The idea that the map is not the territory seems to be itself a map, due to the fact that all words are written in symbolic form, and symbols by definition cannot be the territory itself.
So although on at least one level of abstraction 'The map is not the territory' is useful insight, on another level, it may be meaningless and/or undecidable.
This seems to lead to a credible argument, advanced elsewhere, that the meta-rational is a higher level of abstraction.
But this then seems to lead to infinite regress. As ''The map is not the territory' is also a map' is also a map. Thus implying the possibility of a meta-meta-rationality and so on unto infinity.
A corresponding possibility is that certain assertions or logical arguments may be invalid/undecidable on one level, but valid/decidable on another level, a meta-validity if you will.
There does not seem to be a way to avoid this problem as long as humans think in words, or any other system of symbols.
But this does seem to impinge on some aspect of human cognition that suggest there exist higher levels of abstraction beyond what is commonly perceived or discussed.
-
Is this proof of existence of meta-memes, or meta-antimemes?
It's difficult to say, since 'proof of existence' is itself a meme/antimeme/memeplex/antimemeplex. Do we then need a 'meta-proof of existence'?
And is not 'existence' itself some kind of meme, as all expressible ideas are?
If we rephrase the question to be as general as possible:
Is this proof and/or meta-proof of existence and/or meta-existence of meta-memes, or meta-antimemes?
This seems too esoteric to be a basis for further discussion. However, the human language may not be equipped to pose such questions in a concise way.
-
Perhaps a better way of approaching this would be:
What are some differentiating features of meta-memes, or meta-antimemes?
How could we reliably detect their operation on our thoughts, if any?
If a clear delineation between ’books about books’ and ’books about books about books’ does not exist, how can we be so sure of the same between meta-thoughts and meta-meta-thoughts, which are far more abstract and intangible? (Or a meta-meta-rationality for that matter?)
But before that, I can’t think of even a single concrete example of a meta-meta-book, and if you cannot either, then that seems like a promising avenue to investigate. If none truly exists, we are unconstrained in imagining what it may look like.
1Olomana
I copied our discussion into my PKM, and I'm wondering how to tag it... it's certainly meta, but we're discussing multiple levels of abstraction. We're not at level N discussing level N-1, we're looking at the hierarchy of levels from outside the hierarchy. Outside, not necessarily above. This reinforces my notion that structure should emerge from content, as opposed to trying to fit new content into a pre-existing structure.
The idea that the map is not the territory seems to be itself a map, due to the fact that all words are written in symbolic form, and symbols by definition cannot be the territory itself.
So although on at least one level of abstraction 'The map is not the territory' is useful insight, on another level, it may be meaningless and/or undecidable.
This seems to lead to a credible argument, advanced elsewhere, that the meta-rational is a higher level of abstraction.
But this then seems to lead to infinite regress. As ''The map is not the territory' is also a map' is also a map. Thus implying the possibility of a meta-meta-rationality and so on unto infinity.
A corresponding possibility is that certain assertions or logical arguments may be invalid/undecidable on one level, but valid/decidable on another level, a meta-validity if you will.
There does not seem to be a way to avoid this problem as long as humans think in words, or any other system of symbols.
But this does seem to impinge on some aspect of human cognition that suggest there exist higher levels of abstraction beyond what is commonly perceived or discussed.
-
Is this proof of existence of meta-memes, or meta-antimemes?
It's difficult to say, since 'proof of existence' is itself a meme/antimeme/memeplex/antimemeplex. Do we then need a 'meta-proof of existence'?
And is not 'existence' itself some kind of meme, as all expressible ideas are?
If we rephrase the question to be as general as possible:
Is this proof and/or meta-proof of existence and/or meta-existence of meta-memes, or meta-antimemes?
This seems too esoteric to be a basis for further discussion. However, the human language may not be equipped to pose such questions in a concise way.
-
Perhaps a better way of approaching this would be:
What are some differentiating features of meta-memes, or meta-antimemes?
How could we reliably detect their operation on our thoughts, if any?