What shape has mindspace?

1Gordon Seidoh Worley

2Gurkenglas

2Gordon Seidoh Worley

1Gurkenglas

2Gordon Seidoh Worley

1Gurkenglas

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I did some work in this direction when I wrote about phenomenological complexity classes. I don't lay it out in much detail in that post, but I believe we can build on the work I do there to construct a topology of mindspace based on the assumption of a higher-order theory of consciousness and a formal model of the structure of consciousness grounded in intentionality by (and here's where I'm not sure what model will really work) possibly treating minds as sets within a topological space or as points on manifolds and then being able to say something about the minds we do and don't find in topological spaces with particular properties.

Alas this is all currently speculation and I haven't needed to go further than pointing in this general direction to do any of the work I care about, but it is at least one starting point towards work in this direction.

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Sure, but that issue is irrelevant to the question you're asking. You can disagree with how I choose to convert "conscious" into a technical term from a folk term and even if you agree with my conversion perhaps disagree with whether or not something must be conscious in that sense to be aligned, but you asked about mindspace and those documents, although driving at other purposes, lay out some background that could be used to approach the question.

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From what I see, the phenomenological complexity classes separate minds based on what they are thinking about, while alignment depends on what they are trying to do.
If a mind is a topological space equipped with a subset, what sort of mind would the set being full imply?

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That I'm not sure, as I haven't worked this out in much detail. I just sort of have a vague mathematical intuition that it might be the right sort of way to model it (n.b. I dropped out of a math phd after 6 years to do a startup, if that's some rough guide to how much to trust my mathematical intuition).
For what it's worth, here's some notes I found that I wrote about this a while ago. I make no promises that any of this makes any sense or that I would still agree with any of it, but it is what I wrote about it a while ago:
Mathematical Foundation of Phenomenology
So that phenomenological complexity classes are applicable to as many universes as possible, including our own, it has a rigorous mathematical foundation that makes as few assumptions as possible and easily translates into the standard language of phenomenology. That said, it is not a theory of everything, and so supposes that
* the universe is made of stuff in configurations called states that are related to each other by causation,
* mathematics can be applied to stuff, states, and causation,
* and states can be partially ordered by causation.
Let process denote a set of states partially ordered by causation. Processes include simple physical processes modeled by atoms and quarks, stochastic processes like Brownian motion and waves, mechanistic processes like levers and clocks, phenomenological processes like cats and humans, social processes like organizations and friendships, and a universal process that includes all states and which we refer to as the universe, reality, or the world. Every process is a subset of the universe, including the empty process that contains no state.
We can then construct a topological space, called process space, on the subset processes of the universe where
* every process, including the universal process and the empty process, is a member of the topology,
* the union of processes is itself a process,
* and the finite intersection of processes is itself a

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Isn't process space just discrete, because every subset of a process, a set partially ordered by causation, is partially ordered by causation, so a process? Topology doesn't give you much if you don't restrict which sets are open.
Isn't this a type error? Processes contain states, not processes.

Epistemological status: Babbling.

Let a map each mind in mindspace to how aligned it is. We are trying to optimize a. To that end, lemmata are helpful which talk about the shape of mindspace. That's why we try to call it a space even before defining what category C it lives in.

To optimize a function, start with a diverse enumeration of its domain. The deontological enumeration covers all others with constant-factor overhead, but the consequentialist enumeration gives us more properties to work with.

Every mind m has an implicit utility function u(m). a factors through u as a function, but not as a continuous function, let alone a C-morphism. That's why we've recently moved away from explicit utility maximizers.

Use mathematical language to tell our story! Then we might guess where it's going.