So, how do you feel about going to sleep at night? Because the “you” that goes to sleep is definitely not the same as the “you” who wakes up in the morning
Except in the view of society, the law etc. You wake up with the same name, social security number, property, debts etc. The fact there is a lot of tension between our intuitions about identity , and what a physically based theory can offer is why there is as I'd born if identity.
If I understood Rob correctly, his view is that if R2 feels that he “is Roger,” and he really is a sufficiently accurate copy—then why should we care?
Because it goes against our intuitions that the same person cannot exist in two different places; and creates social and legal questions, such as who controls Roger's property, who gets to sleep with Roger's wife and so on.
Adopting momentary identity , AKA "empty individualism", doesn't help, since it creates the same set of puzzles even in the absence of cloning and teleportation.
But how can I be confident that… it’s the same conscious experience?
Why would that matter? There is still a difference between having two identical tokens of the same type, and having one token in two locations.
Perhaps—even hypothetically—there can be no way to verify whether it is “the same” consciousness
We already have a set of intuitions about unconscious material objects, and they tell us that an exact duplicate of the Mona Lisa would be a duplicate and not the Mona Lisa. The Bensinger approach is therefore special pleading that conscious entities are different
(It happens to be that a lot of people use "consciousness" to mean both " what you are experiencing right now" and "the thread of identity that makes you you" ... but that doesn't mean they actually are the same).
If you are not pure physicalist, the “original consciousness” (aka soul)
We don't think paintings have souls. You can disbelieve that duplicates are originals without departing from physicalism.
if you are pure physicalist, you should deny the existence of qualia and even consciousness in any metaphysical sense
No, identity theory is a thing.
Art identity and human personal identity are different things. For example, art needs to preserve sameness, but if human preserves sameness - he is a dead frozen body.
I’d like to ask the following:
As I understand it, you agree that R1 and R2 would not be the very same individual, even if they were exact copies of each other (i.e., two identical tokens of the same type). That’s the idea I’m trying to convey in my post, but it seems I’m not doing it very well, and I’ve started to doubt myself—whether this is merely a “human language game.”
But it does seem genuinely true: if there are two tokens, then there are two independent “centers of experience” (if we are talking about conscious creatures of course).
And a single token in two locations does not seem physically realizable to me, although my knowledge of physics is fairly limited.
You also say that there are certain intuitions by which one can test or track the identity of objects. I’m not familiar with those ideas, but I’ll definitely look into them—thank you for the link.
Am I correct in understanding that, in the context of my thought experiment about perfect resurrection, you consider it impossible to bring back that very “I”—that very same line of experience, that very same “view from the inside”—whose existence ended with the person’s death?
And regardless of whether the answer is yes or no, I’d be interested to hear why you think so.
If you are pure physicalist, you should deny the existence of qualia and even consciousness in any metaphysical sense - this is the position of Rob as I understand it. (If you don't deny qualia, two consciousness can be different: they can have different qualia but the same functionality like in the inverted specter thought experiment).
If you are not pure physicalist, the "original consciousness" (aka soul) is a meaningful concept and there should be technical ways to preserve it. There are at least three semi-coherent ideas what can it be: rainbow of qualia, continuity of consciousness and God-issued identity token.
I don't think question of identity is relevant to physicalism at all.
Suppose it's impossible to invert qualia without changing something physical in the brain. It's still currious which one of two people I'd be in "creating a perfect copy" experiment.
Fore pure physicalist (I am not but some people on LW expressed this view) there is no meaningful first-person perspective: only third view is objective. So there is no "I" which somehow appears in one of two copies. From third objective view, both copies have the same information, and that's all.
We don't need to deny that there's a meaningful first-person perspective, only that any particular first-person perspective is special (in this case, special in that it's the 'true' continuation of the original). When a perfect copy is made, two meaningful first-person perspectives exist, they both see themselves as continuations of the original, and neither is more right or wrong than the other in any deep sense.
Yes, that's exactly what I meant.
I still haven't fully figured out the issues of consciousness and illusionism, but it seems I'm an illusionist. I doubt that inverted qualia is possible without changing the physical structure. But you understood my idea correctly — "the view from within" will be another one, not the same one. I'm glad I was able to convey this idea, ha.
