Pascal's Mugging has always confused me. It relies on the assumption that the likelihood of the payoff diminishes more slowly than the size of the payoff.
I can imagine regions of payoff vs. likelihood graphs where that's true. But in general, I expect that likelihood diminishes with greater acceleration than the acceleration of payoff. So eventually, likelihood diminishes faster than payoff increases, even if that was not the case at first. This lets me avoid Pascal's Muggings.
I can imagine an intelligence that somehow gets confused and misses this point. Or one that is smarter than us and behaves in a way that we would recognize as a Pascal's Mugging, but which it might be able to justify and persuade us of.
Am I missing a point here? Or is Pascal's Mugging just a description of one of the enormous number of ways it is possible to be dumb?
I agree with your analysis. For a Pascal's mugging to work, you need to underestimate how small Pr(your interlocutor is willing and able to change your utility by x) gets when x gets large. Human beings are bad at estimating that, which is why when we explicitly consider PM-type situations in an expected-utility framework we may get the wrong answer; it's possible that there is a connection between this and the fact (which generally saves us from PM-like problems in real life) that we tend to round very small probabilities to zero, whether explicitly or implicitly by simply dismissing someone who comes to us with PM-type claims.