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There's an interesting line in the old MIRI paper on Definability of Truth: "Tarski’s result on the undefinability of truth is in some sense an artifact of the infinite precision demanded by reasoning about complete certainty."
An alternative idea (inspired by some of davidad's thinking) is that intelligent minds might create logical timelike and spacelike separation as a consequence of their decisions. Demski's conception of logical time (which was anticipated by Lacan!) is mostly motivated by the idea of agents recursively reasoning about each other. It seems like such agents could create a kind of directionality by simply refusing to reason in certain ways, as part of a correlated game-theoretic strategy. (As an aside, the idea of refusing to do certain kinds of reasoning about other agents seems like an important building block for defining concepts like respect, trust, and faith.) This could lead to a logical analogue of the lightspeed limit which is less of a hard constraint, and more like a highway speed limit: breakable, but in a way which might incur larger consequences (specifically, exclusion from the coalition that coordinates itself by imposing spacelike and timelike structure in the logic of rational minds).
[Epistemic status: babble.]
I've been reading Schelling's Strategy of Conflict recently, and I learned that the concept of Schelling points is much richer than I expected and extends beyond tacit (~acausal-ish) bargaining/cooperation to contexts with communications channels, in which Schelling points (among other things?) give structure (e.g., boundaries) to the space of possible bargains, e.g., how high should I try ramping up the price before stopping or what values should I consider as options for my bidding? (Maybe there's some connection to your past shortform on boundaries?)
If we generalize the space of possible bargains to the space of various logical facts (or their representations in the minds of agents), we arrive at the possibility that a process like this one might give space-time-like structure to the space of logical facts.
More broadly, this might kinda favor a constructivist/computationalist approach to math/logic, where the right way to think about it (at least for the purpose of finding space-time-like structure in logical spaces) puts a lot of weight on fixed points / equilibria that recursively reasoning agents can be broadly expected to converge on.
If so, another analogy that comes to mind is that between equilibrium and non-equlibrium reasoning, e.g., in economics, evolution, etc., where the idealized equilibrium is a boring state where not much happens, with stuff actually happening in non-equlibrium settings (see, e.g., complexity economics, maybe ergodicity economics?). You get to the equilibrium in the limit assuming the relevant sort of structure in which the process proceeds (analogous to the loss landscape in SGD or the evolutionary landscape in biology) stays fixed. But it may take a lot of time to get to the equilibrium and the relevant structure doesn't, in general, stay fixed. The connection is that assuming logical omniscience or unbounded computational resources is that sort of in-the-limit reasoning. This sort of reasoning sometimes flattens out some relevant sort of structure, and we can re-derive this structure by expanding the domain of discourse.