Imagine this situation. There's an artificial system that intuitively doesn't appear conscious; it's not designed to replicate consciousness, doesn't claim to be conscious, and doesn't mimic human behavior. However, you discover that it processes information as follows:

1) Part 1 within it performs the initial processing of incoming signals and transforms them into internal "signs" that carry information about previous interactions with similar signals, their valence relative to the system's current and global tasks, the most frequent matches with signals from other modalities, and the most likely future signals. These "signs" overlap in meaning and can reference each other.

2) Part 2 works only with the products of Part 1's processing, performs calculations, and controls the system's actions based on these calculations.

Will the system's lack of consciousness remain intuitive to you? Isn't there a contradiction in "the system does all this while remaining a zombie"? I'd like to hear your thoughts on this, both at the level of "what is described is the realization of consciousness," and at the level of "mentalistic terms are hidden in the description; some of the actions described require consciousness by definition."