(Epistemic status: exploratory. Also, this post isn't thorough; I wanted to write quickly.)
(Thanks to Mary Phuong, Pedro Freire, Tao Lin, Rohin Shah, and probably a few
other people I'm forgetting for discussing this topic with me.)
My perception is that it is a common belief that (after investment spending
becomes sufficiently large) AI progress on domains of focus will likely be
smooth. That is, it will consistently improve at similar rates at a year
over year basis (or perhaps somewhat smaller time periods).
Note that this doesn't imply that growth will necessarily be exponential,
the growth rate could steadily decelerate or accelerate and I would still consider it
I find this idea somewhat surprising because in current ML domains there have
been relatively few meaningful advancements. This seems to imply that each of
these improvements would yield a spike in performance. Yet, empirically, I
think that in many domains of focus ML progress has been relatively
consistent. I won't make the case for these claims here. Additionally,
empirically it seems that most domains are reasonably continuous even after
selecting for domains which are likely to contain discontinuities.
This post will consider some possible gears level explanations of smooth
progress. It's partially inspired by this post in the 2021 MIRI
If a system consists of many part and people are working on many parts at the same
time, then the large number of mostly independent factors will drive down
variance. For instance, consider a plane. There are many, many parts and some
software components. If engineers are working on all of these simultaneously,
then progress will tend to be smooth throughout the development of a given aircraft and
in the field as whole.
(I don't actually know anything about aircraft, I'm just using this as a model.
If anyone has anything more accurate to claim about planes, please do so
in the comments.)
So will AIs have many parts? Current AI doesn't seem to have many parts which
merit much individual optimization. Architectures are relatively uniform and
not all that complex. However, there are potentially a large number of
hyperparameters and many parts of the training and inference stack (hardware,
optimized code, distributed algorithms, etc.). While hyperparameters can be
searched for far more easily than aircraft parts, there is still relevant human
optimization work. The training stack as a whole seems likely to have smooth
progress (particularly hardware). So if/while compute remains limiting, smooth
training stack progress could imply smooth AI progress.
Further, it's plausible that future architectures will be deliberately
engineered to have more different parts to better enable optimization with
Perhaps the actual determining factor of the progress of many fields is the
underlying knowledge of individuals. So progress is steady because individuals
tend to learn at stable rates and the overall knowledge of the field grows
similarly. This explanation seems very difficult to test or verify, but it
would imply potential for steady progress even in domains where there are
bottlenecks. Perhaps mathematics demonstrates this to some extent.
If all discoveries are low-impact and the number of discoveries per year is
reasonably large (and has low variance), then the total progress per year would
be smooth. This could be the case even if all discoveries are concentrated in
one specific component which doesn't allow for parallel progress. It seems
quite difficult to estimate the impact of future discoveries in AI.
There do seem to be a surprising large number of areas where progress is
steady (at least to me). Perhaps this indicates some incorrect human bias (or
personal bias) that progress should be less steady. It could also indicate the
existence of some unknown and unaccounted for latent variable common in many domains.
If this variable was applicable in future AI development, then that would
likely indicate that future AI development would be unexpectedly smooth.
Note that while smooth progress probably correlates with slower takeoffs,
takeoff speeds and smoothness of progress aren't the same: it's
possible to have very fast takeoff in which progress is steady before and after some inflection
point (but not through the inflection point). Similarly it's possible to
have slower takeoffs where progress is quite erratic. ↩︎
I find "large numbers of low-impact discoveries" to be the most compelling, though I'd also add:
"Combinatorial innovation and technological progress in the very long run", Matt Clancy, might be worth looking at.