I presented a version of this argument to Sean Carroll (prominent physicist/blogger) in his December 2022 AMA (for context, the past hypothesis is just the quantitative way to state the assumption that the universe began low entropy, thus throwing out all universes that emerged randomly from fluctuations and predict Boltzman brains):
Q: In the October AMA, you said there was “No experiment you can do” to prove the past hypothesis. However, it seems any universe where the laws of thermodynamics are true and the past hypothesis is false should makes some very strong, very falsifiable predictions! The theory would say that, with overwhelming probability, our experiences are explained by a small world fluctuating from equilibrium, and by illusory stuff outside that world, just enough to make us think the universe is bigger and explain what we’ve observed so far.
So, every time we see stars continue to shine, or take a walk to a new street in town, or otherwise fail to shatter the illusion of the outside world, that is a result not predicted in a universe without a past hypothesis! Given how incredibly thermodynamically unlikely these coincidences would be, are we not gaining several sigmas of certainty per second that the past hypothesis is true?
A: All that's true, but it does not get you the result, Kevin, that you want to get because you have to distinguish between asking, given this universe, in other words a universe where there really just are random fluctuations and we don't have the past hypothesis, what would you expect to see next? That is a question you can ask and that is what you're talking about. But the theory choice question about doing an experiment to prove the past hypothesis is not that question. That's just calculating the likelihood function in Bayes' theorem. To choose between the theories, you have to multiply that likelihood function by the prior. So the question is not given this theory, what do you expect to see next? But given what you see, what is the most likely theory?
And given a universe that is randomly fluctuating, it is true that given what we see now, the next thing we should see is just some thermal equilibrium random fluctuations. But given that the next thing we see is not thermal equilibrium random fluctuations, if that universe were real, it would still be overwhelmingly likely that all that stuff had just fluctuated into existence, okay? So that's why you need to assume the past hypothesis. You can't actually be a good Bayesian and rule it out by data because under that set of assumptions that all configurations of stuff in the universe are equally likely, the prior probability that you're seeing things randomly fluctuate into existence is so overwhelmingly large that you can't beat it down just by likelihood functions and collecting new data.
I don't like his answer. I think it probably comes out of repeated arguments of the form "Boltzman brains wouldn't experience X" "Granted, but you'll still see way more Boltzman brains+X than real coherent universes", or of the form "Here's this info about the early universe from data we collected" "That info assumes the past hypothesis, since you discount the overwhelming numbers of ways your data could be produced from thermodynamically incoherent universes". He's comfortable saying everyone's ultimately assuming the past hypothesis somewhere, so we need to be able to say that's fine.
There's arguably only a semantic difference here: Is being willing to assume the past hypothesis is practically any different from accepting the evidence of the past hypothesis?
I think it’s worth calling evidence evidence. The past hypothesis is a theory, the null past hypothesis (allowing fluctuated universes) is another theory. You can imagine many different acceptable priors on the credence of those theories. The past hypothesis is possibly less natural and possibly should have much weaker weight due to that unnaturalness. It should not however, have a much weaker weight because the other theory thermodynamically assigns it that weaker weight. That’s just backwards: Assign prior likelihoods, then consider the evidence.
The evidence we see in favor of the past hypothesis is strong enough to overwhelm any reasonable naturalness weighting. It is not enough to overwhelm the other theory’s thermodynamic naturalness weighting, but that was never the question.
(Initially written for the LW Wiki, but then I realized it was looking more like a post instead.)
In 1895, the physicist Ignaz Robert Schütz, who worked as an assistant to the more eminent physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, wondered if our observed universe had simply assembled by a random fluctuation of order from a universe otherwise in thermal equilibrium. The idea was published by Boltzmann in 1896, properly credited to Schütz, and has been associated with Boltzmann ever since.
The obvious objection to this scenario is credited to Arthur Eddington in 1931: If all order is due to random fluctuations, comparatively small moments of order will exponentially-vastly outnumber even slightly larger fluctuations toward order, to say nothing of fluctuations the size of our entire observed universe! If this is where order comes from, we should find ourselves inside much smaller ordered systems.
Feynman similarly later observed: Even if we fill a box of gas with white and black atoms bouncing randomly, and after an exponentially vast amount of time the white and black atoms on one side randomly sort themselves into two neat sides separated by color, the other half of the box will still be in expectation randomized. If the Solar System had arisen by a fluctuation of order, in expectation the rest of the universe would be a random smear; even taking our own Solar System for granted, the appearance of the rest of the universe would be vastly-exponentially improbable.
