Yup, you need more dimensions to include utility of certainty at a time, utility of impact on future games, emotional cost of negotiation, and other factors that aren't mentioned in your simplistic 2D payout matrix. And each player's utility function is the projection of this many-dimensional space onto a line for that decision. Your simpler fix is insufficient - the uncertainty cost is not necessarily smooth, and is not the only factor missing.
This more complete modeling, in theory, will just make sure the points are in the right place on your 2-d projection, and you still get a convex hull over them. Most classes teaching this will mention that the utility is "all inclusive", but don't spend much time on defining that, or noting how weak it makes the theory. Note that the costs of uncertainty can vary with the probability distribution, so you can't necessarily pick anything in between without re-projecting the points (or treating each distribution as a new projection, and you can only pick actual intersecting points).
In practice, humans don't have a utility function, don't know how to introspect what preferences they do have, and have inconsistencies that make this fail for almost all real decisions.
It's almost a rule that as soon as you have a "utility of possible outcomes" plot like this:
You must then say "and by randomly choosing between the outcomes, we can achieve any intermediate outcome in terms of utility within the convex hull of these points" resulting in a plot like this:
Cool, I've done a linear interpolation before, seems reasonable. Plus, convex hulls are super nice to work with. But all models are imperfect - how accurate is this convex hull idea in practice?
Three stories
My point is that in practice the mapping from lottery probability p and outcome utilities U1,U2 to lottery utility Up is probably not Up=pU1+(1−p)U2. I wonder if it's occasionally not even close. I would expect the "lottery closure" of the three outcomes above to look something like this:
I'm pretty darn sure I'm not the first person to think about this, so: how big an issue is this when thinking about things like bargaining solutions, or stochastic Nash equilibria?