RE robots / “Element 4”:
IMO the relevant product category here should be human-teleoperated robots, not independent robots.
Robot-control algorithms are not an issue, since we’re already conditioning on Element 1 (algorithms for TAI). Humans can teleoperate a teleoperable robot, and therefore if Element 1 comes to pass, those future AI algorithms will be able to teleoperate a teleoperable robot too, right?
And human-teleoperated robots can already fold sheets, move boxes, get around a cluttered environment, etc., no problem. I believe this has been true for a very long time.
And when I look at teleoperated robots, I find things like Ugo which might or might not be vaporware but they mention a price point below $10/day. (ETA: see also the much more hardcore Sarcos Guardian XT. Pricing is not very transparent, but one site says you leas it for $5K/month, which isn’t bad considering how low the volumes are.)
More generally, I think “progress in robotics” is not the right thing to be looking at in this context, because “progress in robotics” has been mainly limited by algorithms (and on-board compute). I think teleoperated robots are technologically much simpler, more like the kind of thing that a wide variety of companies can crank out at scale, almost as soon as there’s demand.
There are still HR and legal overhead costs involved if you have human operators.
I think part of the answer is also that the space of things low-wage workers can physically do remotely via teleoperation isn't that much larger than the space of things that can be fully automated but still much smaller than the space of things a local human can do. It's a fairly narrow band to exploit, IMO, and the labor cost arbitrage spread is rarely worth the complexity of the extra logistics, capital investment, and maintenance.
(Crossposted to the EA forum)
Abstract
The linked paper is our submission to the Open Philanthropy AI Worldviews Contest. In it, we estimate the likelihood of transformative artificial general intelligence (AGI) by 2043 and find it to be <1%.
Specifically, we argue:
conditional on prior steps being achieved. Many steps are quite constrained by the short timeline, and our estimates range from 16% to 95%.
Thoughtfully applying the cascading conditional probability approach to this question yields lower probability values than is often supposed. This framework helps enumerate the many future scenarios where humanity makes partial but incomplete progress toward transformative AGI.
Executive summary
For AGI to do most human work for <$25/hr by 2043, many things must happen.
We forecast cascading conditional probabilities for 10 necessary events, and find they multiply to an overall likelihood of 0.4%:
Event
Forecast
by 2043 or TAGI,
conditional on
prior steps
If you think our estimates are pessimistic, feel free to substitute your own here. You’ll find it difficult to arrive at odds above 10%.
Of course, the difficulty is by construction. Any framework that multiplies ten probabilities together is almost fated to produce low odds.
So a good skeptic must ask: Is our framework fair?
There are two possible errors to beware of:
We believe we are innocent of both sins.
Regarding failing to model parallel disjunctive paths:
Regarding failing to really grapple with conditional probabilities:
Therefore, for the reasons above—namely, that transformative AGI is a very high bar (far higher than “mere” AGI) and many uncertain events must jointly occur—we are persuaded that the likelihood of transformative AGI by 2043 is <1%, a much lower number than we otherwise intuit. We nonetheless anticipate stunning advancements in AI over the next 20 years, and forecast substantially higher likelihoods of transformative AGI beyond 2043.
For details, read the full paper.
About the authors
This essay is jointly authored by Ari Allyn-Feuer and Ted Sanders. Below, we share our areas of expertise and track records of forecasting. Of course, credentials are no guarantee of accuracy. We share them not to appeal to our authority (plenty of experts are wrong), but to suggest that if it sounds like we’ve said something obviously wrong, it may merit a second look (or at least a compassionate understanding that not every argument can be explicitly addressed in an essay trying not to become a book).
Ari Allyn-Feuer
Areas of expertise
I am a decent expert in the complexity of biology and using computers to understand biology.
Track record of forecasting
While I don’t have Ted’s explicit formal credentials as a forecaster, I’ve issued some pretty important public correctives of then-dominant narratives:
Luck played a role in each of these predictions, and I have also made other predictions that didn’t pan out as well, but I hope my record reflects my decent calibration and genuine open-mindedness.
Ted Sanders
Areas of expertise
I am a decent expert in semiconductor technology and AI technology.
Track record of forecasting
I have a track record of success in forecasting competitions:
Each finish resulted from luck alongside skill, but in aggregate I hope my record reflects my decent calibration and genuine open-mindedness.
Discussion
We look forward to discussing our essay with you in the comments below. The more we learn from you, the more pleased we'll be.
If you disagree with our admittedly imperfect guesses, we kindly ask that you supply your own preferred probabilities (or framework modifications). It's easier to tear down than build up, and we'd love to hear how you think this analysis can be improved.