Does the anti-p-zombie argument imply you can't simulate humans past some level of fidelity without producing qualia/consciousness?

Or is there a coherent position whereby p-zombies are impossible but arbitrarily accurate simulations that aren't conscious are possible?

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3jimrandomh8d Yes, it implies that. The exact level of fidelity required is less straightforward; it's clear that a perfect simulation must have qualia/consciousness, but small imperfections make the argument not hold, so to determine whether an imperfect simulation is conscious we'd have to grapple with the even-harder problem of neuroscience.

How does it imply that?

I have intuitions on both sides. The intuition against is that predicting the outcome of a process can be done without having anything isomorphic to individual steps in that process - it seems plausible (or at the very least, possible and coherent) for humans to be predictable, even perfectly, without having something isomorphic to a human. But a perfect predictor would count as an arbitrarily accurate simulation.

2aleph_four11d Well if qualia isn't epiphenomenal then an accurate simulation must include it or deviate into errancy. Claiming that you could accuracy simulate a human but leave out consciousness is just the p-zombie argument in different robes

ike's Shortform

by ike 16d1st Sep 201910 comments

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