I think that the views of superforecasters on AI / AI risk should be basically no update.

It seems to me like the main reasons to defer to someone are:

1. They have a visibly good track record on the relevant domain. It has to be the literal domain, because people often have good views on their area of expertise, but crazy views elsewhere.
2. They are highly selected for having good beliefs in the domain. For example, if a mathematician tells me something that seems surprising about their area of expertise, I will tend to strongly believe them, despite not being able to evaluate their reasoning. The general reason for this is because mathematics is a verifiable domain, mathematicians are strongly selected for being correct about math. Other domains I'd basically defer to people in are historians about literal historical facts, physicists about well-established physics results, engineers about how cars work, etc. This consideration weakens as disciplines become less verifiable: I'm not very inclined to defer to philosophers, sociologists, psychologists, etc.
3. They make correct arguments about the domain (and very few incorrect arguments). If it's the case that you can talk to someone and they can consistently make clear rock-solid arguments that change your mind regularly, it is justified to defer to them on bottom line conclusions, even if you can't follow the arguments all the way through.
4. They are much smarter than you and are probably being honest. If someone (or, eventually, an AI) is clearly much smarter than you, and they are being honest (e.g. because they seem like an honest person), then you should probably defer to them substantially. (Of course, this isn't even fully general, e.g. a few hundred years ago, many of the smartest people around were superstitious, which would have led you astray.)

Now I'll go through and argue why these don't apply.

1. I think the track record of superforecasters on AI looks quite bad. Superforecasters consistently massively under-estimate AI progress on benchmarks, see, e.g., here, here, here, and here. On open-ended forecasting competitions, e.g. AI 2025, the top people (who I recognized, which is biased) all seemed like AI risk domain area experts, not superforecasters (though I'm also not sure if any superforecasters participated). You might object that AI benchmarks don't track real world impact, and that the real world impact was much lower. I would doubt that superforecasters would have made reasonable predictions of real world impact (such as revenue) over the last few years of AI progress, but I'm not aware of any systematic predictions made by superforecasters on real world impacts. Yes, superforecasters are often good at making geopolitical forecasts, but in practice this doesn't seem to transfer well to the domain that I care about.
2. I think the selection effect for being a superforecaster seems nowhere near as strong as a mathematician / physicist, and I think this evidence gets swamped by the above observations of how good they actually seem to be doing on the domain, which seem very poor.
3. I've talked with some superforecasters about AI but not many. Generally, my sense is that they are smart and reasonable people, but don't know very much about AI. It's hard to make this argument reasoning transparent; but if you are someone in AI who thinks that it's appropriate to defer to superforecasters, I think it would be a good idea to try to set up a meeting and talk with one of the people you are deferring to and see if they are actually making reasonable arguments that seem grounded in technical reality. In my experience, the main arguments I've encountered are outside view-y considerations like "base rate of extinction from new tech is low" which get obsoleted by strong object level arguments (e.g. for the abnormality of superintelligence and how its more analagous to a new smarter species).
4. I don't think the selection effect for being a superforecaster on general intelligence is strong enough for this argument to apply any more than I should defer to e.g. someone who got a 1600 on the SAT.

I also think that it would be better if people deferred less in general because I think that group epistmics go much better if each person in the group attempts to understand the situation as well as possible themselves. If everyone constantly tries to update on everyone else's views, then (i) there's way less novel intellectual thoughts, (ii) there are deference cascades / group think, and (iii) people end up with beliefs that are far less crisp / clearly justified than the person who originated the belief (bc communication is hard to do at high fidelity). I generally think people should communicate based on their own inside view, without deference, even if they expect the average correctness of the things that they are saying to go down because the information value of the communication will be much higher than the alternative.