Seems to me the world can either (A) exist in a form "better" or preferable, whatever that means, to this one - in which case we should: try to figure out what the characteristics of that preferable world are, what the best framework for arriving there is, and work towards it - or (B) it doesn't, there is no preferable state - in which case it can literally never matter what we do. It also seems to me that the "preferable state" must be objectively better in order for what we do to matter. So, based on the above, we should act on the assumption that the world can exist in a state objectively preferable to its current one.

Some problems I can imagine being brought up are:

• What if it is logically impossible for there to be such thing as a "preferable" world? -

Well... Good question, but nothing is really impossible, only very highly improbable - even if it seems logically impossible, I may well have made a mistake in my calculations, right? I can't imagine being Pascal mugged even matters here - if there is no preferable state of existance it really doesn't matter if I "lose my wallet" or waste my life on something that doesn't exist.

• How would you prove that you should desire the "preferable" world or work towards it even if it exists?

...Ok, good question. Maybe we should "mug ourselves" with that too??

• Even if the world doesn't exist as objectively better than it currently is, you still prefer certain states of existance. You should work toward them even if they aren't objectively any better.

Never understood this. Why should I if reality is no better in that state than in any other?

I'm pretty new here, so could someone point me to good discussions of meta ethics of this sort here or elsewhere, offer a different framework for thinking about this than my dichotomy, or explain my mistakes above?

(Not on AI! basic morality)

1. There is a difference between how objectively bad an event is (how far it is from what would have happened in a perfect world) and how bad the person that did it is (how completely they failed to try to do the right thing). Just as someone can kill someone entirely by accident, even when people do things intentionally, there is a dissonance between how bad you have to be to do it and how bad the action's consequences are.
2. People are usually less bad than the bad things they do. The consequences of a terrorist's actions are unspeakably, infinitely evil, causing incredible pain, but the people don't actually need to be as bad as the things they do in order for them to do them. I personally know kids who are quite nice to me, but wouldn't think twice about doing truly terrible things to innocent people because of where they live. I don't think they are as bad as the things they would be okay with doing. They're mostly good people who're just completely failing at being good moral agents. (This is the lenses through which I read the depressing descriptions of the Stanford prison experiment, the Milgram experiment, etc. Yes, it's important to know how easily people can be led to do the wrong thing, but it doesn't actually mean people are bad).
3. If classical utilitarianism is the best moral framework, we should to help people regardless of their goodness or badness, so we should value the deterrence of further offenders but not punishment for its own sake. If having a multiple-values system is the best moral framework and we value justice, we still in most cases shouldn't punish severely for its own sake, since most people aren't as bad as the things they do.

Seems to me we generally shouldn't intrinsically value punishment, even of people who did truly horrible things, whether judicially or extrajudicially.

This is obviously not a particularly sophisticated point and I doubt anyone here disagrees with it, but people's failure to internalize it does seem to be a significant source of conflict and suffering across the globe. On a much smaller scale, it helps me be much more patient with people who really tick me off in my life by reflecting that while what they did may have harmed or annoyed me significantly, they would not have had to be particularly bad or uncaring to do it - it could be just another form of a mistake.

Does anyone disagree on any of the above points, or on my definitions?