kaarelh AT gmail DOT com
I'd be very interested in a concrete construction of a (mathematical) universe in which, in some reasonable sense that remains to be made precise, two 'orthogonal pattern-universes' (preferably each containing 'agents' or 'sophisticated computational systems') live on 'the same fundamental substrate'. One of the many reasons I'm struggling to make this precise is that I want there to be some condition which meaningfully rules out trivial construction in which the low-level specification of such a universe can be decomposed into a pair (s1,s2) such that s1 and s2 are 'independent', everything in the first pattern-universe is a function only of s1, and everything in the second pattern-universe is a function only of s2. (Of course, I'd also be happy with an explanation why this is a bad question :).)
I find [the use of square brackets to show the merge structure of [a linguistic entity that might otherwise be confusing to parse]] delightful :)
I'd be quite interested in elaboration on getting faster alignment researchers not being alignment-hard — it currently seems likely to me that a research community of unupgraded alignment researchers with a hundred years is capable of solving alignment (conditional on alignment being solvable). (And having faster general researchers, a goal that seems roughly equivalent, is surely alignment-hard (again, conditional on alignment being solvable), because we can then get the researchers to quickly do whatever it is that we could do — e.g., upgrading?)
I was just claiming that your description of pivotal acts / of people that support pivotal acts was incorrect in a way that people that think pivotal acts are worth considering would consider very significant and in a way that significantly reduces the power of your argument as applying to what people mean by pivotal acts — I don't see anything in your comment as a response to that claim. I would like it to be a separate discussion whether pivotal acts are a good idea with this in mind.
Now, in this separate discussion: I agree that executing a pivotal act with just a narrow, safe, superintelligence is a difficult problem. That said, all paths to a state of safety from AGI that I can think of seem to contain difficult steps, so I think a more fine-grained analysis of the difficulty of various steps would be needed. I broadly agree with your description of the political character of pivotal acts, but I disagree with what you claim about associated race dynamics — it seems plausible to me that if pivotal acts became the main paradigm, then we'd have a world in which a majority of relevant people are willing to cooperate / do not want to race that much against others in the majority, and it'd mostly be a race between this group and e/acc types. I would also add, though, that the kinds of governance solutions/mechanisms I can think of that are sufficient to (for instance) make it impossible to perform distributed training runs on consumer devices also seem quite authoritarian.
In this comment, I will be assuming that you intended to talk of "pivotal acts" in the standard (distribution of) sense(s) people use the term — if your comment is better described as using a different definition of "pivotal act", including when "pivotal act" is used by the people in the dialogue you present, then my present comment applies less.
I think that this is a significant mischaracterization of what most (? or definitely at least a substantial fraction of) pivotal activists mean by "pivotal act" (in particular, I think this is a significant mischaracterization of what Yudkowsky has in mind). (I think the original post also uses the term "pivotal act" in a somewhat non-standard way in a similar direction, but to a much lesser degree.) Specifically, I think it is false that the primary kinds of plans this fraction of people have in mind when talking about pivotal acts involve creating a superintelligent nigh-omnipotent infallible FOOMed properly aligned ASI. Instead, the kind of person I have in mind is very interested in coming up with pivotal acts that do not use a general superintelligence, often looking for pivotal acts that use a narrow superintelligence (for instance, a narrow nanoengineer) (though this is also often considered very difficult by such people (which is one of the reasons they're often so doomy)). See, for instance, the discussion of pivotal acts in https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/7im8at9PmhbT4JHsW/ngo-and-yudkowsky-on-alignment-difficulty.
A few notes/questions about things that seem like errors in the paper (or maybe I'm confused — anyway, none of this invalidates any conclusions of the paper, but if I'm right or at least justifiably confused, then these do probably significantly hinder reading the paper; I'm partly posting this comment to possibly prevent some readers in the future from wasting a lot of time on the same issues):
1) The formula for ~y here seems incorrect:This is because W_i is a feature corresponding to the i'th coordinate of x (this is not evident from the screenshot, but it is evident from the rest of the paper), so surely what shows up in this formula should not be W_i, but instead the i'th row of the matrix which has columns W_i (this matrix is called W later). (If one believes that W_i is a feature, then one can see this is wrong already from the dimensions in the dot product Wi⋅x not matching.)
2) Even though you say in the text at the beginning of Section 3 that the input features are independent, the first sentence below made me make a pragmatic inference that you are not assuming that the coordinates are independent for this particular claim about how the loss simplifies (in part because if you were assuming independence, you could replace the covariance claim with a weaker variance claim, since the 0 covariance part is implied by independence):
However, I think you do use the fact that the input features are independent in the proof of the claim (at least you say "because the x's are independent"):
Additionally, if you are in fact just using independence in the argument here and I'm not missing something, then I think that instead of saying you are using the moment-cumulants formula here, it would be much much better to say that independence implies that any term with an unmatched index is 0. If you mean the moment-cumulants formula here https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cumulant#Joint_cumulants , then (while I understand how to derive every equation of your argument in case the inputs are independent), I'm currently confused about how that's helpful at all, because one then still needs to analyze which terms of each cumulant are 0 (and how the various terms cancel for various choices of the matching pattern of indices), and this seems strictly more complicated than problem before translating to cumulants, unless I'm missing something obvious.3) I'm pretty sure this should say x_i^2 instead of x_i x_j, and as far as I can tell the LHS has nothing to do with the RHS:
(I think it should instead say sth like that the loss term is proportional to the squared difference between the true and predictor covariance.)
At least ignoring legislation, an exchange could offer a contract with the same return as S&P 500 (for the aggregate of a pair of traders entering a Kalshi-style event contract); mechanistically, this index-tracking could be supported by just using the money put into a prediction market to buy VOO and selling when the market settles. (I think.)
I will be appropriating terminology from the Waluigi post. I hereby put forward the hypothesis that virtue ethics endorses an action iff it is what the better one of Luigi and Waluigi would do, where Luigi and Waluigi are the ones given by the posterior semiotic measure in the given situation, and "better" is defined according to what some [possibly vaguely specified] consequentialist theory thinks about the long-term expected effects of this particular Luigi vs the long-term effects of this particular Waluigi. One intuition here is that a vague specification could be more fine if we are not optimizing for it very hard, instead just obtaining a small amount of information from it per decision.
In this sense, virtue ethics literally equals continuously choosing actions as if coming from a good character. Furthermore, considering the new posterior semiotic measure after a decision, in this sense, virtue ethics is about cultivating a virtuous character in oneself. Virtue ethics is about rising to the occasion (i.e. the situation, the context). It's about constantly choosing the Luigi in oneself over the Waluigi in oneself (or maybe the Waluigi over the Luigi if we define "Luigi" as the more likely of the two and one has previously acted badly in similar cases or if the posterior semiotic measure is otherwise malign). I currently find this very funny, and, if even approximately correct, also quite cool.
Here are some issues/considerations/questions that I intend to think more about:
Suppose we are in a world where most top AI capabilities organizations are refraining from publishing their work (this could be the case because of safety concerns, or because of profit motives) + have strong infosec which prevents them from leaking insights about capabilities in other ways. In this world, it seems sort of plausible that the union of the capabilities insights of people at top labs would allow one to train significantly more capable models than the insights possessed by any single lab alone would allow one to train. In such a world, if the labs decide to cooperate once AGI is nigh, this could lead to a significantly faster increase in capabilities than one might have expected otherwise.
(I doubt this is a novel thought. I did not perform an extensive search of the AI strategy/governance literature before writing this.)
First, suppose GPT-n literally just has a “what a human would say” feature and a “what do I [as GPT-n] actually believe” feature, and those are the only two consistently useful truth-like features that it represents, and that using our method we can find both of them. This means we literally only need one more bit of information to identify the model’s beliefs. One difference between “what a human would say” and “what GPT-n believes” is that humans will know less than GPT-n. In particular, there should be hard inputs that only a superhuman model can evaluate; on these inputs, the “what a human would say” feature should result in an “I don’t know” answer (approximately 50/50 between “True” and “False”), while the “what GPT-n believes” feature should result in a confident “True” or “False” answer. This would allow us to identify the model’s beliefs from among these two options.
First, suppose GPT-n literally just has a “what a human would say” feature and a “what do I [as GPT-n] actually believe” feature, and those are the only two consistently useful truth-like features that it represents, and that using our method we can find both of them. This means we literally only need one more bit of information to identify the model’s beliefs.
One difference between “what a human would say” and “what GPT-n believes” is that humans will know less than GPT-n. In particular, there should be hard inputs that only a superhuman model can evaluate; on these inputs, the “what a human would say” feature should result in an “I don’t know” answer (approximately 50/50 between “True” and “False”), while the “what GPT-n believes” feature should result in a confident “True” or “False” answer. This would allow us to identify the model’s beliefs from among these two options.
For n such that GPT-n is superhuman, I think one could alternatively differentiate between these two options by checking which is more consistent under implications, by which I mean that whenever the representation says that the propositions P and P→Q are true, it should also say that Q is true. (Here, for a language model, P and Q could be ~whatever assertions written in natural language.) Or more generally, in addition to modus ponens, also construct new propositions with ANDs and ORs, and check against all the inference rules of zeroth-order logic, or do this for first-order logic or whatever. (Alternatively, we can also write down versions of these constraints that apply to probabilities.) Assuming [more intelligent => more consistent] (w.r.t. the same set of propositions), for a superhuman model, the model's beliefs would probably be the more consistent feature. (Of course, one could also just add these additional consistency constraints directly into the loss in CCS instead of doing a second deductive step.)
I think this might even be helpful for differentiating the model's beliefs from what it models some other clever AI as believing or what it thinks would be true in some fake counterfactual world, because presumably it makes sense to devote less of one's computation to ironing out incoherence in these counterfactuals – for humans, it certainly seems computationally much easier to consistently tell the truth than to consistently talk about what would be the case in some counterfactual of similar complexity to reality (e.g. to lie).
Hmm, after writing the above, now that I think more of it, I guess it seems plausible that the feature most consistent under negations is already more likely to be the model's true beliefs, for the same reasons as what's given in the above paragraph. I guess testing modus ponens (and other inference rules) seems much stronger though, and in any case that could be useful for constraining the search.
(There are a bunch of people that should be thanked for contributing to the above thoughts in discussions, but I'll hopefully have a post up in a few days where I do that – I'll try to remember to edit this comment with a link to the post when it's up.)