StrivingForLegibility

In Scott Garrabrant's excellent Geometric Rationality sequence, he points out an equivalence between modelling an agent as * Maximizing the expected logarithm of some quantity V, E[ln(V)] * Maximizing the geometric expectation of V, G[V] And as we'll show in this post, not only can we prove a geometric version...

The history of coordination spans billions of years, and we've been finding new ways to help each other out for as long as there have been more than one of us. From multicellularity to the evolution of brains, from the development of social and moral instincts to their codification in...

This is a supplemental post to Geometric Utilitarianism (And Why It Matters), in which I show that when all agents have positive weight ψi, the optimal geometric weighted average moves continuously across the Pareto frontier as we change those weights. I also show that we can extend this continuity result...

This is a supplemental post to Geometric Utilitarianism (And Why It Matters), in which I show that, if we use the weights we derived in the previous post, a gradient ascender will reach the Harsanyi hyperplane H. This is a subproblem of the proof laid out in the first post...

This is a supplemental post to Geometric Utilitarianism (And Why It Matters), in which I show how I derived the weights ψ which make any Pareto optimal point p optimal according to the geometric weighted average. This is a subproblem of the proof laid out in the first post of...

This is a supplemental post to Geometric Utilitarianism (And Why It Matters), which sets out to prove what I think are the main interesting results about Geometric Utilitarianism: * Maximizing a geometric weighted average G(_,ψ) can always lead to Pareto optimality. * Given any Pareto optimal joint utility p, we...

I'm generally a fan of "maximize economic surplus and then split the benefits fairly". And I think this approach makes the most sense in contexts where agents are bargaining over a joint action space D×P, where D is some object-level decision being made and P are side-payments that agents can...