While I have no definitive proof of this, it would seem to me that there has actually been advancement in the area automobiles that have increased their lethality. Mainly more powerful and efficient engines, and other such refinements in design which make them more robust, easier to use, and handle better increasing their utility as a weapon. I realize this is a bit vague, I am not an engineer, but it would seem to me that if I had to choose between a truck produced in the first half of the 20th century or a modern model, the former would likely not be my first choice for a vehicular assault. Of course this is not say that the changes are prohibitive for their use just that it seems to me that there probably has been some relevant changes.
Secondly, I am not sure the actual problem is simply the idea. Take the case of tampering with medication. You point out that regulations were put in place afterwards that made it harder to tamper with medication. However this makes it seem that the subsequent lack of tampering cases may be linked to this, when it is more likely that the first case was simply an outlier. In the past, especially in america, there has been a long history of completely unregulated drug markets, and dubious cures sold out of the back of carts. Many products such as soda often started out as questionable curealls. For instance coca cola was made with actual coca (the plant cocaine alkaloids are derived from) and sold as a cure for headaches. Other drug-laced, or even mildly toxic products were often sold to the public in great quantities. As such there have been many times that anyone with the will to tamper with medications and trick people into consuming poisons has always been possible. In fact it has been quite easy. This holds true not just for medications, but for many consumables that change hands several times on the way to the consumer.
I think the limiting factor here is not the idea, nor the accessibility of means to inflict harm, but instead the lack of will to kill indiscriminately on the part of most humans. Even during wars I have read it is common for most soldiers to deliberately miss the enemy (Dave Grossman's On Killing, although I think some of the claims in that book may have been called into question by more recent research). I would guess it is the case that most of these attacks are unified more by the fact that they were committed spur of the moment by individuals with rare combinations of mental traits and social environments. It is the rarity of such people, with whom the idea enables which is crucial. Further I would say that the idea doesn't cause these people to act violently, it instead adds to their repertoire of possible violent actions, from which they would likely choose either way.
Of course, that is not to say that meme transmission has little to do with the expressions of violence, it is of course of utmost importance in shaping most of our behavior, I simply do not really believe it is the factor of importance in this case.
Finally I just want to say that it strikes me that the idea of "dangerous information" is similar to the idea of computer security by obfuscation. The problem with "security by obfuscation" is that it often also impedes solutions to various attacks, it only works if your opponent has no way of guessing as to how to defeat your security. If I recall correctly that was the justification of releasing the genetic sequence from the research on what mutations could cause the avian flu virus to go airborne. While it is also true that this could enable someone to induce the same change into flu virus, it was judged more important for the scientific community to understand the genetics of pathology. Even if it wasn't released, it would not have taken much for any similarly equipped bio-weapons research lab to turn out the same result. Creating just as much, if not more, danger than public release. As such I tend not to agree with trying to withhold information, unless it can be reasonably established that the information is oddly asymmetric in it's cost and dangers (If some mad genius figures out how to macguyver a nuke out of chewing gum, baking soda, and bits of string, that would certainly be worth keeping secret.)
Well anyways sorry for the longwinded rambling post, just my two pence.
Recently, there has been an alarming development in the field of terrorist attacks; more and more terrorists seem to be committing attacks via crashing vehicles, often large trucks, into crowds of people. This method has several advantages for an attacker - it is very easy to obtain a vehicle, it is very difficult for police to protect against this sort of attack, and it does not particularly require special training on the part of the attacker.
While these attacks are an unwelcome development, I would like to propose an even more worrisome question - why didn't this happen sooner?
I see no reason to believe that there has been any particular technological development that has caused this method to become prevalent recently; trucks have been in mass production for over a hundred years. Similarly, terrorism itself is not particularly new - just look to the anarchist attacks of the late 19th and early 20th century. Why, then, weren't truck attacks being made earlier?
The answer, I think, is both simple and frightening. The types of people who make attacks hadn't thought of it yet. The main obstacle to these attacks was psychological and intellectual, not physical, and once attackers realized these methods were effective the number of attacks of this sort began increasing. If the Galleanists had realized this attack method was available, they might well have done it back in '21 -- but they didn't, and indeed nobody motivated to carry out these attacks seemed to until much later.
Another instance - though one with less lasting harm - pertains to Tylenol. In 1982, a criminal with unknown motives tampered with several Tylenol bottles, poisoning the capsules with cyanide and then replacing them on store shelves. Seven people died in the original attack, which caused a mass panic to the point where police cars were sent to drive down the streets broadcasting warnings against Tylenol from their loudspeakers; more people still were killed in later "copycat" crimes.
In this case, there was a better solution than with the truck rammings - in the aftermath of these events, greatly increased packaging security was put into place for over-the-counter medications. Capsules (which are comparatively easy to adulterate) fell out of favor somewhat in favor of tablets; further, pharmaceutical companies began putting tamper-resistant seals on their products and the government made product tampering a federal offense. Such attacks are now much harder to commit.
However, the core question remains - why was it that it took until 1982 for there to be a public attack like this, and then there were many more (TIME claims hundreds!) in short succession? The types of people who make attacks hadn't thought of it yet. Once the first attack and the panic around it exposed this vulnerability, opportunistic attackers carried out their own plans, and swift action suddenly became necessary - swift action to close a security hole that had been open for years and years!
One practical implication of this phenomenon is quite worrisome - one must be very careful to avoid accidentally spreading dangerous information. If the main constraint on an attack vector can really just be that the types of people who make attacks haven't thought of it yet, it's very important to avoid spreading knowledge of potential ways in which we're vulnerable to these attacks - you might wind up giving the wrong person dangerous ideas!
Many otherwise analytical or strategic thinkers that I have encountered seem to fall prey to the typical mind fallacy in these cases, assuming that others will also have put thought into these things and thus that there's no real risk in discussing them - after all, these methods are "obvious" or even "publicly known". Certainly I have made this mistake myself before!
However, what is "publicly known" in some book or white paper somewhere may only be practically known by a few people. Openly discussing such matters, especially online, risks many more people seeing it than otherwise would. Further, I would generally say that the types of people who make attacks are cunning but unimaginative. They are able to execute existing plans fairly effectively, but are comparatively unlikely to come up with novel methods. This means that there's extra reason to be wary that you might have come up with something they haven't.
Thus, when dealing with potentially dangerous information, care should be taken to prevent it from spreading. That doesn't, of course, mean that you can't talk these matters over with trusted colleagues or study to help prepare defenses and solve vulnerabilities - but it does mean that you should be careful when doing so.
As strange as it seems, it is very possible that the only reason things haven't gone wrong in just the way you're thinking of is that dangerous people haven't thought of it yet - and if so, you don't want to be the one giving them ideas!
Author's note: Sincere thanks to those who assisted me with this post; their assistance has made it safer and more compelling.