For anyone who thinks that cryonics is Pascal's mugging, this thought experiment amounts to "if you don't want to accept Pascal's mugging, how about I construct an opposite Pascal's mugging. I gotcha now--if you reject the first Pascal's mugging, you have to accept this one!" Cryonics is a Pascal's mugging with a small chance of a large benefit and a large chance of a smaller loss. This version is a small chance of a large harm and a large chance of a smaller benefit.
Pascal's mugging is a bad deal either way. I won't accept a very small X in this version merely because I think that the chance of success of cryonics is small, even if the calculation works out that way--the proper response to Pascal's mugging is to not calculate.
This is a very complicated and hard (for me) to internalize setup, meaning it doesn't evoke new framings, and doesn't serve any purpose (again, for me) as a thought experiment. That it's stated with multiple levels of if and iff makes it harder, but I don't have any suggestions (except maybe a flowchart or decision matrix) to improve.
It also doesn't help that it mixes dollars and life, asking for a dollar value against the possibility (even if infinitesimal) of death. Nor that it supposes an omniscient god, which if I had sufficient evidence to believe in the first place SERIOUSLY changes my expectations and probabilities.
And my underlying probability IS infinitesimal that I will die in a way that current cryopreservation systems (tech, legal, and social) will actually lead to my future resurrection.
I like the flipping attempt - changing framing around is a good way to triangulate intuitions. I think there are some things that could be strengthened about it:
1. The "alt" question is better than the 1st, but should include "and you won't be reanimated otherwise", or in other words: God kills you iff (you accept the deal and) being signed up for cryonics before you get significant new information will make the difference between you being re-animated or not.
2. Several reason jump to my mind why I wouldn't trade the rest of my years of life now for a 100% guarantee of n+1 years in the future: My family and friends will be sad now that I am not around, I will be sad later that they are not around, I know my quality of life now and I don't know what it would be after reanimation, I am attempting effective altruism now and believe I will be far less effective in the future, etc.
So, maybe "if being signed up for cryonics now make the difference in getting you reanimated and at least as much total happiness in the future, God will replace you with an unconscious replica that will do exactly what you would have done"
A different way to flip the question:
Let's say you wanted to stay dead. Either being reanimated would pull you back down to earth, or you have some powerful enemies in the future or for whatever reason, it's roughly as important to you that you stay dead as it currently is that you don't. If you do nothing, you will be cryopreserved upon death. How much do you pay to avoid that?
Thanks for engaging!
So, maybe "if being signed up for cryonics now make the difference in getting you reanimated and at least as much total happiness in the future, God will replace you with an unconscious replica that will do exactly what you would have done"
I'm not following. Are you saying cryonics revival "is just a copy"? And so the analogy should preserve that?
Let's say you wanted to stay dead. Either being reanimated would pull you back down to earth, or you have some powerful enemies in the future or for whatever reason, it's roughly as important to you that you stay dead as it currently is that you don't. If you do nothing, you will be cryopreserved upon death. How much do you pay to avoid that?
If I understand correctly, you're saying "what if being reanimated was bad instead of good, then how much would you pay to not be reanimated?". The answer is probably "depends how bad" 🤷♂️ I don't know if I'm missing something deeper you meant to ask though.
(x-post: LessDead)
Set-up: In a world that’s otherwise the same, an anthropomorphic God comes to you with a gun and a check, and offers you the following deal, should you accept it. (God can perfectly see the future and is honest.)
Dilemma: God will give you a check of X USD if you accept to be immediately and instantly killed iff the current cryonics protocole is sufficient to preserve identity.
Alternative: God kills you iff the following is true: If you were signed up for cryonics and died this year, you would get reanimated at some point in the future.
Question: What’s the minimum X for which you would accept this deal? What probability of dying are you trading this for?
Comparison:
Say 100,000 USD and 5%. This means this deal would give you:
If you die and get cryopreserved:
If you die and don’t get cyropreserved:
In this sense, taking the deal is similar to not getting cryopreserved (and vice versa).
Disanalogies:
There are significant disanologies of course:
I still think this might be a useful thought experiment to bring this dilemma to a more near mode way of thinking. It also reverses the default option.