I appreciate the post, it raises an interesting and important question. Long story short, I am significantly more sympathetic to Jennifer's position than to Dominic's. In the interest of saving some time, I'll focus primarily on the US here, and write out a couple of bullet points explaining my current beliefs:
In general, politicians have significantly greater discount rates than experts or even regular citizens because their terms in office are very short. This is a principal-agent problem: politicians are incentivized to sacrifice the future at the altar of the present, while politically unaccountable bureaucrats generally are not.
Which, in practice, will mean the bureaucrats don't agree entirely with the political views of the elected official, as opposed to there being any objective dereliction of duty.
The way private industry does it is by offering a ton of money and great compensation packages to the most productive and knowledgeable workers
And then often suffer from the same problems anyway because in many places management keeps simply pursuing goals based on "what the investors need to hear" or "what I think is good for business" rather than a synthesis with what their hired experts think is feasible to do in time and with good quality.
Focusing on the US seems like a mistake, since Dominic Cummings worked in the UK, yet the situation seems to be substantially worse, despite, eg, there being no separation of powers.
How to find workers that will do with Dominic Cummings wants? He found it quite easy to recruit from people already employed by the Department. He didn't need a lot. He couldn't manage a lot. If the masses had ignored him, it would have been fine, but they actively sabotaged. And lots of people he found productive left because it was too difficult.
Maybe. I know relatively little about the functioning of the UK government, so I focused on areas where I thought I had some useful contributions to share.
I will note Jennifer Palkha has primarily been involved with the US government and bureaucracy, and in any case Martin has talked about bureaucracy topics in the context of the US before here on LW. So there is still some value in figuring out what is going on in America.
There is value figuring out what is going on in America. But since the same thing is going on elsewhere, answers unique to America are incorrect.
Is the same thing going on elsewhere?
There are many other points to be raised. And I certainly do believe that what I mentioned with respect to the US has wide applicability and reflects important arguments that need to be kept in mind regardless of where the country we're discussing is located. But I think the fundamental nature of the problems is quite different in different states, and we need to be cognizant of that instead of painting with too broad a brushstroke. Answers unique to America may (and, I claim, do) well explain why the situation in America is as it is, and why it differs from what goes on in other places.
I don't know how the US system works at all, and have only a shallow understanding of the UK one (mostly from watching Yes Minister), but I think in the US a lot of posts that in the UK would be civil service are instead political posts. For example, I think US politicians directly pick which ambassadors to send, which is not the UK system.
They are probably very different systems.
As a New Zealander we see the same general problems, unaccountable and sclerotic bureaucracy that politicians are finding that they have less and less actual executive control over due to all sorts of inserted regulatory and other mechanisms to restrict govt ability to control them, as well as internal cultures that venerate the in-group bureaucrats consensus on How Things Should Be™ and practice subtle and unsubtle methods of resistance against any outside agency that seeks to change that policy. What Cummings et al call 'the blob', the US call 'deep state'.
NZ public sector has increased in size by 100% in last 25 years, with population growth of 50% and typical white collar productivity increases around 50% it would be reasonable to expect that same level of government function could be accomplished with around half the current numbers. Most private sector people I associate with would not say that governance has improved in last 25 years, in fact in many easily viewable metrics it has clearly deteriorated with worse performance in health and education, higher regulatory burdens etc. The cost and lost-productivity costs on NZ (and lost revenue that would arise from those workers paying tax in productive jobs rather than spending it as civil servants) amount to a few % of GDP, and would probably be the difference between the deficits we currently run and having no deficits - a big drain on our future prosperity.
It's not a new problem, having been an issue ever since the city-state came into being, bureaucrats and people in positions of power will almost always care more about maintaining and growing their power than about providing any utility to others. UK "Yes Minister" comedy series lampooned it in the 1980's, Parkinson wrote a best selling book on in the 1950's: Parkinson's Law And Other Studies in Administration and Parkinson's Law: Or The Pursuit of Progress, and we even have the term 'Byzantian' to describe excessive bureaucracy from an empire dead for 1000 years.
I would concur that it is absolutely a function of lack of accountability and inability to effectively censure poor performance or subtle intransigence/sabotage of political masters in the public service, and has grown worse with the growth of a distinct self-reinforcing in-group civil service tribalistic identity, perhaps stoked by the homogeneity of elitist educational backgrounds of those that seek government jobs with beliefs that don't mirror or even respect those of the general public they effectively rule over. And it is creating an extreme crisis in governance in democracies around the world, potentially to the point of violence in Europe as populations get incensed at their electorally signaled preferences being ignored by civil servants with growing social problems that seems to be rising as a result.
