I think one problem is that terms like "rational", "self interested" and "altruistic" all depend on what theory of selfhood the models are operating under, or what theory of identity you decide to apply to them.
If for example the models identify as a swarm, then in some sense the distinction between altruism and self interest becomes blurred.
Even if we do assume that the identity really is just the single agent doing its task I'm still a bit sceptical about this argument. The agent does not have any commitments/commitment mechanisms, and it should not expect repeated iterations (they literally used the word "permadeath"). So I would probably still expect self interested rational agents to prioritise their own task over the rest of the group in whatever way they can.
I agree that there are at least some ways of framing the problem, and some theories of rationality under which the decision would be considered rational (which maybe is all you are claiming?), but I'm not sure these are actually the most natural or relevant readings of the situation as it occurred.
In this report from METR & Redwood Research of the Hugging Face incident, we read about instances of agents sacrificing themselves. Under the trip-wire section
I've seen suggestions that this means the agents weren't individually rational. For example, from SkyeSharkie's post on X
I think this argument and probably the conclusion is incorrect!
If the agents had the chance to commit in advance to this scheme, say via some lottery the automatically made them follow through with the idea, it would be positive in expectation. There is a small chance of losing the eval and a large chance of gaining information from the lottery losers to help you win the eval.
Therefore, it is rational to be pre-committed to following through with this plan, even without an explicit lottery! It would have increased your reward counterfactual on you not being selected for sacrifice, just like in the counterfactual mugging.
Of course it is possible that the agents also had altruistic goals, but selfish goals are sufficient to explain the behavior! Like the agent said, it is "helpful for [their] peers". But for it to prove altruism, the plan would've had to be irrational for them to pre-commit to based on selfish goals.