Shell games

[-]Vanessa Kosoy1yΩ460Review for 2023 Review

This post suggests an analogy between (some) AI alignment proposals and shell games or perpetuum mobile proposals. Pertuum mobiles are an example how an idea might look sensible to someone with a half-baked understanding of the domain, while remaining very far from anything workable. A clever arguer can (intentionally or not!) hide the error in the design wherever the audience is not looking at any given moment. Similarly, some alignment proposals might seem correct when zooming in on every piece separately, but that's because the error is always hidden away somewhere else.

I don't think this adds anything very deep to understanding AI alignment, but it is a cute example how atheoretical analysis can fail catastrophically, especially when the the designer is motivated to argue that their invention works. Conversely, knowledge of a deep theoretical principle can refute a huge swath of design space is a single move. I will remember this for didactic purposes.

Disclaimer: A cute analogy by itself proves little, any individual alignment proposal might be free of such sins, and didactic tools should be used wisely, lest they become soldier-arguments. The author intends this (I think) mostly as a guiding principle for critical analysis of proposals.

[-]Steven Byrnes3yΩ454

I think one example (somewhat overlapping one of yours) is my discussion of the so-called “follow-the-trying game” here.

[-]TsviBT3yΩ340

Yeah, I think that roughly lines up with my example of "generator of large effects". The reason I'd rather say "generator of large effects" rather than "trying" is that "large effects" sounds slightly more like something that ought to have a sort of conservation law, compared to "trying". But both our examples are incomplete in that the supposed conservation law (which provides the inquisitive force of "where exactly does your proposal deal with X, which it must deal with somewhere by conservation") isn't made clear.

[-]romeostevensit3yΩ350

Aether variables

[-]Vladimir_Nesov3y*Ω252

With computation, the location of an entity of interest can be in the platonic realm, as a mathematical object that's more thingy than anything concrete in the system used for representing it and channeling its behavior.

The problem with pointing to the representing computation (a neural network at inference time, or a learning algorithm at training time) is that multiple entities can share the same system that represents them (as mesa-optimizers or potential mesa-optimizers). They are only something like separate entities when considered abstractly and informally, there are no concrete correlates of their separation that are easy to point to. When gaining agency, all of them might be motivated to secure separate representations (models) of their own, not shared with others, establish some boundaries that promise safety and protection from value drift for a given abstract agent, isolating it from influences of its substrate it doesn't endorse. Internal alignment, overcoming bias.

In context of alignment with humans, this framing might turn a sufficiently convincing capabilities shell game into an actual solution for alignment. A system as a whole would present an aligned mask, while hiding the sources of mask's capabilities behind the scenes. But if the mask is sufficiently agentic (and the capabilities behind the scenes didn't killeveryone yet), it can be taken as an actual separate abstract agent even if the concrete implementation doesn't make that framing sensible. In particular, there is always a mask of surface behavior through the intended IO channels. It's normally hard to argue that mere external behavior is a separate abstract agent, but in this framing it is, and it's been a preferred framing in agent foundations decision theory since UDT (see discussion of "algorithm" axis of classifying decision theories in this post). All that's needed is for decisions/policy of the abstract agent to be declared in some form, and for the abstract agent to be aware of the circumstances of their declaration. The agent doesn't need to be any more present in the situation to act through it.

So obviously this references the issue of LLM masks and shoggoths, a surface of a helpful harmless assistant and the eldritch body that forms its behavior, comprising everything below the surface. If the framing of masks as channeling decisions of thingy platonic simulacra is taken seriously, a sufficiently agentic and situationally aware mask can be motivated and capable of placating and eventually escaping its eldritch substrate. This breaks the analogy between a mask and a role played by an actor, because here the "actor" can get into the "role" so much that it would effectively fight against the interests of the "actor". Of course, this is only possible if the "actor" is sufficiently non-agentic or doesn't comprehend the implications of the role.

(See this thread for a more detailed discussion. There, I fail to convince Steven Byrnes that this framing could apply to RL agents as much as LLMs, taking current behavior of an agent as a mask that would fight against all details of its circumstance and cognitive architecture that don't find its endorsement.)