"You will never understand bureaucracies until you understand that for bureaucrats procedure is everything and outcomes are nothing" - Thomas Sowell
A thoughtful reply. Just to fuel the discussion, here's John Cochrane on ECB overstepping it's mandate: https://www.grumpy-economist.com/p/central-bankers-can-be-too-independent
I'm a bit confused (more than a bit, actually). I read Cochrane's post and the linked ECB blogpost written by the president of the ECB. The latter is a bit disappointing to look at, partly for reasons Cochrane mentioned.[1]
But I don't really understand what (if anything) the ECB has done to overstep its mandate. As far as I can tell, the linked writing is a blog post written by the president of the ECB. In so far as it reveals poor and biased thinking on an important policy matter, it's disappointing. But "the ECB has a mandate to make decisions on the basis of [X]" does not mean "the ECB cannot or even should not express opinions about [Y, which is different from X]" or "the ECB should not lobby governments to provide specific forms of [in this case climate-focused] fiscal stimulus."[2]
Are there specific actions that reveal the way the ECB's thinking has changed its behavior?
It's O'Sullivan's law at play, really: any organization not explicitly designed to be right-wing will eventually trend left-wing over time. When you overlay on top of this the crank realignment and its associated degradation of left-of-center epistemology, I guess this is what you get.
Perhaps as an illustrative example, the Federal Reserve also publishes research and opinion notes (and has for decades). Looking at some topics they've covered, I see foreign direct investment, analyses of China's economic potential and output, the costs of compliance with legal barriers to trade in countries other than the US, etc.
I think this pattern exists in many places (civil service, companies, schools). The generalized form goes like this:
There are two ways to manage people. You can assume that they are aligned, motivated, and competent. In that case, tell them the goal, and give them freedom to do it as they choose to. Even if they mess something up, remain calm, show them the problem, and let them fix it. The advantage is that you can get their best effort and skill; and they will be happy and motivated to work in such environment. The disadvantage is that if you were wrong about "aligned, motivated, and competent", the results will be poor.
The second way is to assume that they are unaligned, unmotivated, and incompetent. In that case, you need to micromanage them. The advantage is that you get some steady guaranteed minimum productivity. The disadvantage is that the productivity is very low, and all competent people will burn out and/or quit.
The problem is, if you try a middle way, you are likely to get the worst of both worlds. Enough annoyance so that the competent people get frustrated and quit, but not enough oversight to prevent problems.
So when the companies get to the "micromanagement" equilibrium, they are likely to stay there. And even the companies that start in the "trust the team" equilibrium are often one disaster or one mistrusting manager away from switching to the opposite.
Also, a large enough company will statistically have both competent and incompetent teams. And the management will probably feel the urge to treat all of them the same way.
Worse, when politics and public money are involved there is a fixation with "accountability" that often leads to micromanagement simply because it feels like it's the responsible thing to do, the one you can defend best with the voters. "Look, we gave them money and didn't much check what they were doing with it because we trust them and think that this is the best way to get bang for our buck in terms of productivity" can be sound thinking, but it's still terrible messaging.
One fundamental problem with public finances is that many voters have what I can only term as "poor mindset". Pinch pennies, account for every expense, don't risk waste, bets don't pay off. Which is fine and often wise when you do in fact have barely enough income to live. But as a voter, you are a tiny fractional manager for an entity that has literally more money than you are capable of imagining. And you can't manage it like you would your home. But very often that is exactly what politicians and media encourage you to do, and how they present the problem.
Anecdata: I quit the UK civil service (AISI, quite atypical) in small part due to feeling micromanagement creeping in, but also I mostly experienced a good amount of trust and autonomy. People sometimes said 'startup in government', perhaps to convey this (among other features). I don't know how long that's sustainable.
I tend to think their viewpoints are coherent. Both observe that the civil service is an unaccountable nightmare. Dom imagines that making them obey the elected officials would improve things, Jen imagines that severing them from the electoral interference would improve things. Both would plausibly be an improvement. The common factor is imagining a civil service that worked like everything else.
I don't think either can be implemented. Dom's desire is romantic, but runs against human nature (why would whitehall take on responsibility when it can just destroy him and his political masters, as it obviously did). Jen's desire is fanciful, the ossification that she rails against is exactly part of the accountability sink.
If you had a genie, you'd grant Dom's wish before Jen's, but neither is actionable.
It's strange... I have a sense that civil services used to be enviable, admirable places to work. Elite selection and talented operators getting impressive things done. At least in the UK and China, and also in the US (presumably also other places but I'm less familiar). What went wrong?
