Nisan's Shortform

Nisan

This is a special post for quick takes by Nisan. Only they can create top-level comments. Comments here also appear on the Quick Takes page and All Posts page.

Google's AI principles used to say:

In addition to the above objectives, we will not design or deploy AI in the following application areas:

Technologies that cause or are likely to cause overall harm. Where there is a material risk of harm, we will proceed only where we believe that the benefits substantially outweigh the risks, and will incorporate appropriate safety constraints.

Weapons or other technologies whose principal purpose or implementation is to cause or directly facilitate injury to people.

Technologies that gather or use information for surveillance violating internationally accepted norms.

Technologies whose purpose contravenes widely accepted principles of international law and human rights.

As our experience in this space deepens, this list may evolve.

On 2025-02-04, Google removed these four commitments. The updated principles seem consistent with making weapons, causing net harm, violating human rights, etc. As justification, James Manyika and Demis Hassabis said:

There’s a global competition taking place for AI leadership within an increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. We believe democracies should lead in AI development, guided by core values like freedom, equality, and respect for human rights. And we believe that companies, governments, and organizations sharing these values should work together to create AI that protects people, promotes global growth, and supports national security.

6cubefox2y

Which shows that "commitments" without any sort of punishment are worth basically nothing. They can all just be silently deleted from your website without generating significant backlash. There is also a more general point about humans: People can't really "commit" to doing something. You can't force your future self to do anything. Our present self treats past "commitments" as recommendations at best.

5Linch8mo

In classical game theory, people usually care to differentiate between a "commitment" from a "precommitment." For example, In a game of chicken, a commitment might be to stare at your opponent and loudly promise "I'm definitely not swerving, no matter what." These commitments are usually treated as not credible or approximately useless. A precommitment, on the other hand, would be to rip off your steering wheel. In other words, a physically binding action that removes (or at least hampers) your ability to not do the thing you committed to. The Unfortunately some nonclassical gt/rationalist jargon confuse the two, and use "precommitment" in cases without a corresponding binding action.

The "commitment" here could be more appropriately called a "promise", which emphasizes that it can be broken. I would moreover classify the precommitment via some binding action (like destroying the steering wheel) as an "indirect" precommitment.

Some discussion related to Newcomb's problem and exotic decision theories has in the past implicitly assumed that there is also a form of "direct" precommitment, where an agent can make a binding decision ahead of time, that is, without ability to change their mind later (in contrast to a mere promise), and without... (read more)

Nisan's Shortform

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Nisan's Shortform

8

Ω 2