FWIW if you look at Rob Bensinger's survey of people who work on long-term AI risk, the average P(AI doom) is closer to Ord than MIRI. So I'd say that Ord isn't that different from most people he talks to.
You might enjoy these posts where people argue for particular values of P(AI doom), all of which are much lower than Eliezer's:
"There is significant uncertainty remaining in these estimates and they should be treated as representing the right order of magnitude—each could easily be a factor of 3 higher or lower."
"In the case of artificial intelligence, everyone agrees the evidence and arguments are far from watertight, but the question is where does this leave us? Very roughly, my approach is to start with the overall view of the expert community that there is something like a one in two chance that AI agents capable of outperforming humans in almost every task will be developed in the coming century."
"Some of my colleagues give higher chances than me, and some lower. But for many purposes our numbers are similar. Suppose you were more skeptical of the risk and thought it to be one in 100. From an informational perspective, that is actually not so far apart: it doesn’t take all that much evidence to shift someone from one to the other. And it might not be that far apart in terms of practical action either—an existential risk of either probability would be a key global priority."
- Toby Ord, The Precipice
As Buck points out, Toby's estimate of P(AI doom) is closer to the 'mainstream' than MIRI's, and close enough that "so low" doesn't seem like a good description.
I can't really speak on behalf of others at FHI, of course, by I don't think there is some 'FHI consensus' that is markedly higher or lower than Toby's estimate.
Also, I just want to point out that Toby's 1/10 figure is not for human extinction, it is for existential catastrophe caused by AI, which includes scenarios which don't involve extinction (forms of 'lock-in'). Therefore his estimate for extinction caused by AI is lower than 1/10.
Suppose astronomers detect an asteroid, and suggest a 10% chance of it hitting the Earth on a near-pass in 2082. Would you regard this assessment of risk as optimistic, or pessimistic? How many resources would you dedicate to solving the problem?
My understanding is that 10% isn't actually that far removed from what many people who are deeply concerned about AI think (or, for that matter, people who aren't that concerned about AI think - it's quite remarkable how differently people can see that 10%); they just happen to think that a 10% chance of total extinction is a pretty bleak thing, and ought to get our full attention. Indeed, I'd bet there's somebody around here who is deeply concerned about AI risk who assesses the risk as 1%. Remember that that risk of total human annihilation is greater than the risk of COVID to any one individual, and our society suffered massive upheaval to limit the risks there.
Which is to say - I don't think FHI or Toby Ord are significantly more optimistic than people who are deeply concerned about AI risk.
I didn't speak about absolute optimism but said: "more optimistic then".
How many resources would you dedicate to solving the problem?
That's an argument you can make for spending much more money on alignment research.
It's however not an argument against stronger measures such as doing the kind of government regulation that would make it impossible to develop AGI.
In The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity Toby Ord gives 1/10 as the likelihood for humanity to die this century due to AI risk. This seems to be a very different view than that of MIRI. Is FHI in general much more optimistic or is it just Toby Ord that's this optimistic in regards to AI risk?