The general strategy is to have fewer beliefs, to allow development of detailed ideas/hypotheses/theories without giving much attention to evaluation of their external correctness (such as presence of their instances in the real world, or them making sense in other paradigms you understand), instead focusing on their internal correctness (validity of arguments inside the idea, from the point of view of a paradigm/mindset native to the idea). Then you only suffer motivated attention, and it's easier to counter by making sure to pay some attention to developing understanding of alternatives.

The results look pretty weird though, for example I imagine that there might be a vague impression from my writings that I'm changing my mind on topics that I've thought about for years back and forth on months-long scale, or believe contradictory things at the same time, or forget some fundamental well-known things (paradigms can insist on failing to understand/notice some established facts, especially when their well-being depends on it). I'm not sure how to communicate transient interest in an obscure idea without it coming across as a resurgent belief in it (with a touch of amnesia to other things), and I keep using belief-words to misleadingly describe beliefs that only hold inside an idea/hypothesis/theory too. (This is not something language has established conventions for.)