[This post contains discussion of antisemitism].

It's interesting to consider how a utilitarian view informs whether or not it's ok to penalize someone for using particular communication maneuvers. For instance, it seems clear that not giving in to threats which are made conditional on you not expressing your political views is a good idea, not least because it disincentivizes people from issuing such threats by making it seem less likely they'll work in the future.

A longer example: nuisance noise and antisemitic "nuisance noise"

Another similar example is that of nuisance noise: some people are particularly bothered by it, and others aren't, so the results of the utilitarian calculation of whether it's a net positive to penalize someone for making nuisance noise when they've told you they won't stop doing so voluntarily depends on the weighted preferences of the particular parties involved. Also, certain kinds of nuisance noise will upset people more than other kinds of noise; loud music might be less disturbing than radio propaganda asserting that there's a wide body of scientific evidence that the presence of certain unflattering physical and personal characteristics can be used to determine that someone is Jewish.

Certain behaviors can add to the effect that nuisance noise has; if our neighbor, who is regularly broadcasting antisemitic radio propaganda, has an established habit of befriending Jewish people, inviting them over to his house, and then beginning to talk with them about all the scientific evidence there is that large, downward-bent noses are an unflattering but sure sign of Judaism, that's more harmful than broadcasting antisemitic radio propaganda alone.

My view is that libertarianism has some very good points, and that being able to do things without having to deal with red tape prevents *a bunch* of failure modes. I would further say that the claim that "socially penalizing the loud antisemitic radio broadcast-player isn't warranted because he's doing his own thing in his own house" isn't something I'd choose to include under the umbrella of libertarianism. Imposing costs on others and claiming that you shouldn't be penalized for deliberately doing so doesn't really count as acting in the spirit of libertarianism; if anything, it provides supporting data to people who are interested in showing that libertarianism doesn't work.

Trickier situations: people have different info

There can also be trickier situations that come about as a result of people having different standpoints. Being insistent that someone making nuisance noise keep the volume down might be read as an attack by those who have never been bothered by nuisance noise. If the loud antisemitic radio broadcast-player who has been inviting Jewish people into his home and privately talking with them about how practically all Jews have ugly downward-bent noses starts publicly talking about how certain kinds of makeup can be used to make your nose look better, it's not clear to me how this should be dealt with. After all, there's plausible deniability--someone might comment that the broadcast player is doing a public service by informing others about how to achieve their beauty-related goals, which is an access need that competes with the (in this case) less visible access need of Jewish people to feel safe. In any case, it's a safe bet that Jewish people who have privately talked with our broadcast-player will react a bit differently than anyone else.

Strategies for resolving the problem

I don't claim to have answers to all of these questions, but I do think there are a few stable outcomes. One is that in which the broadcast-player moves somewhere that suits him, which has the potential to satisfy everyone if moving isn't too costly for him. Others involve him being penalized if he doesn't lower the volume of the broadcasts he's playing, or alternatively, just sticking with the status quo and treating the fact that Jewish pedestrians and his possibly Jewish neighbors will sometimes hear this person's broadcasts as something that has to be worked around.

Some of these stable outcomes would seem to be favored by different value systems--a direct focus on epistemic rationality might suggest letting the loud broadcasts continue without penalty, since that might help people learn true things, especially since the broadcasts claim to use scientific evidence. Proponents might claim that the broadcasts could help people with large downward-bent noses who didn't know they were Jewish figure out their identity, understand how different facial features worked together to make them Jewish (or how being Jewish caused them to have those features), and embrace their Jewishness rather than trying to be something they weren't.

A utilitarian focus informed by instrumental rationality might more strongly take into account the harm caused by the loud broadcasts and the history of this person inviting Jewish people into his home for discussion. Similarly, a focus on epistemic rationality as a long-term goal might more strongly weight preventing damage to your community, so that you have greater ability to pursue collaborative truth-seeking in the future.

In any case, the example likely generalizes; hopefully it's obvious that highly similar considerations would apply in, for example, discussion of whether it's acceptable to loudly talk about scientific evidence that the presence of certain unflattering physical and personal characteristics can be used to determine that someone is gay.