1.All related to parenting and childcare. Most parents may not want a robot to babysit their children.
2.Art history and museums. There is a lot of physical work and non-text knowledge involved and demand may remain. This includes art restoration (until clouds of nanobots will do it).
If we will very quickly constantly replace a mind with its copies, the mind may not have subjective experiences. Why I think that?
Subjective experience appear only when a mind moves from the state A.1 to the state A.2. That is, between A.I (I see an apple) electric signals move through circuits and in the A.2 moment I say "I see an apple!" Subjective experience of the color of apple is happening after A.1 but before A.2.
Frozen mind in A.1 will not have subjective experience.
Now if I replace this process with a series of snapshots of the brain-states, there will be no intermediate calculations between A.1 and A.2 which produce the subjective experiences of apple and we get something like philozomby.
Obviously, we need to know what will be the mind-state A.2 without performing the needed calculations, or that calculations themselves will have the experience. But if A.2 is simple like just saying "I see apple" we can guess about A.2 without having all internal processes.
It may seem as a minor issue in Mars teleporter thought experiment as in the worst case only a small fraction of a second of consciousness disappears for the copy. But if we will replace a mind million times a second, we will get a p-zombie.
Or we need to take some illusionist position about qualia: they do not exist at all, so they are not an epiphenomena of calculations.
We can escape microscopic blackout during Mars Transporter if the coping will be performed after A.2 has finished, but when the mind state A.3 has not started yet, but this is not how the brain works as processes in it are asynchronous. We don't know how such microscopic blackout will affect the next qualia after that. We don't have a theory of qualia. Maybe after microscopic blackout we will get different set of basic qualia, like red and green will change place. In that case, the copy will be subjectively different from me.
Actually, it looks like from this that FNIC favors simpler ways of abiogenesis - as there will be more planets with life and more chances for me to appear.
Abiogenesis seems to depend on the random synthesis of a 100-pieces long stand of RNA capable to self-replicate. Chances of it on any given planet is like 10E-50.
Interstellar panspermia has much less variables, and we know that most of its ingredients are already in place: martian meteorites, interstellar comets. It may have like 0.01 initial probability.
Non-observation of aliens may be explained by the fact that a) either p(intelligence|life) is very small or b) we are the first of many nearby siblings and will meet them soon (local grabby aliens).
My reasoning is the following:
1.My experience will be the same in the planets with and without panspermia, as it is basically invisible for now.
2. If Universe is very large and slightly diverse, there are regions where panspermia is possible and regions where they are not - without any visible for us consequences.
3. (Assumptions) Abiogenesis is difficult, but potentially habitable planets are very numerous.
4. In the regions with pasnpermia, life will be disseminated from initial Edem to millions habitable planets in the Galaxy.
5. For every habitable planet in the non-panspermia region there will be million habitable planets in panseprmia-region.
6. As there is no observable differences between regions, for any my exact copy in non-panspermia region there will be million my copies in paspermia regions. (May be I am wrongly understand FNIC, but this is how I apply it.)
What do you think?
The case for panspermia seems simpler than Sleeping beauty, as it doesn't include possible worlds. Imagine that there are two regions of the Universe, in one of which panspermia is possible and in another is not. The one where it is possible has, 100 times more habitable planets per volume. This suggests that we are more likely to be in the region in which panspermia is happening.
On the other hand, if you simply tried to approximate median human age by doing that estimate at every year, then your results would be pretty bad. Most of the estimates would be very off.
Most of the estimates will not be very off. 90 per cent of them will give the correct order of magnitude.
I think this is a toy problem about how to cooperate with own copies, especially in the cases where it is acausal cooperation in which different copies have to act differently. Similar to "Death in Damascus". Random generator is a good thing to diverge, but naturally flipping process is better.
What you are saying reminds me of FNIC - full non-indexical conditioning. It was discussed on LW. It still may have some anthropic effects - like panspermia is more likely, but may be used against DA.
However, most facts about my personality are irrelevant to my thought process about anthropic. There was a good term "people in my epistemic situation" used in the SIA-thread here in LW.
another example: I can use my age as random sample of human ages and predict that median human life expectancy based on it. This works despite my ages being subsequent from one to another.
For three person in the room - I assume that some amnesia drug removed the knowledge of who exactly I am.
For Doomsday argument we should use only competent observers who at least can think about complex math of Doomsday argument. In other words, I randomly selected from the set of competent observers.
However, my parents was not the members of this class. They were clever, but never look at that direction. So your argument about parents doesn't work for DA. Also, first competent observers appeared around 1970, so the Doomsday is in next few decades.
Also, I still not getting the main idea of your argument. For example, if there are three people in a room who are my grandmother, mother and I. I know only that I am one of them - how it changes that I am grandmother?
Chances of being injured in head but not brain damaged are rather small, I think less than 10 per cent. So in 90 per cent of branches where shots were fired in his head directions, he is seriously injured or dead.
However, climbing to roof without Secret Service reaction was also a very unlikely event. May be only 10 per cent chance of success.
Combining, I get 9 per cent of him being dead or seriously injured yesterday.