Senior research analyst at Open Philanthropy. Recently completed a doctorate in philosophy at the University of Oxford. Opinions my own.
(Partly re-hashing my response from twitter.)
I'm seeing your main argument here as a version of what I call, in section 4.4, a "speed argument against schemers" -- e.g., basically, that SGD will punish the extra reasoning that schemers need to perform.
(I’m generally happy to talk about this reasoning as a complexity penalty, and/or about the params it requires, and/or about circuit-depth -- what matters is the overall "preference" that SGD ends up with. And thinking of this consideration as a different kind of counting argument *against* schemers seems like it might well be a productive frame. I do also think that questions about whether models will be bottlenecked on serial computation, and/or whether "shallower" computations will be selected for, are pretty relevant here, and the report includes a rough calculation in this respect in section 4.4.2 (see also summary here).)
Indeed, I think that maybe the strongest single argument against scheming is a combination of
My sense is that I'm less confident than you in both (1) and (2), but I think they're both plausible (the report, in particular, argues in favor of (1)), and that the combination is a key source of hope. I'm excited to see further work fleshing out the case for both (including e.g. the sorts of arguments for (2) that I took you and Nora to be gesturing at on twitter -- the report doesn't spend a ton of time on assessing how much path-dependence to expect, and of what kind).
Re: your discussion of the "ghost of instrumental reasoning," "deducing lots of world knowledge 'in-context,' and "the perspective that NNs will 'accidentally' acquire such capabilities internally as a convergent result of their inductive biases" -- especially given that you only skimmed the report's section headings and a small amount of the content, I have some sense, here, that you're responding to other arguments you've seen about deceptive alignment, rather than to specific claims made in the report (I don't, for example, make any claims about world knowledge being derived "in-context," or about models "accidentally" acquiring flexible instrumental reasoning). Is your basic thought something like: sure, the models will develop flexible instrumental reasoning that could in principle be used in service of arbitrary goals, but they will only in fact use it in service of the specified goal, because that's the thing training pressures them to do? If so, my feeling is something like: ok, but a lot of the question here is whether using the instrumental reasoning in service of some other goal (one that backchains into getting-reward) will be suitably compatible with/incentivized by training pressures as well. And I don't see e.g. the reversal curse as strong evidence on this front.
Re: "mechanistically ungrounded intuitions about 'goals' and 'tryingness'" -- as I discuss in section 0.1, the report is explicitly setting aside disputes about whether the relevant models will be well-understood as goal-directed (my own take on that is in section 2.2.1 of my report on power-seeking AI here). The question in this report is whether, conditional on goal-directedness, we should expect scheming. That said, I do think that what I call the "messyness" of the relevant goal-directedness might be relevant to our overall assessment of the arguments for scheming in various ways, and that scheming might require an unusually high standard of goal-directedness in some sense. I discuss this in section 2.2.3, on "'Clean' vs. 'messy' goal-directedness," and in various other places in the report.
Re: "long term goals are sufficiently hard to form deliberately that I don't think they'll form accidentally" -- the report explicitly discusses cases where we intentionally train models to have long-term goals (both via long episodes, and via short episodes aimed at inducing long-horizon optimization). I think scheming is more likely in those cases. See section 2.2.4, "What if you intentionally train the model to have long-term goals?" That said, I'd be interested to see arguments that credit assignment difficulties actively count against the development of beyond-episode goals (whether in models trained on short episodes or long episodes) for models that are otherwise goal-directed. And I do think that, if we could be confident that models trained on short episodes won't learn beyond-episode goals accidentally (even irrespective of mundane adversarial training -- e.g., that models rewarded for getting gold coins on the episode would not learn a goal that generalizes to caring about gold coins in general, even prior to efforts to punish it for sacrificing gold-coins-on-the-episode for gold-coins-later), that would be a significant source of comfort (I discuss some possible experimental directions in this respect in section 6.2).
I agree that AIs only optimizing for good human ratings on the episode (what I call "reward-on-the-episode seekers") have incentives to seize control of the reward process, that this is indeed dangerous, and that in some cases it will incentivize AIs to fake alignment in an effort to seize control of the reward process on the episode (I discuss this in the section on "non-schemers with schemer-like traits"). However, I also think that reward-on-the-episode seekers are also substantially less scary than schemers in my sense, for reasons I discuss here (i.e., reasons to do with what I call "responsiveness to honest tests," the ambition and temporal scope of their goals, and their propensity to engage in various forms of sandbagging and what I call "early undermining"). And this especially for reward-on-the-episode seekers with fairly short episodes, where grabbing control over the reward process may not be feasible on the relevant timescales.
Agree that it would need to have some conception of the type of training signal to optimize for, that it will do better in training the more accurate its picture of the training signal, and that this provides an incentive to self-locate more accurately (though not necessary to degree at stake in e.g. knowing what server you're running on).
The question of how strongly training pressures models to minimize loss is one that I isolate and discuss explicitly in the report, in section 1.5, "On 'slack' in training" -- and at various points the report references how differing levels of "slack" might affect the arguments it considers. Here I was influenced in part by discussions with various people, yourself included, who seemed to disagree about how much weight to put on arguments in the vein of: "policy A would get lower loss than policy B, so we should think it more likely that SGD selects policy A than policy B."
(And for clarity, I don't think that arguments of this form always support expecting models to do tons of reasoning about the training set-up. For example, as the report discusses in e.g. Section 4.4, on "speed arguments," the amount of world-modeling/instrumental-reasoning that the model does can affect the loss it gets via e.g. using up cognitive resources. So schemers -- and also, reward-on-the-episode seekers -- can be at some disadvantage, in this respect, relative to models that don't think about the training process at all.)
Agents that end up intrinsically motivated to get reward on the episode would be "terminal training-gamers/reward-on-the-episode seekers," and not schemers, on my taxonomy. I agree that terminal training-gamers can also be motivated to seek power in problematic ways (I discuss this in the section on "non-schemers with schemer-like traits"), but I think that schemers proper are quite a bit scarier than reward-on-the-episode seekers, for reasons I describe here.
I found this post a very clear and useful summary -- thanks for writing.
Re: "0.00002 would be one in five hundred thousand, but with the percent sign it's one in fifty million." -- thanks, edited.
Re: volatility -- thanks, that sounds right to me, and like a potentially useful dynamic to have in mind.
Oops! You're right, this isn't the right formulation of the relevant principle. Will edit to reflect.
Really appreciated this sequence overall, thanks for writing.
I really like this post. It's a crisp, useful insight, made via a memorable concrete example (plus a few others), in a very efficient way. And it has stayed with me.