Vague idea for how to theoretically decide whether a mind's existence at any given moment is net positive, from a utilitarian standpoint:
I feel like some version of this has to logically follow if you assume that the utility of multiple experiences at once is equal to the sum of the utilities of the individual experiences (might not be true), plus some uncontroversial utilitarian assumptions, but I can't formalize the proof in my head.
If anyone has links to other attempts to get a utilitarian threshold for net positive/negative existence, they would be appreciated.
(I should note that I know approximately zero neuroscience, and don't know if the concept of an "individual experience" as distinct from other "individual experiences" happening in the same mind at the same time is coherent)
Responding to 3):
What is your standing to judge your imagined version of someone's experience? Maybe your preferences are different enough from the subject's that you're simply wrong in your comparison.
You're right and I should have said "imagine the point at which they are indifferent", "would they prefer the 10x experience or the 1x experience", etc. Imagining whether I would prefer it could be a decent approximation of their preferences, though.