Renaming "paperclip maximizer" tag to "squiggle maximizer" might be a handy vector for spreading awareness of squiggle maximization, but epistemically this makes no sense.
The whole issue with "paperclip maximizer" is that the meaning and implications are different, so it's not another name for the same idea, it's a different idea. In particular, literal paperclip maximization, as it's usually understood, is not an example of squiggle maximization. Being originally the same thing is just etymology and doesn't have a normative claim on meaning.
Historical Note: This was originally called a "paperclip maximizer", with paperclips chosen for illustrative purposes because it is very unlikely to be implemented, and has little apparent danger or emotional load (in contrast to, for example, curing cancer or winning wars). Many people interpreted this to be about an AI that was specifically given the instruction of manufacturing paperclips, and that the intended lesson was of an outer alignment failure. i.e humans failed to give the AI the correct goal.
The originally intended lesson was of inner alignment failure, wherein the humans gave the AI some other goal, but the AI's internal processes converged on a goal that seems completely arbitrary from the human perspective.)
discussed in conversations between Yudkowsky and Bostrom (circa 2003), a squiggle maximizer is an artificial general intelligence (AGI) whose goal is to maximize the number of molecular squiggles in its collection.
Paperclip Maximizer is a hypothetical artificial intelligence whose utility function values something that humans would consider almost worthless, like maximizing the number of paperclips in the universe. The paperclip maximizer is the canonical thought experiment showing how an artificial general intelligence, even one designed competently and without malice, could ultimately destroy humanity. The thought experiment shows that AIs with apparently innocuous values could pose an existential threat. The goal of maximizing paperclips is chosen for illustrative purposes because it is very unlikely to be implemented, and has little apparent danger or emotional load (in contrast to, for example, curing cancer or winning wars). This produces a thought experiment which shows the contingency of human values: An extremely powerful optimizer (a highly intelligent agent) could seek goals that are completely alien to ours (orthogonality thesis), and as a side-effect destroy us by consuming resources essential to our survival.
described by Bostrom (2003), a paperclip maximizer is an artificial general intelligence (AGI) whose goal is to maximize the number of paperclips in its collection. If it has been constructed with a roughly human level of general intelligence, the AGI might collect paperclips, earn money to buy paperclips, or begin to manufacture paperclips.
Probable first mention by Yudkowsky on the extropians mailing list:
I wouldn't be as disturbed if I thought the class of hostile AIs I was
talking about would have any of those qualities except for pure
computational intelligence devoted to manufacturing an infinite number of
paperclips. It turns out that the fact that this seems extremely "stupid"
to us relies on our full moral architectures.
A Paperclip Maximizer is a hypothetical artificial intelligence whose utility function values something that humans would consider almost worthless, like maximizing the number of paperclips in the universe.
It's possible to have an AI with a high level of general intelligence which does not reach the same moral conclusions that humans do. Some people might intuitively think that something so smart should want something as "stupid" as paperclips, but there are possible minds with high intelligence that pursue any number of different goals.
-Instrumental convergence: The paperclip maximizer only cares about paperclips, but maximizing them implies taking control of all matter and energy within reach, as well as other goals like preventing itself from being shut off or having its goals changed.
" The AI does not hate you, nor does it love you, but you are made out of atoms which it can use for something else ."
AI that, being naively trained to value happiness, tiles the universe with tiny molecular smiley faces. Paperclip maximizers have also been the subject of much humor on Less Wrong. A paperclip maximizer in a scenario is often given the name Clippy, in reference to the animated paperclip in older Microsoft Office software.
Agree these are different concepts. The paperclip maximizer is good story to explain to a newbie in this topic. "You tell the AI to make you paperclips, it turns the whole universe into paperclips." Nobody believes that this is exactly what will happen, but it is a good story for pedagogical purposes. The squiggle maximizer, on the other hand, appears to be a high-level theory about what the AI actually ultimately does after killing all humans. I haven't seen any arguments for why molecular squiggles are a more likely outcome than paperclips or anything else. Where is that case made?