- Hard DBIC: you have no access to any classification data in
- Relaxed DBIC: you have access to classification inputs from , but not to any labels.
SHIFT as a technique for (hard) DBIC
You use pile data points to build the SAE and its interpretations, right? And I guess the pile does contain a bunch of examples where the biased and unbiased classifiers would not output identical outputs - if that's correct, I expect SAE interpretation works mostly because of these inputs (since SAE nodes are labeled using correlational data only). Is that right? If so, it seems to me that because of the SAE and SAE interpretation steps, SHIFT is a technique that is closer in spirit to relaxed DBIC (or something in between if you use a third dataset that does not literally use but something that teaches you something more than just - in the context of the paper, it seems that the broader dataset is very close to covering ).
Oops, that's what I meant, I'll make it more clear.
I think this is what you are looking for
By Knightian uncertainty, I mean "the lack of any quantifiable knowledge about some possible occurrence" i.e. you can't put a probability on it (Wikipedia).
The TL;DR is that Knightian uncertainty is not a useful concept to make decisions, while the use subjective probabilities is: if you are calibrated (which you can be trained to become), then you will be better off taking different decisions on p=1% "Knightian uncertain events" and p=10% "Knightian uncertain events".
For a more in-depth defense of this position in the context of long-term predictions, where it's harder to know if calibration training obviously works, see the latest scott alexander post.
For the product of random variables, there are close form solutions for some common distributions, but I guess Monte-Carlo simulations are all you need in practice (+ with Monte-Carlo can always have the whole distribution, not just the expected value).
I listened to The Failure of Risk Management by Douglas Hubbard, a book that vigorously criticizes qualitative risk management approaches (like the use of risk matrices), and praises a rationalist-friendly quantitative approach. Here are 4 takeaways from that book:
A big part of the book is an introduction to rationalist-type risk estimation (estimating various probabilities and impact, aggregating them with Monte-Carlo, rejecting Knightian uncertainty, doing calibration training and predictions markets, starting from a reference class and updating with Bayes). He also introduces some rationalist ideas in parallel while arguing for his thesis (e.g. isolated demands for rigor). It's the best legible and "serious" introduction to classic rationalist ideas I know of.
The book also contains advice if you are trying to push for quantitative risk estimates in your team / company, and a very pleasant and accurate dunk on Nassim Taleb (and in particular his claims about models being bad, without a good justification for why reasoning without models is better).
Overall, I think the case against qualitative methods and for quantitative ones is somewhat strong, but it's far from being a slam dunk because there is no evidence of some methods being worse than others in terms of actual business outputs. The author also fails to acknowledge and provide conclusive evidence against the possibility that people may have good qualitative intuitions about risk even if they fail to translate these intuitions into numbers that make any sense (your intuition sometimes does the right estimation and math even when you suck at doing the estimation and math explicitly).
I don't think I understand what is meant by "a formal world model".
For example, in the narrow context of "I want to have a screen on which I can see what python program is currently running on my machine", I guess the formal world model should be able to detect if the model submits an action that exploits a zero-day that tampers with my ability to see what programs are running. Does that mean that the formal world model has to know all possible zero-days? Does that mean that the software and the hardware have to be formally verified? Are formally verified computers roughly as cheap as regular computers? If not, that would be a clear counter-argument to "Davidad agrees that this project would be one of humanity's most significant science projects, but he believes it would still be less costly than the Large Hadron Collider."
Or is the claim that it's feasible to build a conservative world model that tells you "maybe a zero-day" very quickly once you start doing things not explicitly within a dumb world model?
I feel like this formally-verifiable computers claim is either a good counterexample to the main claims, or an example that would help me understand what the heck these people are talking about.
I remembered mostly this story:
[...] The NSA invited James Gosler to spend some time at their headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland in 1987, to teach their analysts [...] about software vulnerabilities. None of the NSA team was able to detect Gosler’s malware, even though it was inserted into an application featuring only 3,000 lines of code. [...]
[Taken from this summary of this passage of the book. The book was light on technical detail, I don't remember having listened to more details than that.]
I didn't realize this was so early in the story of the NSA, maybe this anecdote teaches us nothing about the current state of the attack/defense balance.
I recently listened to The Righteous Mind. It was surprising to me that many people seem to intrinsically care about many things that look very much like good instrumental norms to me (in particular loyalty, respect for authority, and purity).
The author does not make claims about what the reflective equilibrium will be, nor does he explain how the liberals stopped considering loyalty, respect, and purity as intrinsically good (beyond "some famous thinkers are autistic and didn't realize the richness of the moral life of other people"), but his work made me doubt that most people will have well-being-focused CEV.
The book was also an interesting jumping point for reflection about group selection. The author doesn't make the sorts of arguments that would show that group selection happens in practice (and many of his arguments seem to show a lack of understanding of what opponents of group selection think - bees and cells cooperating is not evidence for group selection at all), but after thinking about it more, I now have more sympathy for group-selection having some role in shaping human societies, given that (1) many human groups died, and very few spread (so one lucky or unlucky gene in one member may doom/save the group) (2) some human cultures may have been relatively egalitarian enough when it came to reproductive opportunities that the individual selection pressure was not that big relative to group selection pressure and (3) cultural memes seem like the kind of entity that sometimes survive at the level of the group.
Overall, it was often a frustrating experience reading the author describe a descriptive theory of morality and try to describe what kind of morality makes a society more fit in a tone that often felt close to being normative / fails to understand that many philosophers I respect are not trying to find a descriptive or fitness-maximizing theory of morality (e.g. there is no way that utilitarians think their theory is a good description of the kind of shallow moral intuitions the author studies, since they all know that they are biting bullets most people aren't biting, such as the bullet of defending homosexuality in the 19th century).