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I have gripes with EA's that try to argue about which animals have consciousness. They assume way too readily that consciousness and valence can be inferred from behavior at all.
It seems quite obvious to me that these people equate their ability to empathize with an animal with the ability for the animal to be conscious, and it seems quite obvious to me that this is a case of mind projection fallacy. Empathy is just a simulation. You can't actually see another mind.
If you're going to make guesses about whether a species is conscious, you should first look at neural correlates of consciousness and valence and then try to find these correlates in animals. You don't look at animal behavior at all. We have absolutely no reason to believe that behavior correlates with consciousness. That's just your empathy getting in the way. The same empathy that attributes feelings to stuffed animals.
It's not intended to be a complete definition of consciousness, just a nudge away from behaviourism.
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From my point of view, that's missing the central point quite badly.
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And elsewhere that they are metaphysically impossible.
5Matthew Barnett
Could you let me know why? What about consciousness is missed by a purely behavioral description of an object (keeping in mind that what I mean by behavior is very broad, and includes things like the behavior of electrical signals)?