A toy model of ethics which I've found helpful lately:
Consider society as a group of reinforcement learners, each getting rewards from interacting with the environment and each other.* We can then define two moral motivations:
Importantly, if you have one faction who's primarily optimizing for altruism, and another that's primarily optimizing for justice, by default they'll undermine each other's goals:
One way of thinking about the last few decades (and possibly centuries) is that ethical thinking has become dominated by altruism, to the point where being ethical and being altruistic are near-synonymous to many people (especially utilitarians). At an extreme, it leads to reasoning like in the comic below:
Of course, positively reinforcing misbehavior will tend to produce more misbehavior (both by teaching those who misbehave to do it again, and by making well-behaved people feel like chumps). And so more thoughtful utilitarians will defend justice as an instrumental moral good, albeit not as a terminal moral good. Unfortunately, it seems very hard to actually hold this position without in practice deprioritizing justice (e.g. it's rare to see effective altruists reasoning themselves into trying to make society more just).
I think this difficulty is related to why consequentialism is wrong. This is a tricky topic to write about, but one core intuition is that before figuring out how to act, you need to figure out who is acting. For example, before trying to plan for the future, you need to have a sense of personal identity whereby your future self will feel a sense of continuity with and loyalty to your plans.
We can analogously view justice (and other moral intuitions which I'm ignoring in this simplified analysis) are mechanisms for holding society together as a moral agent which is able to act coherently at all. And so people who think that individuals should choose actions on the basis of their consequences are putting the locus of agency in the wrong place—it's like saying that each ten-second timeslice of you should choose actions based on their consequences. Instead, something closer to virtue ethics is a far better approach.
Is this still consistent with some version of consequentialism? In some sense yes, in another sense no. Mostly I expect that the viewpoint I've outlined above will, when explored carefully enough, dissolve the standard debate between different branches of ethics. This is conceptually tricky to work through, though, and I'll save further discussion for another post.
* The main reason I call this a toy model is that viewing people as reward-maximizers is itself assuming a kind-of-consequentialist viewpoint. I think we actually want a much richer conception of what it means to help and hurt people, but "increase or decrease reward" is so much easier to describe that I decided to use it here.
** Justice isn't quite the right term here, because it implies being reward/punished for a specific action rather than being rewarded/punished for being generally good/bad; the same with "accountability". "Fairness" might be better except that it's been coopted by egalitarian notions of fairness. Other suggestions welcome—maybe something related to karma?
(One way I think about politics is that one faction has refused to consider "without creating bad incentives" and in response the other faction is now polarizing towards refusing to consider "help those people". And we've now reached the point where these refusals commonly serve as vice signals on each side.)
I relate to this. There's the guys who (sometimes) understand incentives and the guys who (sometimes) show any compassion.
Relatedly, It seems like most of the intellectuals that have anything like an accurate model of the sociology of morality (eg mora... (read more)