I think that, in almost full generality, we should taboo the term "values". It's usually ambiguous between a bunch of distinct meanings.

• The ideals that, when someone contemplates, invoke strong feelings (of awe, motivation, excitement, exultation, joy, etc.)
• The incentives of an agent in a formalized game with quantified payoffs.
• A utility function - one's hypothetical ordering over words, world-trajectories, etc, that results from comparing each pair and evaluating which one is better.
• A person's revealed preferences.
• The experiences and activities that a person likes for their own sake.
• A person's vision of an ideal world. (Which, I claim, often reduces to "an imagined world that's aesthetically appealing.")
• The goals that are at the root of a chain or tree of instrumental goals.
  • [This often comes with an implicit or explicit implication that most of human behavior has that chain/tree structure, as opposed being, for instance, mostly hardcoded adaptions, or a chain/tree of goals that grounds out in a mess of hardcoded adaptions instead of anything goal-like.]
• The goals/narratives that give meaning to someone's life.
  • [It can be the case almost all one's meaning can come through a particular meaning-making schema, but from a broader perspective, a person could have been ~indifferent between multiple schema. 
    
    For instance, for some but not most EAs, EA is very central to their personal meaning-making, but they could easily have ended up as a social justice warrior, or a professional Libertarian, instead. And those counterfactual worlds, the other ideology is similarly central to their happiness and meaning-making. I think in such cases, it's at least somewhat confused if to look at the EA and declare that "maximizing [aggregate/average] utility" is their "terminal value". That's papering over the psychological process that adopts ideology or another, which is necessarily more fundamental than the specific chosen ideology/"terminal value".
    
    It's kind of like being in love with someone. You might love your wife more than anything, she might be the most important person in your life. But if you admit that it's possible that if you had been in different communities in your 20s you might have married someone else, then there's some other goal/process that picks who to marry. So to with ideologies.]
• Behaviors and attitudes that signal well regarded qualities.
• Core States.
• The goals that are sacred to a person, for many possible meanings of sacred.
• What a person "really wants" underneath their trauma responses. What they would want, if their trauma was fully healed.
• The actions make someone feel most alive and authentically themselves.
• The equilibrium of moral philosophy, under arbitrary reflection.

Most of the time when I see the word "values" used on LessWrong, it's ambiguous between theses (and other) meanings. 

A particular ambiguity: sometimes "values" seem to be referring to the first-person experiences that a person likes for their own sake ("spending time near beautiful women is a terminal value for me"), and other times it seems to be referring to a world that a person thinks is awesome, when viewing that world from a god's eye view. Those are not the same thing, and they do not have remotely the same psychological functions! Among other differences, one is a near-mode evaluation, and the other is a far-mode evaluation.

Worse than that, I think there's often a conflation of these meanings. 

For instance, I often detect a hidden assumption that that the root of someone's tree of instrumental goals is the same thing as their ranking over possible worlds. I think that conflation is very rarely, if ever, correct: the deep motivations of a person's actions are not the same thing as the hypothetical world that is evaluated as best in thought experiments, even if the later thing is properly the person's "utility function". At least in the vast majority of cases,  one's hypothetical ideal world has almost no motivational power (as a matter of descriptive psychology, not of normative philosophy).

Also (though this is the weakest reason to change our terminology, I think), there's additional ambiguity to people who are not already involved in the memeplex. 

To broader world "values" usually connotes something high-minded or noble: if you do a corporate-training-style exercise to "reflect on your values", you get things like "integrity" and "compassion", not things like "sex" or "spite". In contrast, LessWrongers would usually count sex and spite, not to mention boredom and pain, as part of "human values" and many would also own them as part of their personal values.