The increased still-infinitesimal likelihood of "just one solar system fluctuates out of chaos", compared to "one Hubble-sized volume randomly fluctuates out of chaos", is vastly vastly greater than the ratio of a Hubble volume's size to a solar system's size. So if you pick a solar system that is part of a system that has randomly fluctuated out of chaos, the incredibly incredibly vast majority of solar systems like that find themselves alone in a larger bath of chaos.
Indeed, if a fluctuation out of chaos gives rise to a system containing something that can look around itself at all, by the far the most likely case is that it would be just a minimal brain that formed out of chaos, maybe for only a few moments before dissolving again. Any larger system would fluctuate out of chaos exponentially-vastly less often.
This, finally, reflects an anthropic challenge to any model of physics which predicts an eternal universe dissolving into thermal equilibrium and lasting literally forever -- or similarly, any sort of quantum continuum said to last for an eternity of equally-real distinct moments. "Boltzmann brains" assembled by random fluctuations would then vastly outnumber the sorts of brains that had found themselves in larger ordered worlds of thermal disequilibrium.
But if a supervast or infinite majority of observer-moments happen in Boltzmann brains, our own experience of reality seems miraculously ordered by comparison. Boltzmann brains that have briefly self-assembled do not on average find themselves with very ordered memories, nor seeing visual fields that are themselves highly structured and ordered. Boltzmann brains like this exist, but they are supervastly outnumbered by Boltzmann brains with more chaotic experiences, for the probably-few moments that they experience. Even among the infinitesimal fraction of Boltzmann brains that have a regular visual field, and see apparently ordered shapes on the left side of their visual field, a supervast majority of those would see chaos on the right side of their visual field.
Our current experience -- your own experience, at this very moment, of seeing ordered letters on a screen -- therefore seems to provide overwhelming anthropic evidence against any model of reality or physics which would imply that most brains are Boltzmann brains.
Any attempted objection to "the surprising overwhelming order of our present experience contradicts the theory that most experience is far more disordered" -- eg, "But I don't believe in anthropic reasoning, so there" -- makes the prediction that your experience will dissolve into chaos in the next moment. Assuming the Boltzmann scenario, even conditioned on your current experience being anomalously orderly, most orderly experiences like this dissolve into chaos within moments. So if your current experience does not dissolve into chaos within moments, you should regard the Boltzmann hypothesis as having made an extremely strong prediction which has now been falsified -- at least to the extent that you ever regard any physical theory as ever being falsifiable by your memories of what it predicted and your memories of what you observed.
Realistically, you expect your experience to not dissolve into chaos in the next instant. I think that given our incredibly ordered current experience and memories, to treat this as not just a coincidence of superexponentially tiny probability, seems to me wholly justified. If it is not coincidental, then indeed our currently orderly experience may continue to be orderly rather than dissolving back into chaos. We are then faced with the question of how and why reality works to make this not be the case. I find myself without the stamina to further dissect the one who now wisely smiles that this is just a pragmatic sort of useful assumption rather than a credible belief.
"But we're not Boltzmann brains" then constitutes a strong-seeming anthropic objection to any larger story about the universe which implies that most experience would reside in Boltzmann brains; for example, to any physical theory which implies that the universe would eventually turn into a thermal bath (which would then persist forever (through an infinite succession of distinct, equally-real moments and events)).
An analogous objection may be made to any larger metaphysical story which provides no basis on which to say that ordered experiences would outnumber disordered experiences; for example, a bare assertion that "All mathematical structures exist." If all mathematical structures exist, why do comparatively tiny numbers of orderly observer-moments seem to carry so much more weight-of-existence than the vastly more numerous horde of possible disorderly moments of conscious awareness?
Similarly if every physical object can with equal justice to be said to implement every computation. Then why would computations of orderly observer-moments outnumber computations of chaotic observer-moments?
So the argument from "My experience does not look like a typical Boltzmann brain experience" not only weighs against models of physics in which the universe ends up as a literally eternal sea of particles or quantum foam in thermal equilibrium, but also, any account of mathematical realism / modal realism which makes it hard to explain why some universes or observer-moments have greater weight than others; or any account of computationalism in which it is said to be ultimately subjective and arbitrary which objects implement which (conscious) computations; or any metaphysics which says you can't objectively answer the question "Which observer-moments exist or don't exist / have more weight to them than other observer-moments?"