statistics they can share?

Technical AI alignment/control is still impactful; don't go all-in on AI gov!

• Liability incentivizes safeguards, even absent regulation;
• Cheaper, more effective safeguards make it easier for labs to meet safety standards;
• Concrete, achievable safeguards give regulation teeth.

It seems plausible to me that if AGI progress becomes strongly bottlenecked on architecture design or hyperparameter search, a more "genetic algorithm"-like approach will follow. Automated AI researchers could run and evaluate many small experiments in parallel, covering a vast hyperparameter space. If small experiments are generally predictive of larger experiments (and they seem to be, a la scaling laws) and model inference costs are cheap enough, this parallelized approach might be be 1) computationally affordable and 2) successful at overcoming the architecture bottleneck.

An incomplete list of possibly useful AI safety research:

• Predicting/shaping emergent systems (“physics”)
  • Learning theory (e.g., shard theory, causal incentives)
  • Regularizers (e.g., speed priors)
  • Embedded agency (e.g., infra-Bayesianism, finite factored sets)
  • Decision theory (e.g., timeless decision theory, cooperative bargaining theory, acausal trade)
• Model evaluation (“biology”)
  • Capabilities evaluation (e.g., survive-and-spread, hacking)
  • Red-teaming alignment techniques
  • Demonstrations of emergent properties/behavior (e.g., instrumental powerseeking)
• Interpretabili

AI alignment threat models that are somewhat MECE (but not quite):

• We get what we measure (models converge to the human++ simulator and build a Potemkin village world without being deceptive consequentialists);
• Optimization daemon (deceptive consequentialist with a non-myopic utility function arises in training and does gradient hacking, buries trojans and obfuscates cognition to circumvent interpretability tools, "unboxes" itself, executes a "treacherous turn" when deployed, coordinates with auditors and future instances of itself, etc.);
• Coordination failur

How fast should the field of AI safety grow? An attempt at grounding this question in some predictions.

• Ryan Greenblatt seems to think we can get a 30x speed-up in AI R&D using near-term, plausibly safe AI systems; assume every AIS researcher can be 30x’d by Alignment MVPs
• Tom Davidson thinks we have <3 years from 20%-AI to 100%-AI; assume we have ~3 years to align AGI with the aid of Alignment MVPs
• Assume the hardness of aligning TAI is equivalent to the Apollo Program (90k engineer/scientist FTEs x 9 years = 810k FTE-years); therefore, we need ~

Can the strategy of "using surrogate goals to deflect threats" be countered by an enemy agent that learns your true goals and credibly precommits to always defecting (i.e., Prisoner's Dilemma style) if you deploy an agent against it with goals that produce sufficiently different cooperative bargaining equilibria than your true goals would?