Plummeting fertility rates are a ticking time bomb that is likely to collapse the economies of many first (and third) world countries within the next few decades; low fertility leads to high dependency ratios and ballooning taxes on the working population, which in turn leads to depressed or negative growth and worker emigration, feeding a vicious cycle.
For many countries it's too late to fully fix this - even if their fertility rate shot up today they'd still face an acute worker shortage in 20 years. But in countries like the USA and the UK the fertility drop off has been gradual and recent enough that the situation can still be salvaged. The most obvious option is to transfer money to new parents to encourage increased fertility. Alas doing so is expensive, and cash strapped countries can ill afford to increase expenditure by the hundreds of billions of dollars required to reach replacement fertility. Worse, the cheapest parents to induce to have kids are those in the lowest income brackets, whose children are likely to be net fiscally negative. Encouraging the highest earners to have children is orders of magnitude more expensive.
Cremieux Recueil, based on ideas by Robin Hanson, suggests that governments could fund this by granting parents a share in the taxes their children pay, and using this to phase out social security. This has the advantage of being fiscally neutral today, not obviously fiscally negative down the line, and provides more income to parents of well off children than poor ones - exactly the properties we desire.
Robin extends this by suggesting we allow parents to sell these rights for a one-time payment, which can be used to fund immediate child raising costs.
I think this suffers from some major flaws:
Given the median voter in the US is 52, phasing out social security is likely a no-go (it might be possible if it only impacts younger people who are still in key childbearing years, but I'm extremely skeptical even then).
Children are sacred and therefore having children for personal benefit is considered taboo. As such there will be strong pressure to refuse to accept the tax earnings from children.
A strongly delayed payment is a weak incentive to have children today. Providing the option to sell it fixes this, but if most people do so we won't be able to phase out social security easily.
The solution to the first and third problems is not to phase out social security. Unfortunately it's got to stay. The solution to the second is to remove the parent from the equation entirely:
When a child is born, the government sells the rights to X% of their future tax income[1] to the highest bidding company, and this amount is transferred directly to the parents, as a standard baby bonus.
In the short run this proposal remains free[2], and gives greater benefits to wealthier parents as desired. In the long run the fiscal impact of the proposal depends strongly on how much it drives up CFR and encourages families to have children younger, and whether that's enough to increase total tax earnings more than the loss in income tax earnings.
My initial models suggest that there's very high uncertainty in the long term impact, but it is likely net neutral for total tax takings, and thus a net fiscal burden since a higher population means higher expenses. It is net positive for the total economy. It could be made significantly cheaper per added birth if only offered from the third child onwards, but this significantly limits total possible impact.
I do not think it's possible to get to replacement fertility either way, though it might be possible to get close (albeit with a higher per child fiscal impact).
Hanson suggests this would also have other positive effects, as the companies would be induced to invest in the children and adults whose tax rights they own. Given that they only earn a handful of cents for every extra dollar the child earns, I expect that impact to be limited to the cheapest, most effective interventions: perhaps running a job board or providing free career counselling. Paying for IVF in order to benefit from embryo screening is unlikely to be cost effective.
So what do we do in a situation like this? The viability of the policy depends almost entirely on how much this impacts TFR in practise, broken down by parents socioeconomic status. Once that's known the impact on future tax income can be predicted pretty reliably. Fortunately this doesn't take 20 years to find out - as I suggested in an earlier post it isn't hard to randomly select 20 counties across the country at random, and apply this policy only to people who are residents of these counties at the start of 2026, and measure the impact[3]. And don't stop there - pick 10 alternative policies and run them all in parallel, so we can get actual data, and in two years pick the best option!
Technically this should be an instrument where the government agrees to pay the company an amount each year equivalent to the income tax the child would pay, assuming a specific fixed income tax code (with brackets linked to wage growth), rather than an actual share in the income tax. This avoids risk relating to the tax code changing, or government failure to collect the owed tax.