You're speculating on a topic on which we have no way to collect evidence. We can't measure qualia or experience - we have only self-reported information about identity, and none of it includes copying.
Now we have two Rogers—R1 and R2. And it seems obvious that they do not share one and the same consciousness: they are two different consciousnesses of identical personalities.
(If this isn’t obvious to you, I’d genuinely like to hear how two brains, isolated from each other, could share a single consciousness. Obviously, I’m a physicalist.)
It's unclear whether you think there is an instantaneous experience, or if all experience is over time (reminder: we have no measurements that would provide evidence here). It seems obvious to me that R1 and R2 at that point in time share all memories and experiences-in-progress up to and including the point of copy. And for some number of milliseconds afterward, there won't be time for new inputs or environmental changes to have any impact, so they remain identical.
Of course, they begin to diverge as the different environments come into play. However, they diverge about as much from each other as each does from their shared past. You're not the same person you were 10 minutes ago, and they're not the same person as each other.
Of course, I agree that our personality is constantly changing. In my post, I wanted to reflect on the fact that even with perfect cloning, R1 would retain its sense of self, while R2 would develop its own separate sense of self. Both would have two separate "first-person perspectives," even if we imagine that time has frozen and they remain two completely perfect copies. I mean, they would not become a single consciousness connected by invisible threads.
I don't agree (or I misunderstand something about the scenario).
With a perfect copy of all identity-relevant state, BOTH R1 and R2 retain their sense of self - they're identical at the point of copy. They EACH continue to develop their selves independently. They diverge from each other and from their shared past, but there's no distinction or privilege of the "original".
Unless the copy process is flawed, but that's not part of this thought experiment. To a great extent, this is a definition question: if there is an internally-detectable difference (a way to tell which is the original), that means the copy was imperfect.
They would be like twins - however they would know all of each other's most intimate secrets and desires. They could also work together - a goal now becomes a shared goal, but they now require twice as much food. R1 could share his possessions with R2 or he might decide that they should each have their own stuff. They might be fighting on who gets to sleep on the bed - unless they agree to sleep together. Would you be happy sleeping in the same bed as a clone of you? Or splitting half your possessions with them?
Since it's not currently possible to make a duplicate copy of someone - it's not something I want to spend much time pondering over.
When you ask "would this be the same conscious experience", do you have a clear idea of what "the same conscious experience" means, and you're wondering whether the world works in such a way that the concept would hold in these hypotheticals? Or is it a concept that feels important, but which you can't pin down, and your goal here is to analyse it?
I would rather analyze this concept; I do not yet have completely accurate and firm conclusions on these issues.
I would like to emphasize once again that, for me, the question is that even when creating identical clones, we have two subjective experiences, two perspectives from within. Therefore, for me, being “the same” in the “perfect resurrection” scenario means remaining the same consciousness, without creating an additional consciousness, an additional first-person perspective (above, in my response to Dagon, I tried to explain this more clearly again).
Most likely, there may be no way to verify whether the new instance is “the same,” but I am interested in discussing this.
From my perspective, unless there is something akin to a soul or disembodied consciousness, there's simply no fact of the matter here beyond the more granular facts. I don't think "the same consciousness" means anything more than the prosaic ways in which we might define it, e.g. with reference to overlapping chains of experience and memory. We instinctively care about it, but I think that's fairly easy to explain as a byproduct of our self/other distinction and self-preservation instinct and so on.
You ask "But how can I be confident that… it’s the same conscious experience?"
So, how do you feel about going to sleep at night? Because the "you" that goes to sleep is definitely not the same as the "you" who wakes up in the morning. For example, the brain creates long-term memories during sleep. Conversely, you can't "remain the same person" by refusing to sleep; that instead transforms you into a different person who has unpleasant hallucinations.
In short - the constancy of identity is unattainable. The most we can hope for is the continuity of identity. And even that is denied to us for eight hours a night.
Personal identity is a topic that I associate with a big tangled ball of yarn—you have to spend a long time untangling it to get to something that resembles truth.
