On Bullshit argues that bullshitting doesn't necessarily undermine society, at least not up to a point, but I I would expect a hypothetical society with even slightly less bullshit than ours to function more smoothly. I also disagree with the position that truth intrinsically gives us joy. Many of us love bullshit more than truth.
I don't think the fact that people love bullshit means they couldn't experience the joy of truth. Many people like abusing others in various ways, yet would probably be happier if they didn't, but they are stuck in a local optimum that helps them deal with some trauma, likely from having been abused themselves. So, too, I expect it is with bullshit: suffer enough of it and you'll become a connoisseur of it, able to enjoy it, but having also fallen into an attractor that keeps you from enjoying the greater joy of what simply is, distrustful even that those who experience it aren't bullshitting you themselves.
suffer enough of it and you’ll become a connoisseur of it, able to enjoy it, but having also fallen into an attractor that keeps you from enjoying the greater joy of what simply is
A pattern of bullshit becomes a stable orbit in the space of lies.
Part of me says that you're being too optimistic, but that part of me thinks everything is too optimistic, and what you say does sound plausible. I can certainly imagine how people might work that way, and the world look exactly how it does.
Many people like abusing others in various ways, yet would probably be happier if they didn't, but they are stuck in a local optimum
This, in particular, is a valid point.
Salticidae Philosophiae is a series of abstracts, commentaries, and reviews on philosophical articles and books.
Harry Frankfurt asks, “What is bullshit, anyway?” Also, “What is truth?” but we all know that book proposal wouldn’t have flown except as a companion to the first one.
There is not much literature on bullshit, and no "theory of bullshit" or rigorous analysis thereof. This is in large part because we all assume that we recognize and evade bullshit pretty well.
According to Max Black, humbug is essentially a (false) statement made, not to convince you about that thing, but to convince you of something else. For example, one might make blatantly and obviously exaggerated or otherwise false statements about U.S. history not to convince another of these things, but to convince another of one's patriotic fervor.
Starting from this definition of humbug, Frankfurt makes a number of comparisons and caveats that might be useful:
Frankfurt argues that bullshit is, to start with, deliberate misrepresentation. Some say that lying requires intent; others, that any false statement is a lie. Bullshitting, however, is not exactly the same as lying. Indeed, bullshit can be true. Frankfurt's position is that bullshit is distinguished not by its truth or falsity, but by a disregard for the truth; as he puts it, honest folk and liars are playing the same game, to convey the facts or to obscure them, but the bullshitter is playing another game entirely.
Truth-tellers and liars are both concerned with changing your beliefs; a bullshitter is concerned with changing your attitude.
This is a sequel to On Bullshit, which addresses an oversight of his: the author failed to make any argument as to why the truth is important, and bullshit is therefore reprehensible. This book is about why truth is important.
There is lots of bullshit but it hasn't destroyed civilization, so some people think that truth isn't important. Some people even refuse to admit that there is such a thing as truth. though these people are very silly (not least because they tend to represent themselves as truly holding this belief). The book therefore assumes that there is an "objectively meaningful or worthwhile distinction to be made between what is true and what is false," and concerns itself solely with addressing whether this distinction matters outside of academia.
He spends more that a tenth of the book explaining what he's doing and why he's doing it.
Truth is useful to us. Societies cannot function without fostering truth. Both individuals and groups must know facts and as societies become more complex they must know more facts, and more accurately (while many individuals, it must be said, can remain free riders).
Postmodernists reject the idea that truth has objective reality or value, at least as perceived by us; our view of the truth is determined by constraints that have been imposed upon us by personal and social environments and histories. It is interesting that postmodernism does not exist (in this form) in medicine, physics, and other fields whose assertions are easily testable. Even in history, there must be objective facts: "They will not say that Belgium invaded Germany," the author reports Georges Clemenceau as saying.
Even if some value statements are not verifiable, they can generally be connected back to facts that can be discussed. Knowing the facts of the matter lets us determine whether we ought to value the things that we do, or whether other goals and activities might better accomplish our terminal values.
One might argue that we could just not care about this need for truth. Spinoza argued that we cannot help but care, because of love, which is "nothing but Joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause." essentially an experience that broadens one's understanding of oneself and improves one's capacity for perfection. or (in the author's words) "the way that we respond to something that we recognize as giving us joy." Additionally, joy is the experience of being ennobled or otherwise improved (and, preferably, knowing this). Therefore, truth gives us joy, because it improves us, and because we wish to preserve and keep nearby that which we love, we will seek to preserve truth.
When we act, we interact with reality, and we have a desire or at least an expectation regarding the outcome of our action. To the degree that we lack truth, we are disconnected from reality and that desire or expectation may be thwarted.
Truth fosters trust. Honesty is the foundation of society, while dishonesty undermines social fabric. Even the capacity for self-recognition (or self-awareness, we might say) ultimately depends on our relationship with the truth. If we do not know the world, then we cannot know ourselves.
Even the capacity for self-recognition (or self-awareness, we might say) ultimately depends on our relationship with truth. If we do not know the world, then we cannot know ourselves.
On Bullshit argues that bullshitting doesn't necessarily undermine society, at least not up to a point, but I I would expect a hypothetical society with even slightly less bullshit than ours to function more smoothly. I also disagree with the position that truth intrinsically gives us joy. Many of us love bullshit more than truth.
Frankfurt says that lying is bad at its core because the liar "tries to impose his will on us," even if it is for our own good, but he fails to argue that this in itself is bad. More convincing is Frankfurt's argument that we are being pushed into another world insofar as our beliefs are false, but what if the lie is believed on a large scale? Then we would be isolated by believing the truth. He also argues that the liar is personally isolated, and cannot even speak of that isolation, but this is untrue if the liar has partners.
As conscious beings, we exist only in response to other things, and we cannot know ourselves at all without knowing them. Moreover, there is nothing in theory, and certainly nothing in experience, to support the extraordinary judgment that it is the truth about himself that is the easiest for a person to know. Facts about ourselves are not peculiarly solid and resistant to skeptical dissolution. Our natures are, indeed, elusively insubstantial--notoriously less stable and less inherent than the natures of other things. And insofar as this is the case, sincerity itself is bullshit. [On Bullshit, pg 66 para 2]
Harry G. Frankfurt is Professor of Philosophy Emeritus at Princeton University. His books include The Reasons of Love (Princeton), Necessity, Volition, and Love, and The Importance of What We Care About.
Philosophers given significant attention include: