re "The Axiom of Choice is necessary to select a set from an infinite number of pairs of socks, but not an infinite number of pairs of shoes." — Bertrand Russell, Introduction to mathematical philosophy
"Tarski told me the following story. He tried to publish his theorem [the equivalence between the Axiom of Choice and the statement 'every infinite set A has the same cardinality as AxA'] in the Comptes Rendus Acad. Sci. Paris but Fréchet and Lebesgue refused to present it. Fréchet wrote that an implication between two well known propositions is not a new result. Lebesgue wrote that an implication between two false propositions is of no interest. And Tarski said that after this misadventure he never again tried to publish in the Comptes Rendus." - Jan Mycielski, A System of Axioms of Set Theory for the Rationalists
The Axiom of Choice, the most controversial axiom of the 20th Century.
The axiom states that a certain kind of function, called a `choice' function, always exists. It is called a choice function, because, given a collection of non-empty sets, the function 'chooses' a single element from each of the sets. It is a powerful and useful axiom, asserting the existence of useful mathematical structures (such as bases for vector spaces of arbitrary dimension, and ultraproducts). It is a generally accepted axiom, and is in wide use by mathematicians. In fact, according to Elliott Mendelson in Introduction to Mathematical Logic (1964) "The status of the Axiom of Choice has become less controversial in recent years. To most mathematicians it seems quite plausible and it has so many important applications in practically all branches of mathematics that not to accept it would seem to be a wilful hobbling of the practicing mathematician. "
Neverless, being an axiom, it cannot be proven and must instead be assumed. In particular, it is an axiom of set theory and it is not provable from the other axioms (the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of Set Theory). In fact many mathematicians, in particular constructive mathematicians, reject the axiom, stating that it does not capture a 'real' or 'physical' property, but is instead just a mathematical oddity, an artefact of the mathematics used to approximate reality, rather than reality itself. In the words of the LessWrong community: the constructive mathematicians would claim it is a statement about the map, and not the territory.
Historically, the axiom has experienced much controversy. Before it was shown to be independent of the other axioms, it was believed either to follow from them (i.e., be 'True') or lead to a contradiction (i.e., be 'False'). Its independence from the other axioms was, in fact, a very surprising result at the time.
Intuitively, the axiom of choice states that, given a collection of non-empty sets, there is a function which selects a single element from each of the sets.
More formally, given a set
from
In logical notation,
For a finite set
The problem comes in if
To understand this properly, one must understand what it means to be able to 'describe' or 'construct' a function
Mathematicians have been using an intuitive concept of a set for probably as long as mathematics has been practiced. At first, mathematicians assumed that the axiom of choice was simply true (as indeed it is for finite collections of sets).
Georg Cantor introduced the concept of transfinite numbers and different cardinalities of infinity in a 1874 paper (which contains his infamous Diagonalization Argument) and along with this sparked the introduction of set theory. In 1883, Cantor introduced a principle called the 'Well-Ordering Princple' (discussed further in a section below) which he called a 'law of thought' (i.e., intuitively true). He attempted to prove this principle from his other principles, but found that he was unable to do so.
Ernst Zermelo attempted to develop an axiomatic treatment of set theory. He managed to prove the Well-Ordering Principle in 1904 by introducing a new principle: The Principle of Choice. This sparked much discussion amongst mathematicians. In 1908 published a paper containing responses to this debate, as well as a new formulation of the Axiom of Choice. In this year, he also published his first version of the set theoretic axioms, known as the Zermelo Axioms of Set Theory. Mathematicians, Abraham Fraenkel and Thoralf Skolem improved this system (independently of each other) into its modern version, the Zermelo Fraenkel Axioms of Set Theory.
In 1914, Felix Hausdorff proved Hausdorff's paradox. The ideas behind this proof were used in 1924 by Banach and Alfred Tarski to prove the more famous Banach-Tarski paradox (discussed in more detail below). This latter theorem is often quoted as evidence of the falsehood of the axiom of choice.
