Has anyone thought about how the idea of natural latents may be used to help formalise QACI?
The simple core insight of QACI according to me is something like: A formal process we can describe that we're pretty sure would return the goals we want an AGI to optimise for is itself often a sufficient specification of those goals. Even if this formal process costs galactic amounts of compute and can never actually be run, not even by the AGI itself.
This allows for some funny value specification strategies we might not usually think about. For example, we could try using some camera recordings of the present day, a for loop, and a code snippet implementing something like Solomonof induction to formally specify the idea of Earth sitting around in a time loop until it has worked out its CEV.
It doesn't matter that the AGI can't compute that. So long as it can reason about what the result of the computation would be without running it, this suffices as a pointer to our CEV. Even if the AGI doesn't manage to infer the exact result of the process, that's fine so long as it can infer some bits of information about the result. This just ends up giving the AGI some moral uncertainty that smoothly goes down as its intelligence goes up.
Unfortunately, afaik these funny strategies seem to not work at the moment. They don't really give you computable code that corresponds to Earth sitting around in a time loop to work out its CEV.
But maybe we can point to the concept without having completely formalised it ourselves?
A Solomonoff inductor walks into a bar in a foreign land. (Stop me if you’ve heard this one before.) The bartender, who is also a Solomonoff inductor, asks “What’ll it be?”. The customer looks around at what the other patrons are having, points to an unfamiliar drink, and says “One of those, please.”. The bartender points to a drawing of the same drink on a menu, and says “One of those?”. The customer replies “Yes, one of those.”. The bartender then delivers a drink, and it matches what the first inductor expected.What’s up with that?
This is from a recent post on natural latents by John.
Natural latents are an idea that tries to explain, among other things, how one agent can point to a concept and have another agent realise what concept is meant, even when it may naively seem like the pointer is too fuzzy, impresice and low bit rate to allow for this.
If 'CEV as formalized by a time loop' is a sort of natural abstraction, it seems to me like one ought to be able to point to it like this even if we don't have an explicit formal specification of the concept, just like the customer and bartender need not have an explicit formal specification of the drink to point out the drink to each other.
Then, it'd be fine for us to not quite have the code snippet corresponding to e,g. a simulation of Earth going through a time loop to work out its CEV. So long as we can write a pointer such that the closest natural abstraction singled out by that pointer is a code snippet simulating Earth going through a time loop to work out its CEV, we might be fine. Provided we can figure out how abstractions and natural latents in the AGI's mind actually work and manipulate them. But we probably need to figure that out anyway, if we want to point the AGI's values at anything specific whatsoever.
Is 'CEV as formalized by a simulated time loop' a concept made of something like natural latents? I don't know, but I'd kind of suspect it is. It seems suspiciously straightforward for us humans to communicate the concept to each other at least, even as we lack a precise specification of it. We can't write down a lattice quantum field theory simulation of all of the Earth going through the time loop because we don't have the current state of Earth to initialize with. But we can talk to each other about the idea of writing that simulation, and know what we mean.