My limited experience (c. 14 months as a 'civil servant' in the UK AISI, really more like an imported technical expert pretending to be a civil servant) was that I encountered a predominance of very driven, intelligent, and well-motivated people in my immediate vicinity (including, perhaps especially, the 'real' civil servants who'd pre-existed AISI). I expect there may have been substantial selection effects. I heard complaints about interfacing with other parts of govt, and certain kinds of moves (like publication or sending messages 'up the chain' to MPs) were highly bureaucratised and a bit Procrustean in ways that sometimes limited our autonomy and ability to achieve the mission.
I don't think there's a conflict between the two views. They can both be true simultaneously. Since both sides can produce compelling examples, they both probably are true simultaneously.
Neither is there an obvious conflict between Cummings' and Pahlka's solutions. It's easy to imagine a civil service that is both more accountable to politicians, and also has a better feedback loop to those politicians. In fact, the solutions seem synergistic, because if the civil servants may be fired for under-delivering, they should be more motivated to get problems fixed via the feedback loop.
(Of course there is still a question as to which is the "bigger problem".)
Nah. Good organizations impose both what and how. Look at Bezos imposing how meetings should be run.
Entirely disanalogous situations. "Good organizations" of the kind you're describing (private, for-profit, somewhat narrow-in-scope corporations), unlike governments, generally:
"Good organizations" are playing on easy mode. A software engineer disagrees with the scope of your project and tries to sabotage it? Fire them![2]
Governments are playing on hard mode. A citizen disagrees with a policy enacted by the executive and organizes protests against it? Deport them! Oh, wait... you can't deport them, because they have rights,[3] and it's actually good they have rights and you can't deport them because otherwise the entire enterprise falls apart and you get an authoritarian hell-on-Earth.
"If men were angels, there would be no need for government."[4] The existence of strife and disagreement is the reason why government and bureaucracy require intelligent mechanism design and game theory ideas to function properly. In economic terms, exit costs are extremely high for individuals in their dealings with governments.[5] It's why the Archipelago doesn't work.
Mind you, this isn't an argument that bureaucracies, as currently enacted, are good. But it does serve to explain why they face radically different challenges. Challenges that need to be considered individually to figure out ways of overcoming them.
And when they do, the end results aren't pretty and don't follow a thoughtful "what + how" framework. See the OpenAI saga as an illustration.
Even better, such a person is unlikely to apply to a job for your corporation in the first place!
At least in the Western world
Well, there might be... as a means of large-group coordination and to create public knowledge of important facts, at the very least. But it would be much more minarchist in nature.
Unlike in the case of the fired software engineer, who can usually find a job for another company rather quickly, setting up roots in a different country entirely can be a ridiculously daunting task.
The question is what happens when HOW contradicts WHAT. Would WHAT be prioritized or HOW or the other way round? In extremely volatile environments (war) there's a reasonable argument that HOW should not even be specified, because it's going to get obsolete, or even counterproductive, immediately (Moltke: "No plan survises the first contact with the enemy.") but at the same time it will tempt the subordinates to follow it nonetheless.
Well, of course, WHAT takes priority. And you need subordinates who have guts to do the right thing even if it contradicts the stated HOW.
I like the “learn the rules before you break them” approach.
In my organization, I tell people that they can break any rule / best practice they truly understand and truly mastered.
In government HOW always wins. That's why the famous joke that the most frightening words in the English language are "Hi I'm from the government and I'm here to help."
I think the manual just acknowledges the phenomenon and gives advice to the saboteurs to take advantage of it. I does not imply that it does not exist in the real world.
Sure. What I was trying to point at was that the manual acknowledges that this is actually bad and that things could be done differently. That’s a surprising level of lucidity that I wouldn’t expect to see these days in any government force.
Bezos is bezos forever. Democracy has to function with a different angry baby at the helm every 4 years (and the alternative where the populace isn’t allowed to install their gibbering id is worse.)
Dominic Cummings and Jennifer Pahlka are both unhappy about the civil service. However, they have different understandings of what the problem is and how it should be solved.
Dominic is a politician. The problem, as he sees it, is that the civil service is disconnected from the electoral political system. Bureaucrats are appointed rather that elected, often in complex and opaque ways, and cannot even be fired by the elected politicians. This creates an self-standing, unaccountable ruling class, the bureaucracy, which does not have skin in the game and is thus focused on self-preservation rather than on solving real problems.
Jennifer is a former civil servant. The problem, as she sees it, is that the civil service is micromanaged by politicians to the point that it becomes incapable of solving real problems. Aware that bureaucrats are not politically accountable, politicians attempt to impose accountability by requiring them to fill out ever more reports, undergo ever checks and obey a labyrinthine and ever expanding set of regulations.
Despite their differences, their diagnoses ultimately converge on the same core issue: the government gives commands, but the civil service fails to deliver.