Well, I started doing this intellectual work and got stuck on one question that doesn’t seem to be discussed very often (at least, I haven’t encountered it in the exact framing I’m going to present here).
So, imagine we copy a person named Roger, and we do it with absolutely perfect accuracy—down to the quantum properties of every particle that makes up his body. Or, if you prefer, with any arbitrarily high accuracy.
Now we have two Rogers—R1 and R2. And it seems obvious that they do not share one and the same consciousness: they are two different consciousnesses of identical personalities.
(If this isn’t obvious to you, I’d genuinely like to hear how two brains, isolated from each other, could share a single consciousness. Obviously, I’m a physicalist.)
Because the copied person is located at a different point in space, by definition he:
• cannot be physically connected to the original person (R1)
• will instantly begin to have different experiences and will stop being an absolutely exact copy (since even R2 being 10 cm away from R1 is already a pretty significant difference in experience).
In our reality, if object A and object B occupy the exact same point, they are the same object.
So it’s impossible to place a copy at the same spatial address as the original. Doing that would mean doing nothing.
Now, we have two Rogers. And they do not share the same subjective experience. Then what grounds do we have to believe that a teleportation machine really “transports us,” rather than transporting “someone else”?
Yes, it’s a perfect copy. As I said, we can imagine it even preserves the properties of the elementary particles that make up Roger’s body. But that exact copy—which truly is Roger—still contains another, new consciousness.
Right before writing this post, I also read a post by Rob Bensinger where he discusses a similar situation.
If I understood Rob correctly, his view is that if R2 feels that he “is Roger,” and he really is a sufficiently accurate copy—then why should we care?
Rob says that if it turned out we die and are reborn every second, while still feeling like the same person, nothing would change.
He writes:
But I think we can push back on that perspective.
Imagine someone offers you a deal: you are forced to kill your entire family, but then your memories of it are erased and an illusion is created in which your loved ones are alive and happy. Would you agree to that?
Let’s consider another version of the question—at least to me they seem similar (oh god, and here come identity problems again!):
If Rob Bensinger were offered this: your body will be completely destroyed, but in exchange a being will be created with an incredibly stable conviction that it is Rob Bensinger, who never died and was never destroyed—what is the probability that the real Rob Bensinger would accept?
(In fact, I suspect that probability is high.)
You might want to say these examples aren’t the same. Sure, they aren’t identical—but I think they’re pointing at the same thing: for us humans, what often matters is what actually happened, not just how we experience or interpret the event. I think this even connects to the very idea of rationality.
In both examples, you can choose a “sweet lie” over a “bitter truth,” even though on the surface the examples really do look quite different.
I would not agree to be destroyed, even if I knew that an exact copy of me would exist, convinced that it never died. Because I know that my own subjective experience would end, and the experience of “another me” would begin.
So why am I asking this?..
Imagine a resurrection machine. Suppose it’s an unimaginably powerful, gigantic computer—something like a Matrioshka brain around WR-102. Based on indirect evidence, this machine has computed the exact structure of the brain of our deceased Roger (let’s call him R1D1, where D stands for Dead).
The machine recreates an exact copy of Roger, R2D2. Yes, it really is him! There’s no doubt it’s the same personality.
But how can I be confident that… it’s the same conscious experience?
That it’s the same consciousness that ceased to exist at the moment R1D1 died?
I call this idea “perfect resurrection,” because we could stop at resurrecting a sufficiently similar, or even a perfect, copy of Roger. But what interests me (almost purely in a philosophical sense) is whether it’s possible to bring back the original consciousness itself, rather than a “second instance” of that consciousness.
So that Roger would say:
“Oh wow, what a day. I felt terrible, and now I woke up completely healthy. What the hell?”
And it would be literally true.
So that this wouldn’t just be a special case of my earlier proposal: “destroy Rob Bensinger and create a being that’s convinced it is Rob and never died.”
Perhaps—even hypothetically—there can be no way to verify whether it is “the same” consciousness. Perhaps I made some serious mistake in my reasoning.
In any case, I hope these thoughts will give many of you an opportunity to exercise your imagination and thinking. And of course, I’ll be doing that along with you.