One of the key ways a board exerts control through it's ability to be able to fire a CEO. The ability to threaten to fire the CEO is also important. The new board likely can do neither.
You seem to argue that there's something positive that the board can do.
Yes, you are right.
The important aspect is that the ribosome can add one amino acid at a time to the string and once it's finished the string can fold into the 3D shape.
Eliezer Yudkowsky notes (reproduced in full below) that in theory he could debate Beff Jezos, but that they do not actually seem to disagree about what actions cause which outcomes, so it is not clear what they would debate exactly?
Having a debate that comes to the result that they agree on the outcomes might be quite valuable.
This depends a bit on what you mean with "held-together" the covalent bonds are what holds the string together but the 3D structure needs the hydrogen bonds. If you exert force on the protein the hydrogen bonds will break first and the 3D structure breaks.
The magic of protein folding is that you have a machine that can create a 2D string of amino acids gives you a 3D protein with a stable shape and reliably the same shape. For that to happen you likely inherently require that the 2D string is hold together is a way that's strong while it wiggles around and finds the desired 3D shape. If there would be a lot of ways to create stronger bonds it would likely misfold a lot easier. And when biology does need stronger bonds Cysteine with it's sulfide bond is available. If
Proteins are a good solution given the design constraints under which they operate, so putting them in the same category of the human retina is wrong, but I don't think your post does a good explanation as to why.
* I studied bioinformatics but it has been a while since I have been in my molecular biology lectures.
What kind of actions do you think the board could take that are not in the interest of Altman? Given what happened it seems pretty hard for a board to vote to get rid of him.
Method. Better methods make for better science, from Baconian empiricism to Koch’s postulates to the RCT (and really, all of statistics).
A large part of statistics seems to be practically used for purposes like P-hacking where the researcher uses some fancy statistical techniques to find results when normal statistics don't give them a result.
How evolvable are our scientific institutions? Not very. Most scientific organizations today are departments of university or government.
It seems to me like there are a bunch of entities like Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National Laboratories that are funded by the government but are managed or run by LLCs.
It might be worth looking more into those institutions.
Yes, it happened before for me as well. I think it would be good to have profile pictures to make it easier to recognize users.
It's good to use prediction markets in practice but most people who read the post likely don't get that much value from reading the post.
Larry McEnerney is good at explaining that good writing isn't writing that's cool or interesting but simply writing that provides value to the reader.
As far as the actual execution goes, it might have been better to create fewer markets and focus on fewer experiments, so that each one gets one attention.
I think efforts to reduce insider risk are also really valuable, but these look less like the kind of technical work I've been focusing on and more like better policies at labs and not engaging in particular kinds of risky research.
Out of your proposal, it seems to me that the LLM question is a policy question. Faster evaluation of vaccines also is a lot about policy.
In general, that sentiment sounds a bit like "It's easy to search the keys under the lampost, so that's what I will do".
Esvelt doesn't have in his threat model "people who work on vaccines release the pathogen for their own gain" the way Bruce Edwards Ivins did according to the FBI.
Esvelt does say dangerous things like "Only after intense discussions at the famous Asilomar conference of 1975 did they correctly conclude that recombinant DNA within carefully chosen laboratory-adapted constructs posed no risk of spreading on its own."
While you might argue that the amount of risk is acceptable, pretending that it's zero makes Kevin Esvelt not have that much credibility when it comes to the actual act of reducing risk. He lists a bunch of interventions that EA funders can spend their money so that they can feel like they are taking action effective action about biorisk while not addressing the center of the risk.