Between 1935 and 1938, Kurt Gödel proved that the Axiom of Choice is consistent with the rest of the ZF axioms.
Finally, in 1963, Paul Cohen developed a revolutionary mathematical technique called forcing, with which he proved that the axiom of choice could not be proven from the ZF axioms (in particular, that the negation of AC is consistent with ZF). For this, and his proof of the consistency of the negation of the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis from ZF, he was awarded a fields medal in 1966.
This axiom came to be accepted in the general mathematical community, but was rejected by the constructive mathematicians as being fundamentally non-constructive. However, it should be noted that in many forms of constructive mathematics, there are provable versions of the axiom of choice. The difference is that in general in constructive mathematics, exhibiting a set of non-empty sets (technically, in constructive set-theory, these should be 'inhabited' sets) also amounts to exhibiting a proof that they are all non-empty, which amounts to exhibiting an element for all of them, which amounts to exhibiting a function choosing an element in each. So in constructive mathematics, to even state that you have a set of inhabited sets requires stating that you have a choice function to these sets proving they are all inhabited.
Some explanation of the history of the axiom of choice (as well as some of its issues) can be found in the paper "100 years of Zermelo's axiom of choice: what was the problem with it?" by the constructive mathematician Per Martin-Löf at this webpage.
(Martin-Löf studied under Andrey Kolmogorov of Kolmogorov complexity and has made contributions to information theory, mathematical_statistics, and mathematical_logic, including developing a form of intuitionistic type theory).
A nice timeline is also summarised on Stanford Encyclopaedia of Logic.
The Axiom of Choice is in common use by mathematicians in practice. Amongst its many applications are the following:
This is the statment that taking the mathematical product of non-empty sets will always yield a non-empty set. Consider infinitely many sets
Note, that without the axiom, it is not necessarily the case that the product is empty. It just isn't provable that there are any elements. However, it is consistent that there exists some product that is empty. Also, bear in mind that even without the axiom of choice, there are products of this form which are non-empty. It just can't be shown that they are non-empty in general.
However, it does seem somewhat counterintuitive that such a product be non-empty. In general, given two non-empty sets,
This example is discussed in more detail in the next section.
A vector space can be intuitively thought of as a collection of vectors which themselves can be thought of as arrows (or the information of a 'direction' and a 'magnitude').
A vector space has a number of 'directions' in which the vectors can point, referred to as its vector_space_dimension. For a finite-dimensional vector space, it is possible to find a basis consisting of vectors. The property of a basis is that:
For finite-dimensional vector spaces, such a basis is finite and can be found. However, for infinite-dimensional vector spaces, a way of finding a basis does not always exist. In fact, if the axiom of choice is false, then there is an infinite-dimensional vector space for which it is impossible to find a basis.
Any continuous functions
In other words, there is at least one point
This works also for rectangles, and even in multiple dimensions. Hence, if true for real world objects, this theorem has the following somewhat surprising consequences:
The following example is somewhat technical. An attempt is made to describe it very roughly.
Given an indexing set
An ultrafilter
One of the applications of ultrafilters is ultraproducts. For each subset
Now, any statement that is either true for cofinitely many
One basic example of an application of ultrafilters is forming the nonstandard_real_numbers.
Further examples of applications of the axiom of choice may be found on the Wikipedia page here and here.
One of the most counter-intuitive consequences of the Axiom of Choice is the Banach-Tarski Paradox. It is a theorem provable using the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms along with the axiom of choice.
This theorem was proven in a 1924 paper by Stefan Banach and Alfred Tarski.
Intuitively, what the theorem says is that it is possible to take a ball, cut it into five pieces, rotate and shift these pieces and end up with two balls.
Now, there are some complications, including the fact the pieces themselves are infinitely complex, and the have to pass through each other when they are being shifted. There is no way a practical implementation of this theorem could be developed. Nevertheless, that the volume of a ball could be changed just by cutting, rotating and shifting seems highly counter-intuitive.
A suprisingly good video explanation in laymans terms by Vsauce can be found Here.
The video Infinity shapeshifter vs. Banach-Tarski paradox by Mathologor advertises itself as a prequel to the above video, which puts you 'in the mindset' of a mathematician, so-to-speak, and makes the result a bit less surprising.
This theorem is the main counterexample used as evidence of the falsehood of the Axiom of Choice. If not taken as evidence of its falsehood, thsi is at least used as evidence of the counter-intuitiveness of AC.
Q: What's an Anagram of Banach-Tarski? A: Banach-Tarski Banach Tarski
The Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms of Set Theory (ZF) introduce a fundamental concept, called a set, and a relation between sets, called the element of relation (usally written
What one must remember is that theorems derived from these axioms are merely statements of the form that 'if one has a system which satisfies these laws (even if, for example
In particular, a function can be interpreted as a specific kind of set. In particular, it is a set of ordered pairs (more generally, ordered n-tuples, each of which can itself be interpreted as a specific kind of set) satisfying a specific property.
There are different ways of stating the same axioms (by separating or combining axioms, giving different formulations of the same axioms, or giving different axioms that are equivalent given the other axioms) hence what follows is only a specific formulation, namely, the Zermelo-Fraenkel one from Wikipedia.
The axioms begin by stating that two sets are the same if they have the same elements. Then the axiom regularity states sets are well-behaved in a certain way that's not so important to us right now.
Now comes the part that is important for our purposes: The axiom schema of specification (actually a schema specifying infinitely many axioms, but we can pretend it is just one axiom for now). This is an axiom asserting the existence of certain sets. In a sense, it allows one to 'create' a new set out of an existing one. Namely, given a set
For example, if we know (or assume) the set of all numbers
Additionally the axioms of pairing and union, axiom schema of replacement, and axiom of power set are all of the form "Given that some sets
Notice that all of the above are axioms. It is not expected that any of them be proven. They are simply assumptions that you make about whichever system you want to reason. Any theorems that you can prove from these axioms will then be true about your system. However, mathematicians generally agree that these axioms capture our intuitive notion about how "sets" of objects (or even concepts) should behave, and about which sets we are allowed to reason (which sets 'exist'). Most of these (except maybe the axiom of infinity, and even that one possibly) seem to apply to our world and seem to work fine.
Now, the last axiom, the axiom of choice (or the well-ordering principle) asserts that a certain kind of function exists. It cannot be proven from the above. In other words, given a system that satisfies all of the above, it cannot be assumed that the system also satisfies this axiom (nor in fact that it does not satisfy this axiom). That's all there is to it, really.
Yet, mathematicians do disagree about this axiom, and whether it applies to our world as well. Some mathematicians take a Platonic view of mathematics, in which mathematical objects such as sets actually exist in some abstract realm, and for which the axiom of choice is either true or false, but we do not know which. Others take a highly constructive view (in many cases motivated by realism and the ability of the mathematics to model the world) in which either the axiom of choice is false, or infinite sets do not exist in which case the axiom of choice is provable and hence superfluous. Others take the view that the axiom is not true or false, but merely useless, and that anything provable from it is meaningless. Many seem not to care: the axiom is convenient for the mathematics they wish to do (whose application they are not much concerned about in any case) and hence they assume it without qualm. Another interpretation of the axiom is as analogous to Euclid's parallel postulate, delineating one region of the mathematical universe in which it is true from others where it might be replaced with alternatives.
How Could we Possibly Know that AC is Independent of ZF?# It has been stated above multiple times that the Axiom of Choice is independent from the other Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms. In other words, it can neither be proven nor disproven from those axioms. But how can we possibly know this fact?
The answer lies in models. However, these are not physical or even computational models, but models of a more abstract kind.
For example, a model of group theory is a specific group, which itself can be characterized as a specific set. Now, notice that the axioms of group theory say nothing about whether a given group is abelian (commutative) or not. It does not follow from the axioms that for groups it is always true that
In order to reason about such models of set theory, one assumes the existence of "meta-sets" in some meta-theory. The entire "universe" of set theory is then a certain "meta-set" behaving in a certain way. In case this feels too much like cheating, this StackExchange answer should help clear things up. In particular, the following quote from VanLiere's thesis:
" Since these questions all have to do with first-order provability, we could take as our metatheory some very weak theory (such as Peano arithmetic) which is sufficient for formalizing first-order logic. However, as is customary in treatises about set theory, we take as our metatheory ZF plus the Axiom of choice in order to have at our disposal the infinitary tools of model theory. We will also use locutions such as ... which are only really justifiable in some even stronger metatheory with the understanding that they could be eliminated through the use of Boolean-valued models or some other device. "
In other words, it is possible to form these models in some weaker theory on which we have "more of a grip". The entirety of set theory are then special objects satisfying the axioms of this weaker theory. Is it possible to repeat this process ad infinitum? No. But if we want, we could even deal with just a finite fragment of set theory: We assume that any mathematics we want to do only needs a finite number of the (infinitely many) axioms of set theory. We then prove what we want about this finite fragment. But we may as well have proved it about the whole theory.
Now, pick (or construct) two specific objects of the meta-theory such that in one of them, the axiom of choice is true, and that in the other, the axiom of choice is false.
To obtain these two models requires vastly different approaches which will not be described in detail here. More detail can be found online in Kunen's text. The consistency of choice is the easier direction, and involves constructing something called Gödel's constructible universe of sets (or just Gödel's universe or the constructible universe). The consistency of the negation of choice is more difficult, and involves a technique developed by Paul Cohen called forcing.
There are a few similar ways to state the axiom of choice. For example:
Given any set
There are also many alternative theorems which at first glance appear to be very different from the axiom of choice, but which are actually equivalent to it, in the sense that each of the theorems can both be proven from the axiom of choice and be used to prove it (in conjunction with the other ZF axioms).
A few examples: - Zorn's Lemma (Described in more detail below). - Well-Ordering Theorem (Also described in more detail below). - The product of non-empty sets is non-empty. - Tarski's Theorem for Binary Products (from the quote at the start of this article) that
- Every surjective function has a right inverse. - Given two sets, either - Every vector space has a basis - Every connected graph has a spanning tree. - For any pair of sets have comparable[-4w5 cardinality]: for any pair of sets
More examples can be found on the Wikipedia page.
Because of the intuitive nature of some of these statements (especially that products are non-empty, that vector spaces have bases and that cardinalities are comparable), they are often used as evidence for the truth, or motivation for the use, of the Axiom of Choice.
The following is a specific example of a very common way in which the axiom of choice is used, called Zorn's Lemma. It is a statement equivalent to the axiom of choice, but easier to use in many mathematical applications.
The statement is as follows:
Every partially ordered set (poset) for which every chain has an upper bound has a maximal element.
In other words, if you have an ordered set
Again, this is provable for a finite poset X, and for some infinite posets X, but not provable in general.
Zorn's Lemma can be proven by using the axiom of Choice to choose the elements in a particular such chain which is so long that it cannot be extended in the 'upwards' direction by adding a further element to it; the existence of this chain combined with the fact that each one has an upper bound implies that there is a maximal element, namely that chain's upper bound.
Consider that if Zorn's lemma were false, then it would not be possible to extend the chain that far, in which case it would have an upper bound, by the chain hypothesis. But this upper bound would need to be less than some element in the partially ordered set, otherwise it would be maximal, and that even larger element could then be appended to lengthen the chain, contradicting the assumption that it couldn't be extended.
How can this chain be 'constructed' 'chosen'? Clearly, the partially ordered set contains at least one element. This element can be designated the least or first in the chain. We can then define a set to be the minimal subset of the partially ordered set which satisfies certain criteria:
While this may seem like a strange or convoluted definition, it's actually very similar to the principle of mathematical induction. The (Von-Neumann ordinal) set of all natural numbers (ω) is defined to be the smallest set which:
This definition ensures the existence of the whole set of natural numbers, but it does it in a way which doesn't require an infinite number of symbols, namely by a kind of self reference: the set contains the successor of any element it contains. It also ensures that if you have a statement which is true of 0, and you know that it's also true of the successor of any natural number of which it's true, then the set of all natural numbers of which it's true satisfies the above criteria and therefore contains all the natural numbers. This is because it is the minimal set with this property, so any other set with it must, by definition, include it.
In other words, the set of natural numbers has the smallest infinite(i.e. unending as the definition explicates) ordinal number of elements. That such a set exists is guaranteed by the Axiom of Infinity.
Unfortunately, however, the principle of ordinary mathematical induction only suffices to prove a special case of Zorn's lemma; what if the poset in question contains, in addition to all n, the integer infinity ω itself? Then a chain defined to contain 0 and the successor of each of its elements will, although infinite, miss out on the maximal element of the set, namely ω. What is needed is a principle which enables us to traverse the gaps between different infinities, 'going beyond infinity' . The problem with the principle of Mathematical induction in this regard is that it only 'gets to' the direct successor of each element, so it can only 'reach' an element which has a direct predecessor, but there is no largest finite number preceding ω, so it can never 'get all the way to' ω. The definition above, however, could 'reach' ω because even though ω has no individual predecessor, it does have a set of all its predecessors known as its initial segment, namely itself. It is referred to as the principle of transfinite induction, and can in fact 'reach as far as it is possible to reach' within the partially ordered set.
The final task is to prove that the set it delineates really is a chain. To this end we demonstrate that each element chosen by the Axiom of Choice follows its unbroken chain in the same way ω succeeds all the natural numbers. To achieve this, we will prove an equivalent statement about these 'anchored unbroken chains' or 'antechains' as we call them: that none of them 'gives rise to' anything beyond any element beyond any of its elements. This is to say that it does not include any antechains (including itself) whose chosen element is greater than any element which strictly exceeds all of its elements. That this is true of all such chains less than a given element is a statement about said element, the induction hypothesis.
As this is a statement about each element, all we need to do is to prove that the version of it that applies to the initial element holds, and that it is true of the element chosen to follow any antechain consisting entirely of elements of which it is true, in direct analogy with mathematical induction.
Clearly this induction hypothesis is vacuously true when applied to the initial element...We now hypothesize that it is true of an antechain; it is apparent that the only way it might fail to hold in the case of the chain obtained by appending the chosen element to this one would be if it were broken. In particular, there could be further elements between this chain's chosen element and itself.
However, we can define a potentially new subset of the partially ordered set as follows: we take the element chosen to succeed the original antechain to be the least element of this subset, and stipulate that the new choice function coincides with the original wherever the initial segment whose element it chooses is a subset of the initial segment for which it chose the same element in the original construction. Otherwise, we define this set in exactly the same way as the original. We then take its union with the original antechain, to obtain something which we can easily confirm to satisfy both criteria of our definition. By virtue of the lack of any element which might be there for any reason other than that it meets them, we can conclude that this subset is minimal, so that it satisfies the definition by transfinite induction and that any other set which does, in particular the original, must be the same set. Although we have arrived at the same set again, it is now manifest that this set does not contain any of the 'missing link' elements, as neither of its constituent sets contain them. We can conclude that the induction hypothesis is true with respect to the element chosen to succeed the original antechain, and therefore that it is true of the entire set we've defined.