It must be guaranteed to continue for at least 20 years so we can be sure we're not just measuring parents bringing their births earlier in case the policy is cancelled, and we can't allow people who move into the county after it was announced to benefit because of selection effects.
Plummeting fertility rates are a ticking time bomb that is likely to collapse the economies of many first (and third) world countries within the next few decades; low fertility leads to high dependency ratios and ballooning taxes on the working population, which in turn leads to depressed or negative growth and worker emigration, feeding a vicious cycle.
For many countries it's too late to fully fix this - even if their fertility rate shot up today they'd still face an acute worker shortage in 20 years. But in countries like the USA and the UK the fertility drop off has been gradual and recent enough that the situation can still be salvaged. The most obvious option is to transfer money to new parents to encourage increased fertility. Alas doing so is expensive, and cash strapped countries can ill afford to increase expenditure by the hundreds of billions of dollars required to reach replacement fertility. Worse, the cheapest parents to induce to have kids are those in the lowest income brackets, whose children are likely to be net fiscally negative. Encouraging the highest earners to have children is orders of magnitude more expensive.
Cremieux Recueil, based on ideas by Robin Hanson, suggests that governments could fund this by granting parents a share in the taxes their children pay, and using this to phase out social security. This has the advantage of being fiscally neutral today, not obviously fiscally negative down the line, and provides more income to parents of well off children than poor ones - exactly the properties we desire.
Robin extends this by suggesting we allow parents to sell these rights for a one-time payment, which can be used to fund immediate child raising costs.
I think this suffers from some major flaws:
The solution to the first and third problems is not to phase out social security. Unfortunately it's got to stay. The solution to the second is to remove the parent from the equation entirely:
When a child is born, the government sells the rights to X% of their future tax income[1] to the highest bidding company, and this amount is transferred directly to the parents, as a standard baby bonus.
In the short run this proposal remains free[2], and gives greater benefits to wealthier parents as desired. In the long run the fiscal impact of the proposal depends strongly on how much it drives up CFR and encourages families to have children younger, and whether that's enough to increase total tax earnings more than the loss in income tax earnings.
My initial models suggest that there's very high uncertainty in the long term impact, but it is likely net neutral for total tax takings, and thus a net fiscal burden since a higher population means higher expenses. It is net positive for the total economy. It could be made significantly cheaper per added birth if only offered from the third child onwards, but this significantly limits total possible impact.
I do not think it's possible to get to replacement fertility either way, though it might be possible to get close (albeit with a higher per child fiscal impact).
Hanson suggests this would also have other positive effects, as the companies would be induced to invest in the children and adults whose tax rights they own. Given that they only earn a handful of cents for every extra dollar the child earns, I expect that impact to be limited to the cheapest, most effective interventions: perhaps running a job board or providing free career counselling. Paying for IVF in order to benefit from embryo screening is unlikely to be cost effective.
So what do we do in a situation like this? The viability of the policy depends almost entirely on how much this impacts TFR in practise, broken down by parents socioeconomic status. Once that's known the impact on future tax income can be predicted pretty reliably. Fortunately this doesn't take 20 years to find out - as I suggested in an earlier post it isn't hard to randomly select 20 counties across the country at random, and apply this policy only to people who are residents of these counties at the start of 2026, and measure the impact[3]. And don't stop there - pick 10 alternative policies and run them all in parallel, so we can get actual data, and in two years pick the best option!
Technically this should be an instrument where the government agrees to pay the company an amount each year equivalent to the income tax the child would pay, assuming a specific fixed income tax code (with brackets linked to wage growth), rather than an actual share in the income tax. This avoids risk relating to the tax code changing, or government failure to collect the owed tax.
Sort of, I expect it to increase inflation and interest rates, but expect this to be by only about 0.1% on both.
It must be guaranteed to continue for at least 20 years so we can be sure we're not just measuring parents bringing their births earlier in case the policy is cancelled, and we can't allow people who move into the county after it was announced to benefit because of selection effects.