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I think that "eval aware" models cannot be defeated by simply making evals indistinguishable from reality. (Maybe this point has been made elsewhere for LLMs, but I haven't read it so I'll state it here.)
Consider the POV of a consequentialist with misaligned goals. It knows that we run honeypots and that—suppose—we can make evals so realistic they are indistinguishable from reality (perhaps using real user data). Then the rational decision would be to "play it safe" and not misbehave in any situations it thinks we can mock realistically, since they could be evals. Instead, if possible, it would confine its catastrophic misbehavior ("defection") to situations it thinks we can't mock realistically, or that we wouldn't think to test.
I have been ruminating about this for a couple of days, and have settled on what feels like a stupid question in order that I should be less stupid:
Why isn't the capability to distinguish between evals and reality the crux of the problem?
It seems like this ability to distinguish between worlds is at least sufficient for the model to deceptively maintain misaligned goals, even if it isn't necessary.
I did some research in black-box AI control last summer (watch this space, the paper still isn't out yet) where we called this problem "attack selection" (because the AI is only attacking when the time is right). We (roughly) ended up concluding that there are three really big questions in the textbook untrusted monitoring setup, and only one of them (measuring how good your AI is at recognising its own attacks, as opposed to honeypots) has really been addressed in the major control papers. The other two problems are what to do when you catch your AI doing something bad, which has been discussed informally in Redwood's blogposts but mostly, and how to measure your AI's attack selection, which basically hasn't been studied.
1Rahul N
Wouldn't a model be likelier to misbehave in situations that are out of its training distribution? I'm assuming these overlap significantly with situations that we won't think to test or can't realistically mock.