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Mechanism Design

Edited by Yoav Ravid, Bird Concept, et al. last updated 14th Oct 2021

Mechanism Design is the theory of how to design incentives for strategic agents, such that the agents acting according to their selfish interests will result in a desired outcome. It can be applied to things like institution design, voting systems, school admissions, regulation of monopolists, market design, and auction design. Think of it as the engineering side of game theory, thinking backward from a desired goal, and designing structures that lead strategic agents to behave in a way that achieves that goal.

Important Concepts

  • Incentive Compatibility: Wikipedia, LessWrong
  • Revelation Principle: Wikipedia, LessWrong

Related Pages: Game Theory, Incentives, Principal-Agent Problems, Cryptocurrencies and blockchain, Public discourse

Related Sequences: Mechanism Design

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Posts tagged Mechanism Design
95[Sequence announcement] Introduction to Mechanism Design
badger
11y
12
40Incentive compatibility and the Revelation Principle
badger
11y
7
71Mechanism Design: Constructing Algorithms for Strategic Agents
badger
11y
14
176Swiss Political System: More than You ever Wanted to Know (I.)
Martin Sustrik
5y
39
42Strategyproof Mechanisms: Possibilities
badger
11y
4
242A voting theory primer for rationalists
Jameson Quinn
7y
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186EigenKarma: trust at scale
Henrik Karlsson
3y
52
403Will Jesus Christ return in an election year?
Eric Neyman
4mo
59
323Anti-social Punishment
Martin Sustrik
7y
66
153Moral public goods
paulfchristiano
6y
74
79When Hindsight Isn't 20/20: Incentive Design With Imperfect Credit Allocation
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johnswentworth
5y
Ω
24
73 Swiss Political System: More than You ever Wanted to Know (III.)
Martin Sustrik
5y
8
32[not ongoing] Thoughts on Proportional voting methods
Jameson Quinn
5y
53
215Pay Risk Evaluators in Cash, Not Equity
Adam Scholl
1y
19
212The Costly Coordination Mechanism of Common Knowledge
Ben Pace
7y
32
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