JesseClifton

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Cooperation, Conflict, and Transformative Artificial Intelligence: A Research Agenda

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The "Commitment Races" problem

Yeah I agree the details aren’t clear. Hopefully your conditional commitment can be made flexible enough that it leaves you open to being convinced by agents who have good reasons for refusing to do this world-model agreement thing. It’s certainly not clear to me how one could do this. If you had some trusted “deliberation module”, which engages in open-ended generation and scrutiny of arguments, then maybe you could make a commitment of the form “use this protocol, unless my counterpart provides reasons which cause my deliberation module to be convinced otherwise”. Idk.

Your meta-level concern seems warranted. One would at least want to try to formalize the kinds of commitments we’re discussing and ask if they provide any guarantees, modulo equilibrium selection.

The "Commitment Races" problem

It seems like we can kind of separate the problem of equilibrium selection from the problem of “thinking more”, if “thinking more” just means refining one’s world models and credences over them. One can make conditional commitments of the form: “When I encounter future bargaining partners, we will (based on our models at that time) agree on a world-model according to some protocol and apply some solution concept (e.g. Nash or Kalai-Smorodinsky) to it in order to arrive at an agreement.”

The set of solution concepts you commit to regarding as acceptable still poses an equilibrium selection problem. But, on the face of it at least, the “thinking more” part is handled by conditional commitments to act on the basis of future beliefs.

I guess there’s the problem of what protocols for specifying future world-models you commit to regarding as acceptable. Maybe there are additional protocols that haven’t occurred to you, but which other agents may have committed to and which you would regard as acceptable when presented to you. Hopefully it is possible to specify sufficiently flexible methods for determining whether protocols proposed by your future counterparts are acceptable that this is not a problem.

Eight claims about multi-agent AGI safety

Nice post! I’m excited to see more attention being paid to multi-agent stuff recently.

A few miscellaneous points:

  • I get the impression that the added complexity of multi- relative to single-agent systems has not been adequately factored into folks’ thinking about timelines / the difficulty of making AGI that is competent in a multipolar world. But I’m not confident in that.

  • I think it’s possible that conflict / bargaining failure is a considerable source of existential risk, in addition to suffering risk. I don’t really have a view on how it compares to other sources, but I’d guess that it is somewhat underestimated, because of my impression that folks generally underestimate the difficulty of getting agents to get along (even if they are otherwise highly competent).

Homogeneity vs. heterogeneity in AI takeoff scenarios

Neat post, I think this is an important distinction. It seems right that more homogeneity means less risk of bargaining failure, though I’m not sure yet how much.

Cooperation and coordination between different AIs is likely to be very easy as they are likely to be very structurally similar to each other if not share basically all of the same weights

In what ways does having similar architectures or weights help with cooperation between agents with different goals? A few things that come to mind:

  • Having similar architectures might make it easier for agents to verify things about one another, which may reduce problems of private information and inability to credibly commit to negotiated agreements. But of course increased credibility is a double-edged sword as far as catastrophic bargaining failure is concerned, as it may make agents more likely to commit to carrying out coercive threats.
  • Agents with more similar architectures / weights will tend to have more similar priors / ways of modeling their counterparts and as well as notions of fairness in bargaining, which reduces risk of bargaining failure . But as systems are modified or used to produce successor systems, they may be independently tuned to do things like represent their principal in bargaining situations. This tuning may introduce important divergenes in whatever default priors or notions of fairness were present in the initial mostly-identical systems. I don’t have much intuition for how large these divergences would be relative to those in a regime that started out more heterogeneous.
  • If a technique for reducing bargaining failure only works if all of the bargainers use it (e.g., surrogate goals), then homogeneity could make it much more likely that all bargainers used the technique. On the other hand, it may be that such techniques would not be introduced until after the initial mostly-identical systems were modified / successor systems produced, in which case there might still need to be coordination on common adoption of the technique.

Also, the correlated success / failure point seems to apply to bargaining as well as alignment. For instance, multiple mesa-optimizers may be more likely under homogeneity, and if these have different mesa-objectives (perhaps due to being tuned by principals with different goals) then catastrophic bargaining failure may be more likely.

In a multipolar scenario, how do people expect systems to be trained to interact with systems developed by other labs?

Makes sense. Though you could have deliberate coordinated training even after deployment. For instance, I'm particularly interested in the question of "how will agents learn to interact in high stakes circumstances which they will rarely encounter?" One could imagine the overseers of AI systems coordinating to fine-tune their systems in simulations of such encounters even after deployment. Not sure how plausible that is though.

Against strong bayesianism

I don't think bayesianism gives you particular insight into that for the same reasons I don't think it gives you particular insight into human cognition

In the areas I focus on, at least, I wouldn’t know where to start if I couldn’t model agents using Bayesian tools. Game-theoretic concepts like social dilemma, equilibrium selection, costly signaling, and so on seem indispensable, and you can’t state these crisply without a formal model of preferences and beliefs. You might disagree that these are useful concepts, but at this point I feel like the argument has to take place at the level of individual applications of Bayesian modeling, rather than a wholesale judgement about Bayesianism.

misleading concepts like "boundedly rational" (compare your claim with the claim that a model in which all animals are infinitely large helps us identify properties that are common to "boundedly sized" animals)

I’m not saying that the idealized model helps us identify properties common to more realistic agents just because it's idealized. I agree that many idealized models may be useless for their intended purpose. I’m saying that, as it happens, whenever I think of various agentlike systems it strikes me as useful to model those systems in a Bayesian way when reasoning about some of their aspects --- even though the details of their architectures may differ a lot.