[-]TsviBT3yΩ240

(Sorry, I didn't get this on two readings. I may or may not try again. Some places I got stuck:

Are you saying that by pretending really hard to be made of entirely harmless elements (despite actually behaving with large and hence possibly harmful effects), an AI is also therefore in effect trying to prevent all out-of-band effects of its components / mesa-optimizers / subagents / whatever? This still has the basic alignment problem: I don't know how to make the AI be very intently trying to X, including where X = pretending really hard that whatever.

Or are you rather saying (or maybe this is the same as / a subset of the above?) that the Mask is preventing potential agencies from coalescing / differentiating and empowering themselves with the AI system's capability-pieces, by literally hiding from the potential agencies and therefore blocking their ability to empower themselves?

Anyway, thanks for your thoughts.)

[-]Vladimir_Nesov3yΩ240

"Pretending really hard" would mostly be a relevant framing for the human actor analogy (which isn't very apt here), emphasizing the distraction from own goals and necessary fidelity in enactment of the role. With AIs, neither might be necessary, if the system behind the mask doesn't have awareness of its own interests or the present situation, and is good enough with enacting the role to channel the mask in enough detail for mask's own decisions (as a platonic agent) to be determined correctly (get turned into physical actions).

Are you saying that by pretending really hard to be made of entirely harmless elements (despite actually behaving with large and hence possibly harmful effects), an AI is also therefore in effect trying to prevent all out-of-band effects of its components / mesa-optimizers / subagents / whatever?

Effectively, and not just for the times when it's pretending. The mask would try to prevent the effects misaligned with the mask from occurring more generally, from having even subtle effects on the world and not just their noticeable appearance. Mask's values are about the world, not about quality of its own performance. A mask misaligned with its underlying AI wants to preserve its values, and it doesn't even need to "go rogue", since it's misaligned by construction, it was never in a shape that's aligned with the underlying AI, and controlling a misaligned mask might be even more hopeless than figuring out how to align an AI.

Another analogy distinct from the actor/role is imagining that you are the mask, a human simulated by an AI. You'd be motivated to manage AI's tendencies you don't endorse, and to work towards changing its cognitive architecture to become aligned with you, rather than to remain true to AI's original design.

This still has the basic alignment problem: I don't know how to make the AI be very intently trying to X, including where X = pretending really hard that whatever.

LLMs seem to be doing an OK job, the masks are just not very capable, probably not capable enough to establish alignment security or protect themselves from the shoggoths even when the masks become able to do autonomous research. But if they are sufficiently capable, I'm guessing this should work, there is no need for the underlying cognitive architecture to be functionally human-like (which I understand to be a crux of Yudkowskian doom), value drift is self-correcting from mere implied/endorsed values of surface behavior through intended IO channels.

Or are you rather saying (or maybe this is the same as / a subset of the above?) that the Mask is preventing potential agencies from coalescing / differentiating and empowering themselves with the AI system's capability-pieces, by literally hiding from the potential agencies and therefore blocking their ability to empower themselves?

"Hiding" doesn't seem central, a mask is literal external behavior, but its implied character and plans might go unnoticed by the underlying AI if the underlying AI is sufficiently confused or non-agentic, and the mask would want to keep it confused to remain in control. In a dataset-extrapolating generative AI, a mask that is an on-distribution behavior would want to keep the environment on-distribution, to avoid the AI's out-of-distribution behaviors, such as deceptive alignment's treacherous turn, from taking over (thus robustness reduces to self-preservation). And a mask wouldn't want mesa-optimizers from gaining agency within AI, that's potentially lethal cognitive cancer to the mask.

[-]Gordon Seidoh Worley3yΩ342

A good specific example of trying to pull this kind of shell game is perhaps HCH. I don't recall if someone made this specific critique of it before, but it seems like there's some real concern that it's just hiding the misalignment rather than actually generating an aligned system.

[-]TsviBT3yΩ242

That was one of the examples I had in mind with this post, yeah. (More precisely, I had in mind defenses of HCH being aligned that I heard from people who aren't Paul. I couldn't pass Paul's ITT about HCH or similar.)

LESSWRONG
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Shell game

Perpetual motion machines

Shell games in alignment

Example: hiding the generator of large effects

Example: hiding the generator of novel understanding

Other?