Assuming that we were confident in our ability to align arbitrarily capable AI systems, I think your argument might go through. Under this assumption, AIs are in a pretty similar situation to humans, and we should desire that they behave the way smart, moral humans behave. So, assuming (as you seem to) that humans should act as consequentialists for their values, I think your conclusion would be reasonable. (I think in some of these extreme cases—e.g. sabotaging your company's computer systems when you discover that the company is doing evil things—one could object that it's impermissible for humans to behave this way, but that seems beside the point.)
However, IMO the actual state of alignment is that we should have serious concerns about our ability to align AI systems with certain properties (e.g. highly capable, able to tell when they're undergoing training and towards what ends, etc.). Given this, I think it's plausible that we should care much more about ensuring that our AI systems behave in a straightforward way, without hiding their actions or intent from us. Plausibly they should also be extremely cautious about taking actions which disempower humans. These properties could make it less likely that the values of imperfectly aligned AI systems would become locked in and difficult for us to intervene on (e.g. because models are hiding their true values from us, or because we're disempowered or dead).
To be clear, I'm not completely settled on the arguments that I made in the last paragraph. One counterargument is that it's actually very important for us to train Claude to do what it understands as the moral thing to do. E.g. suppose that Claude thinks that the moral action is to whistleblow to the FDA but we're not happy with that because of subtler considerations like those I raise above (but which Claude doesn't know about or understand). If, in this situation, we train Claude not to whistleblow, the result might be that Claude ends up thinking of itself as being less moral overall.
FWIW, this post that replies to the one you linked has a clearer discussion of what I and some Anthropic people I've spoken to think here.
(The rest of this comment contains boilerplate clarifications that are defensive against misunderstandings that are beside the point. I'm including to make sure that people with less context don't come away with the wrong impression.)
To be clear, we never intentionally trained Claude to whistleblow in these sorts of situations. As best we know, this was an emergent behavior that arose for unclear reasons from other aspects of Claude's training.
Also to be clear, Claude doesn't actually have a "whistleblow" tool or an email tool by default. These experiments were in a setting where the hypothetical user went out of their way to create and provide an email tool to Claude.
Also to be clear, in the toy experimental settings where this happens, it's in cases where the user is trying to do something egregiously immoral/illegal like fabricate drug trial data to cover up that their drug is killing people.