I didn’t quite understand why you said “boundedly rational” is a misleading concept, I’d be interested to see you elaborate.

if we have no good reason to think that explicit utility functions are something that is feasible in practical AGI

I’m not saying that we should try to design agents who are literally doing expected utility calculations over some giant space of models all the time. My suggestion was that it might be good --- for the purpose of attempting to guarantee safe behavior --- to design agents which in limited circumstances make decisions by explicitly distilling their preferences and beliefs into utilities and probabilities. It's not obvious to me that this is intractable. Anyway, I don't think this point is central to the disagreement.

Against strong bayesianism

I agree with the rejection of strong Bayesianism. I don’t think it follows from what you’ve written, though, that “bayesianism is not very useful as a conceptual framework for thinking either about AGI or human reasoning”.

I'm probably just echoing things that have been said many times before, but:

You seem to set up a dichotomy between two uses of Bayesianism: modeling agents as doing something like "approximate Solomonoff induction", and Bayesianism as just another tool in our statistical toolkit. But there is a third use of Bayesianism, the way that sophisticated economists and political scientists use it: as a useful fiction for modeling agents who try to make good decisions in light of their beliefs and preferences. I’d guess that this is useful for AI, too. These will be really complicated systems and we don’t know much about their details yet, but it will plausibly be reasonable to model them as “trying to make good decisions in light of their beliefs and preferences”. In turn, the Bayesian framework plausibly allows us to see failure modes that are common to many boundedly rational agents.

Perhaps a fourth use is that we might actively want to try to make our systems more like Bayesian reasoners, at least in some cases. For instance, I mostly think about failure modes in multi-agent systems. I want AIs to compromise with each other instead of fighting. I’d feel much more optimistic about this if the AIs could say “these are our preferences encoded as utility functions, these are our beliefs encoded as priors, so here is the optimal bargain for us given some formal notion of fairness” --- rather than hoping that compromise is a robust emergent property of their training.

Equilibrium and prior selection problems in multipolar deployment

The new summary looks good =) Although I second Michael Dennis' comment below, that the infinite regress of priors is avoided in standard game theory by specifying a common prior. Indeed the specification of this prior leads to a prior selection problem.

The formality of "priors / equilibria" doesn't have any benefit in this case (there aren't any theorems to be proven)

I’m not sure if you mean “there aren’t any theorems to be proven” or “any theorem that’s proven in this framework would be useless”. The former is false, e.g. there are things to prove about the construction of learning equilibria in various settings. I’m sympathetic with the latter criticism, though my own intuition is that working with the formalism will help uncover practically useful methods for promoting cooperation, and point to problems that might not be obvious otherwise. I'm trying to make progress in this direction in this paper, though I wouldn't yet call this practical.

The one benefit I see is that it signals that "no, even if we formalize it, the problem doesn't go away", to those people who think that once formalized sufficiently all problems go away via the magic of Bayesian reasoning

Yes, this is a major benefit I have in mind!

The strategy of agreeing on a joint welfare function is already a heuristic and isn't an optimal strategy; it feels very weird to suppose that initially a heuristic is used and then we suddenly switch to pure optimality

I’m not sure what you mean by “heuristic” or “optimality” here. I don’t know of any good notion of optimality which is independent of the other players, which is why there is an equilibrium selection problem. The welfare function selects among the many equilibria (i.e. it selects one which optimizes the welfare). I wouldn't call this a heuristic. There has to be some way to select among equilibria, and the welfare function is chosen such that the resulting equilibrium is acceptable by each of the principals' lights.

Equilibrium and prior selection problems in multipolar deployment

both players want to optimize the welfare function (making it a collaborative game)

The game is collaborative in the sense that a welfare function is optimized in equilibrium, but the principals will in general have different terminal goals (reward functions) and the equilibrium will be enforced with punishments (cf. tit-for-tat).

the issue is primarily that in a collaborative game, the optimal thing for you to do depends strongly on who your partner is, but you may not have a good understanding of who your partner is, and if you're wrong you can do arbitrarily poorly

Agreed, but there's the additional point that in the case of principals designing AI agents, the principals can (in theory) coordinate to ensure that the agents "know who their partner is". That is, they can coordinate on critical game-theoretic parameters of their respective agents.

How special are human brains among animal brains?

Chimpanzees, crows, and dolphins are capable of impressive feats of higher intelligence, and I don’t think there’s any particular reason to think that Neanderthals are capable of doing anything qualitatively more impressive

This seems like a pretty cursory treatment of what seems like quite a complicated and contentious subject. A few possible counterexamples jump to mind. These are just things I remember coming across when browsing cognitive science sources over the years.

My nonexpert sense is that it is at least controversial both how each of this is connected with language, and the extent to which nonhumans are capable of them.

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