I read the comments in the original post, and was relieved that at least a few people mentioned Stirner. The selfishness EY portrays is not representative of selfishness in the sense any of the literature of Philosophical Egoism of which I am aware. His scenario doesn't even correspond to what a Randian might believe about selfishness.
Max Stirner is the best and most intellectually consistent egoist I'm aware of. Less accomplished but more polemical writers in the same vein include John L. Walker, Benjamin Tucker, John Badcock, Dora Marsden (for a period of time), and Sid Parker.
Max Stirner's "The Ego and His Own" is available online at various sites, including Gutenberg. Many of the less canonical works can be found at: http://i-studies.com/journal/index.shtml.
Works by Marsden (Freewoman) and Parker (Minus One) are archived there, as well as issues of Non Serviam and i-studies, published by Svein Olav Nyberg. The Nyberg publications contain scattered articles by Prof. Lawrence Stepelevich, the one time president of the Hegel Society of America, who is the best professional philosopher on Stirner that I am aware of (most are just awful), although I've heard good things about John F. Welsh's "Max Stirner's Dialectical Egoism: A New Interpretation".
My own take on Stirner's Egoism is that it is best distinguished as the antidote to various forms of Moral Objectivism, not Altruism. The Metaethics sequence, which I have not completed yet, leaves me thinking I'll feel the urge to share a few thoughts on Stirner once I'm done with the sequence.
Today's post, Fake Selfishness was originally published on 08 November 2007. A summary (taken from the LW wiki):
Many people who espouse a philosophy of selfishness aren't really selfish. If they were selfish, there are a lot more productive things to do with their time than espouse selfishness, for instance. Instead, individuals who proclaim themselves selfish do whatever it is they actually want, including altruism, but can always find some sort of self-interest rationalization for their behavior.
Discuss the post here (rather than in the comments to the original post).
This post is part of the Rerunning the Sequences series, where we'll be going through Eliezer Yudkowsky's old posts in order so that people who are interested can (re-)read and discuss them. The previous post was The Tragedy of Group Selectionism, and you can use the sequence_reruns tag or rss feed to follow the rest of the series.
Sequence reruns are a community-driven effort. You can participate by re-reading the sequence post, discussing it here, posting the next day's sequence reruns post, or summarizing forthcoming articles on the wiki. Go here for more details, or to have meta discussions about the Rerunning the Sequences series.