We have not yet shown that the set is a chain; to do so, we nest one application of the principle of transfinite induction inside another in a process called double induction. To initiate the first layer, we note that its least element is comparable to each of the others by definition, and again assume that there exists an antechain each of the elements of which is also comparable to each of the others in our set. To demonstrate that the same is true of the element chosen to succeed this chain, we apply the principle of transfinite induction again, now to the elements being compared to it. We observe that it is comparable to the initial element and that if it lies within the antechain compared to it, then it is also smaller than the 'successor' element selected by the Axiom of Choice. Alternatively, it could be that every element in that entire unbroken chain precedes the element to which they are being compered, and we have already seen that this is a minimal element greater than those in its own antechain. In addition to this, we can prove by contradiction that of any two antechains in this set, the shorter constitutes an initial segment of the longer, which, together with the former result, entails that either the element to which the others are compared is that chosen to succeed them, or it is greater than this element. We can infer that the set of all elements comparable to the selected element on the first layer is the entire subset defined by transfinite induction, and therefore that the set of all elements comparable to all those elements is the entire subset , or, in other words, that it is totally ordered. The existence of this inextensible chain contradicts the assumption that each chain has an upper bound even though no maximal element lies within the partially ordered set, i.e. that Zorn's lemma is false, therefore Zorn's lemma is true. Equivalently, we can observe that the chain hypothesis implies that this chain has an upper bound, and this must be a maximal element, as the chain is defined to contain any element larger than any of its initial segments.
The Axiom of Choice was required to define this chain because an infinite number of choices needed to be made 'simultaneously' ; the definition of the chain was expressed in the timeless language of set theory, preventing it from referring to antechains 'already having been constructed' in order to show that further such chains exist by observing that the partially ordered set contained at least one element which could be appended to each at the 'next' step of the construction. For any finite chain, this approach might be helpful because we could simply explicate its construction, but we didn't know the partially ordered set was finite .
Interestingly, we can see that any subset containing elements of the 'chosen' chain either contains the initial element, or contains only elements which are greater than those of some subset of this chain (at the very least, that containing the initial element alone). The union of all of the subsets of the chain whose elements are smaller than the subset in question is clearly an unbroken anchored chain. This means that the element chosen by the choice function to be greater than this chain is the least element of the subset in question, and we can infer that this is true of all of the non empty subsets of the maximal chain, a property known as being well ordered.
Now, why is this rather arcane statement useful?
Well, often for some type of mathematical structure we are interested in, all the structures of that type form a poset under inclusion, and if a maximal such structure existed, it would have a particularly nice property. Furthermore, for many structures, a union of all the structures in a upwards-increasing chain of such structures (under inclusion) is itself a structure of the right type, as well as an upper-bound for the chain. Then Zorn's lemma gives us the maximal structure we are looking for.
As an example, consider a (esp. infinite-dimensional) vector space
Choose any element
It can be shown to be linearly independent, since if some element
Then every chain of such linearly indpendent sets has an upper bound, so the hypothesis of Zorn's Lemma holds. Then by Zorn's Lemma, there is a maximal element
Since the definition of a basis is a maximal linearly independent set spanning
One might wonder why Zorn's lemma is even necessary. Why could we not just have picked the union of the chain as our basis? In a sense, we could have, provided we use the correct chain. For example, the chain of two elements
But there is a difference between being able to prove that any chain has an upper bound, and being able to actually choose a specific chain that works. In some sense, without Zorns lemma, we can reason in a very general vague way that, yes, the chains all have upper bounds, and there might be a long enough chain, and if there is then its upper bound will be the maximal element we need. Zorn's lemma formalizes this intuition, and without it, lemma we can't always pin down a specific chain which works.
Note how Zorn's Lemma allows us to make infinitely many arbitrary choices as far as selecting elements of the infinite basis for the vector space is concerned. In general, this is where Zorn's lemma comes in useful.