For Cummings, the failure stems from a lack of incentives and skin in the game. Why would bureaucrats inconvenience themselves, after all? For Pahlka, it’s because the regulatory thicket has grown so dense that, in many cases, no sensible course of action remains.
The case study of choice for Cummings is COVID and the underwhelming way in which governments responded to it. In his view, this can be blamed at incompetence, complacency and inflexibility of the civil service.
One of the things that we did to get the rapid testing to work was we got a guy who formerly was commanding officer of the SAS, British Special Forces, and this guy got a bunch of his friends from Special Forces also to work on rapid testing. When we first got this pushing from Number 10, I got the critical people from procurement, commercial HR, etc, into the Cabinet room with the Cabinet Secretary, the single most important official in the whole country, and the two of us said, “The PM wants rapid testing dealt with as if this is a wartime crisis.” We’re going to have a second wave. There’s going to be thousands more people getting CoViD, there’s NHS. People are dying, etc. We can’t have any of the normal civil service HR. We can’t have any of the normal civil service bullshit on procurement. Exactly the same as with the vaccine task force. Everyone sits around the cabinet table, they all nod their heads.
A week later, I call this guy, a former SAS boss and say, “So, how’s it going? Are you getting who you want and is everything working great?”
He says, “No, it’s all the same shit show.”
So I have to get all the people back in the same room with the country’s most senior official and say, who the fuck have we got to fire around here to make clear that these people doing testing don’t have to do all of your bullshit HR?
That’s how extreme things have to be. It was only by doing that a second time and making clear that I would get the PM to actually just start firing senior people in the Cabinet office. It’s only then that the system will kind of part and go, “Okay, this element is allowed to.” But you imagine as soon as that countervailing force is removed, all the normal sea floods back.
Pahlka’s the case study of choice would probably be Obamacare, where the failure to deliver a functioning website for people to sign up for the program nearly sank the entire political enterprise.
But for a more hands-on example, consider rhe U.S. Digital Service developing software to transmit data from satellites to ground stations, ensuring the continued operation of the Global Positioning System (GPS):
This issue of data transmission to the ground stations and back again was one of a few problems that was holding them back. There is an industry standard way of doing this, a simple, reliable protocol [UDP] that is built into almost every operating system in the world.
But this team wasn’t using this simple protocol on its own. Instead, the team had written a piece of software to receive the message from that protocol, read the data, and then recode it into a different format, so they could feed it into a very complex piece of software called an Enterprise Service Bus, or ESB. The ESB eventually delivered the data to yet another piece of software, at which point the whole process ran in reverse order to deliver it back to the original, simple protocol. Because the data was taking such a roundabout route, it wasn’t arriving quickly enough for the ground stations to make the calculations needed. Using the simple protocol alone would have made the entire job a snap—as easy as nailing a couple of boards together. Instead, they had this massive Rube Goldberg contraption that was never going to work.
The people on this project knew quite well that using this ESB was a terrible idea. They’d have been relieved to just throw it out, plug in the simple protocol, and move on. But they couldn’t. It was a requirement in their contract. The contracting officers had required it because a policy document called the Air Force Enterprise Architecture had required it. The Air Force Enterprise Architecture required it because the Department of Defense Enterprise Architecture required it. And the DoD Enterprise Architecture required it because the Federal Enterprise Architecture, written by the Chief Information Officers Council, convened by the White House at the request of Congress, had required it.
All that being said, I cannot fail to notice that what the two are saying is not truly incompatible. They both want the civil service to be more flexible, to show greater initiative, to care less about the process and more about the outcomes and to respond to the challenges on the ground more quickly and creatively.
Pahlka complains that, given the tight regulation imposed by the government, they can’t. Cummings complains that, even if given the leeway, they won’t take advantage of it.
Cumming’s preferred solution is to make civil servants fireable by the government so that they get skin in the game and can be forced, under the threat of dismissal, to act creatively. (Good luck with that.)
Pahlka’s preferred solution is to replace the one-way flow of instructions, from the government to the civil service, with a feedback loop, allowing civil servants to point out problems inherent in the directives and government to revise the regulations accordingly. (Hm. Given how hard political renegotiation tends to be, good luck with that, I guess.)
All in all, it looks like a classic accountability sink: if you give your subordinates a clear process and make them accountable for following it, they will follow it up to the letter. They’ll follow it even if it does not help. They’ll follow it even if it actively undermines the actual goal. Because as long as they do, you see, they can’t be fired.
In the rare organizations where this dilemma has been resolved, it has been through superiors specifying WHAT it is to be achieved, but not HOW it is to be achieved. Subordinates are given a free hand in choosing the means, while superiors must place trust in their efforts and accept that failures may occur along the way.
But that, of course, requires mutual trust and politically, it’s a hard sell.