Exploring an idea that I'm tentatively calling "adversarial philosophical attacks"—there seem to be a subset of philosophical problems that come up (only?) under conditions where you are dealing with an adversary who knows your internal system of ethics. An example might be Pascal's mugger—the mugging can only work (assuming it works at all) if the mugger is able to give probabilities which break your discounting function. This requires either getting lucky with a large enough stated number, or having some idea of the victim's internal model. I feel like there should be better (or more "pure") examples, but I'm having trouble bringing any to mind right now. If you can think of any, please share in the comments!

The starting ground for this line of thought was that intuitively, it seems to me that for all existing formal moral frameworks, there are specific "manufactured" cases you can give where they break down. Alternatively, since no moral framework is yet fully proven (to the same degree that, say, propositional calculus has been proven consistent), it seems reasonable that an adversary could use known points where the philosophy relies on axioms or unfinished holes/quandaries to "debunk" the framework in a seemingly convincing manner. 

I'm not sure I'm thinking about this clearly enough, and I'm definitely not fully communicating what I'm intending to, but I think there is some important truth in this general area....