The upper bounds are necessary. For example, in the natural numbers
Note that it may also be possible for a maximal element to exist without there being an upper bound. Consider for example the natural numbers with an 'extra' element which is not comparable to any of the numbers. Then this is a perfectly acceptable poset. Since this extra element is incomparable, then in particular there is no element larger than all n.
In fact, the Axiom of Choice follows from Zorn's Lemma,
because if there is a set of sets, for example :
and if there are two sets, each of which contains exactly one subset of each set in this set of sets, such as :
and
then we can consider the latter to be smaller than the former because of this inclusion, and both of them to be members of a partially ordered set of subsets of the original set. We can see that any chain of these sets ordered in this way has an upper bound which can be obtained simply by taking the intersections of their elements, which in this case yields
A linearly ordered set is called well-ordered if any of its non-empty subsets has a least element.
For example, the natural numbers
The positive real numbers (and in fact the positive rational numbers) are not well-ordered. There is no least element, since for any number bigger than zero (e.g. 1/3) it is possible to find a smaller number (e.g. 1/4) which is also bigger than zero.
The well-ordering principle states that any set is bijective to some well-ordered one. This basically states that you can have a well-ordered set of any size.
To see why this is surprising, try imaging a different linear order on the reals such that any subset you may choose - Any subset - has a least element.
Again, the Axiom of Choice allows us to do this.
In fact if we are always able to well order sets, then we are able to use it to make choice functions: imagine you needed to choose an element from each set in a set of sets, then you can just choose the least element from each set.
All well ordered sets are susceptible to transfinite induction. This means that if we can prove that any statement which is true of all elements smaller than a given element in the well-ordered set is also true of that element, it follows that it is true of every element in the well ordered set. This extends the principle of mathematical induction to apply to sets of vastly larger cardinality than the set of natural numbers.
There are also theorems which do not follow from ZF, and which do follow from AC, but are not strong enough to use to prove AC. What this is equivalent to saying is that there are models of set theory in which these theorems are true, but for which the axiom of choice does not hold in full generality.
A few examples of such theorems:
More examples may be found on Wikipedia page.
Intuitively, the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) states that there is no set strictly bigger than the set of all natural numbers, but strictly smaller than the set of all real numbers. (These are two infinite sets, but they are different infinities).
The formal statement concerns cardinality of sets. In particular, it states that there is no set which has cardinality strictly larger than the set of natural numbers, but strictly smaller than the set of real numbers.
It is called the 'Continuum Hypothesis' because it concerns the size of the continuum (the set of real numbers) and was hypothesized to be true by Georg Cantor in 1878.
It is again independent of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms, and this was proven in the same manner and at the same time as the proof of the independence of AC from ZF (described in more detail above).
In fact, the continuum hypothesis was shown to be independent even from ZFC, (ZF with the Axiom of Choice). However, the continuum hypothesis implies the Axiom of Choice under ZF. In other words, given the ZF axioms, if you know that the Axiom of Choice is true then you do not yet know anything about the truth of Continuum Hypothesis. However, if you know that the Continuum Hypothesis is true, then you know the Axiom of Choice must also be true.
The Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) is, well, a generalized version of the Continuum Hypothesis, stating that not only are there no sets of size lying strictly between the natural numbers
Why does the axiom of choice have such a bad reputation with constructive mathematicians?
It is important to realise that some of the reasons mathematicians had for doubting AC are no longer relevant. Because of some of its counter-intuitive results, mathematicians
To understand this view, it is necessary to understand more about the constructive view in general. %TODO
(Posting a list of links here until I have a better idea of what to write, in approx. reverse order of relevance / usefulness) See also
It is also possible to assume axioms which contradict the axiom of choice. For example, there is the Axiom of Determinancy. This axiom states that for any two-person game of a certain type, one player has a winning strategy. %TODO
There are a few examples of very counter-intuitive solutions to (seemingly) impossible challanges which work only in the presence of the Axiom of Choice.
Examples may be found in the following places: